Guest Post: On the Allahabad HC Direction for Mandatory Prosecution of Complainants in Closure Report Cases

(This is a guest post by Vaneet Kumar)

The criminal process in cognizable offences is ordinarily kick-started by filing a First Information Report (“FIR”) under Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (“BNSS”). This is followed by the police investigation, which culminates in a Police Report where police recommends either launching a prosecution or closing the case. The report in the former scenario is commonly referred to as a Chargesheet or Challan across many parts of India; and in the latter scenario, it is called a Closure Report. 

On 14 January 2026, the Allahabad High Court in Umme Farva v. State of Uttar Pradesh ordered that, as per law, where the police file a closure report they must also launch a prosecution against the complainant by way of a written complaint under sections 212 and 217 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita of 2023 (“BNS”). Subsequently, this decision was appealed before the Supreme Court, and the Court in Mahmood Ali Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh has put this direction on hold, for now. A good time as any to discuss the issue.

Examining the Sources of the HC Direction

Sources/Reasoning Behind the Direction

Umme Farva frames this direction to file a mandatory complaint as a “statutory obligation” of the investigation officer, the failure to dispose of which will not only attract an offence under Section 199(b) of BNS (para 15) but also departmental proceedings and contempt case (para 21). The High Court framed this stringent and deterring obligation on the collective reading of the provisions of substantive and procedural criminal laws dealing with the offences of false complaint. It began by emphasising that Section 215(1) of the BNSS forbids a court from proceeding in matters under Sections 212 and 217 of the BNS without a “complaint in writing of the public servant concerned” or its superior (para 16). Therefore, it reasoned that retaining the filing of a complaint as discretionary would render the purpose of Sections 212 and 217 of the BNS redundant and defeat the legislative intent (para 47). After passing this general direction for the IO, proceeds to integrate it into the judicial system. It reiterates the established position of law: a magistrate, upon receiving the Closure Report, can still take cognisance, order further investigation under section 193(9) of BNSS, or consider a protest petition by the informant (para 31). As a result, the mandatory police complaint under sections 212 and 217 of the BNS “shall be kept in abeyance till the acceptance of the final/closure report or rejection of the protest petition/application” (para 34). Thus, only after the magistrate believes that no offence can be made out against the accused, the magistrate should go ahead under sections 212 and 217 of the BNS (para 31).

Analysis and Application of Existing Jurisprudence

There is not a lot of law interpreting the BNS, so we would need to look at the position as it availed for these offences under the repealed Indian Penal Code of 1860 (“IPC”). The predecessors of Sections 212 and 217 of the BNS were Sections 177 and 182 IPC, respectively. Analysing the precedents on these provisions, it would seem that the directions in Umme Farva are directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s observations on the matter. The Supreme Court in Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab noted that these offences do not require that action must be taken. It recognised that there is a discretion, rather than an obligation, vested with the police to initiate action on a false complaint. Similarly, Basir-Ul-Huq v. State of West Bengal also contemplates and permits the scenario where the police does not take any action under these sections. 

Besides being apparently contrary to judicial precedent, I would also argue that the discretion-based approach which courts had hitherto supported also makes a better argument in principle. The High Court in Umme Farva reasoned that Section 199(b) BNSS can't be seen as giving any discretion, as it would in turn nullify the offence itself. But the very idea behind requiring a formal complaint from a specified officer was precisely to prevent every case of an acquittal or closure from becoming a prosecution against the complainant. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mata Bhikh, the Supreme Court held that the object of the requirement for a complaint “is to protect persons from being vexatiously prosecuted upon inadequate materials or insufficient grounds”. Thus, the requirement of complaint is not to initiate automatic prosecution to avoid nullification of BNS provisions, but to protect the complainant from frivolous proceedings. Unnecessary prosecution in bona fide complaints that the bar originally intended to keep at bay will amount to mala fide prosecution, even though it is a product of judicial diktat. Moreover, the unclear jurisprudence on the state’s responsibility for victim compensation in cases of mala fide prosecutions adds to the worries of the original complainant (page 44). And it is not as if accused persons are remediless. An accused person, in the absence of an action by an IO, can either file a complaint of criminal defamation or apply to the High Court for an order to file a complaint under sections 212 and 217 of the BNS.

As a result, the system envisioned by the High Court, in addition to having a deterrent effect on the ill-willed complainers, will also have a chilling effect on genuine victims, who might fear going ahead with their case because of the possibility of mechanical prosecution under Sections 212 and 217 of the BNS. While the High Court acknowledges the possibility that the police closure may be ruled incorrect, this is hardly any succour to the ordinary litigant. The logical leap that every closure must mean false prosecution is something that the Court somehow does not seem perturbed by. 

Testing on the Anvil of Practicality

The suggestion, in addition to being tested on the anvil of law, should also be considered in light of the current situation of the Indian criminal system. At first, Umme Farva recommends filing the complaint as soon as a closure report is filed (para 31). However, without qualifying the closure report with “false case”, it also covers other types, such as “mistake of law” and “insufficient evidence”. Thus, these other types unravel the fact that mere filing of a closure report does not automatically imply that the original complaint was legally ‘false’ or malicious. To illustrate, assume police file a closure report, concluding that the dispute is civil in nature. The automatic classification of the original complaint as ‘false information’ under the complaint is legally unsound, especially when it compels the police to criminalise a jurisdictional misunderstanding. Therefore, by omitting classification, the direction facilitates frivolous litigation and frustrates the objective of section 215(1), BNSS, as noted in Mata Bhikh.

Furthermore, by creating a structure of mandatory prosecution, even in the case of a “false case” closure report, the possibility of petty prosecution and hence, violation of the well-accepted principle of de minimis non curat lex cannot be ignored. Moreover, this narrow category fails to create a distinction between genuine false cases and cases categorised as false cases because of a politically influenced investigation. This type of investigation is not imaginative but recognised and deprecated by the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh v. Union of India. Moreover, even if not politically influenced, the investigation may be faulty, as noted in Kailash Gour v. State of Assam. The Court therein ruled that “the benefit arising from any such faulty investigation ought to go to the accused and not to the prosecution” (para 29). While the benefit to the accused cannot be curtailed, the burden cannot be shifted to the victim either, as it will have a chilling effect on genuine victims.

Even if these possibilities are foreclosed, this option of mandate will divert the focus of the already understaffed police force from investigating serious offences to procedural filing of mechanical complaints. Moreover, the state’s prosecutorial team is also diverted towards prosecuting these complainants. It can also not be understated that this mechanisation will add to the already humongous pendency and therefore, add undue pressure to the already overloaded Indian judicial system (see 239th Law Commission Report). Thus, the interests of victims, especially of serious crimes, will be hampered, frustrating the objective of criminal law.

Conclusion

The directives in Umme Farva, which mandate filing complaints for false information alongside closure reports, face significant legal and practical challenges. Legally, Supreme Court precedents like Daulat Ram establish that such action should remain discretionary and requires proof of criminal intent rather than being an automatic procedure. Practically, a mandatory approach fails to distinguish between malicious falsehoods and simple mistakes of law or insufficient evidence. Consequently, enforcing this mandate would likely overburden the judicial system and distract police from investigating serious crimes. The existing system of prosecutorial discretion operates efficiently and effectively within the bounds of law and therefore requires no modification.