Showing posts with label fair investigations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label fair investigations. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 1, 2020

The Constitution Bench Judgment in Mukesh Singh — A Sensible Retreat from Automatic Bias

On 31.08.2020, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court delivered its unanimous verdict in Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) [SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 39528/2018 decided on 31.08.2020, along with other batch matters]. The Constitution Bench had been assembled to decide on the correctness of a Three Justices' Bench decision of 2018, Mohan Lal [AIR 2018 SC 3853]. 

Mohan Lal had taken up a very specific issue upon which conflicting decisions had been rendered by the different benches of the Supreme Court in the past. This issue was what is the effect upon the validity of a criminal investigation where the investigating officer is the same person who is the first informant. This is not an uncommon instance, mind you. For example, in narcotics cases, it is quite ordinary for the crime to be reported as a result of officers conducting a raid. Can the officer who conducted the raid continue as the investigating officer? And if so, does that have any effect on the validity of the ensuing investigation? The conclusions in Mohan Lal were that (a) the same officer reporting the offence must not continue as the investigating officer of the case, and (b) where this happens, then it vitiates subsequent proceedings, due to a presumption of bias being established. While the facts in Mohan Lal were specific to the NDPS Act, the observations made in the decision were broad and applicable to the context of criminal investigations more generally. 

This author had expressed his reservations about these conclusions in Mohan Lal. The doubts were loudly expressed within the year by a Bench of Two Justices in Mukesh Singh (which ultimately found its way to the Constitution Bench). Then, in Varinder Kumar [2019 SCC OnLine SC 190], a different Three Justices' Bench (Two members of which were part of the Bench in Mohan Lal) supported the conclusions that had been arrived at earlier but with many reservations (and some problematic language on procedural rights of accused persons), and expressly declared that the 2018 ruling would only apply with prospective effect.

It appears that now, finally, the confusion has been put to rest.

The Arguments  
The 62 page long judgment details the submissions of the Appellants from Paragraphs 3 to 4, then narrates the submissions by the Solicitor General [Para 5] and the Additional Solicitor General [Para 6], and finally rounds this up with Rejoinder submissions [Para 7]. 

The Appellants, naturally, argued in support of Mohan Lal and its logic of automatic bias. The thrust of argument was focused around the NDPS Act and a key point was the interplay between Sections 42 and 52 of the Act. Section 52(3) states that an officer who conducts an arrest / search / seizure under Section 42, must turn over the person / items over to an officer empowered to investigate the case. For the appellants, this added statutory gloss to the point of principle that the observations in Mohan Lal were based upon. Surely, the text of Section 52(3) suggested that Parliament was also uncomfortable with the same officer continuing as the investigating officer in a case.    

On the other hand, the Respondents approached the issue from a generalist perspective and delved into the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 to argue that there was, in fact, clear support for the same officer to continue as the investigating officer on a case in Section 157. The Code was also cited to argue that the categories of issues which render proceedings vitiated for "illegality" is clearly set out, and having the same officer continue on the case is not one of the specified grounds. On the scheme of the NDPS Act itself, it was argued that Section 52 did not demand that the officers must be different. 

Reading the judgment, it seems a bit surprising that the central focus of arguments was not the universalist approach of Mohan Lal. The Appellants recorded submissions do not suggest why that specific position is the desirable one. If anything, only the Respondents seem to have tried to explain what are the problems in that approach and why a case by case approach ought to be favoured. The argument in this regard seems to have been purely consequentialist — so many cases with good evidence will be thrown out on a technicality — and not about where this specific issue fits in the larger legal fabric of the doctrine on bias.

The Judgment 
The judicial consideration of the argument begins from Para 8 onwards. The dissatisfaction with Mohan Lal is evident in Para 8.1: 

"On considering the entire decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal (supra), it appears that in this case also the Court did not consider in detail the relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. under which the investigation can be undertaken by the investigating officer, more particularly Sections 154, 156 and 157 and the other provisions, namely, Section 465 Cr.P.C. and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. Even in the said decision, this Court did not consider the aspect of prejudice to be established and proved by the accused in case the investigation has been carried out by the informant/complainant, who will be 35 one of the witnesses to be examined on behalf of the prosecution to prove the case against the accused. This Court also did not consider in detail and/or misconstrued both the scheme of the NDPS Act and the principle of reverse burden."

It is quite evident by this point which way the judgment is going to go, and there are no surprises from here till the conclusions in Para 12. After a detailed discussion of the 1973 Code [Para 9], the judgment turns to the NDPS Scheme. How is the point about Section 42 / 52 dealt with? At Para 9.3.8 and 9.5, the judgment notes that it is nowhere stated that the officers empowered under 53 have to be different / shall be different from those empowered for 42. Thus, to require otherwise would be overstepping the judicial function by inserting words in the statute which do not exist. 

For the Court, the NDPS being a law which casts a reverse burden and carries heavy punishments is not something which warrants a rule of automatic bias in cases where the informant continues as investigating officer. As the judgment notes [Para 10], the accused would have the opportunity to cross-examine that officer and burnish her claim about bias. The judgment also referred to the presumption of regularity that is attached to official acts under Section 114, illustration (e) of the Evidence Act and observed that a rule of automatic bias would run contrary to this presumption. Thus, "the matter has to be left to be decided on a case to case basis without any universal generalisation." [Para 10.1]

Some Thoughts
On the whole, Mukesh Singh is the kind of dour, sensible decision, that we need more of (perhaps without the copious extracts of statutory provisions — Sections 41 to 57 of the NDPS Act are extracted almost entirely!). For this author, the conclusions arrived at mark a sensible retreat from the rule of automatic bias that Mohan Lal had supported. It is impractical for a legal system where law enforcement is understaffed and it did not sit comfortably in a procedural setup where standards always trump rules when it comes to issues about weighing the impact of procedural safeguards. On top of which, I still think that a rule such as this would only have prompted law enforcement to find loopholes to work-around what they saw as a bad rule rather than the rule actually furthering the promise of fairer investigations. Lastly, and the speed with which the issue got resolved by a Constitution Bench is proof of this, the truly awesome nature of reliefs offered for the breach of a procedural rule were bound to make courts have second-thoughts about going ahead and fully implementing Mohan Lal.    

Coming back to a position where accused persons have to demonstrate bias is a sensible retreat. But, what next? How is this task to be carried out by accused persons and the plea determined by courts? And what about reliefs beyond acquittals? It is quite surprising that, much like Mohan Lal which it overruled, the judgment in Mukesh Singh has not offered us any clarity on these important practical aspects. There has been a tendency on part of the Supreme Court to not fully explore the remedial aspect of rights cases, and Mukesh Singh fits the bill. In being concerned with limiting the scope for acquittals on pleas of bias, the Court ended up missing a chance to explore other reliefs that accused persons might be entitled to when a plea of bias is raised at the end of trial or, as is much more common, in an appeal context.  

Let us take the bias point next. The Constitution Bench brackets prior decisions into two buckets — those for an automatic bias rule and those against — and in doing so ignores that there is a fair bit of subtlety involved in the task of determining a plea of bias [For more on the Indian law on bias, see here]. For instance, consider the judgment in Mohan Lal. A key reason for the Three Justices' Bench choosing the automatic bias rule was its mistaken finding that the existing legal position required accused persons to "demonstrate prejudice" and "bias [to] be actually proved". A closer look at the older case law would reveal that none of the decisions had gone ahead and actually dealt with how accused persons were to go and establish pleas of bias. The only real exception being the 2004 decision in V. Jayapaul [(2004) 5 SCC 223], which required that an accused must establish the existence of a "real likelihood of bias" and not existence of "actual bias". 

The only reference we get to this practical side of things is Para 11 of the judgment in Mukesh Singh, where it is observed that: 

... Only in a case where the accused has been able to establish and prove the bias and/or unfair investigation by the informant-cum investigator and the case of the prosecution is merely based upon the deposition of the informant-cum-investigator, meaning thereby prosecution does not rely upon other witnesses, more particularly the independent witnesses, in that case, where the complainant himself had conducted the investigation, such aspect of the matter can certainly be given due weightage while assessing the evidence on record. Therefore, as rightly observed by this Court in the case of Bhaskar Ramappa Madar (supra), the matter has to be decided on a case to case basis without any universal generalisation. As rightly held by this Court in the case of V. Jayapaul (supra), there is no bar against the informant police officer to investigate the case. As rightly observed, if at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating officer the question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and therefore it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition that in every case where the police officer who registered the case by lodging the first information, conducts the investigation that itself had caused prejudice to the accused and thereby it vitiates the entire prosecution case and the accused is entitled to acquittal. (Emphasis supplied)

What we see is that the Court has gone ahead and supported Jayapaul, but observed that the accused may establish bias or its real likelihood, which is a tad confusing to say the least. Furthermore, the observations in the first half of Para 11 are loosely worded and can lend themselves to a view that the judgment goes to limit the significance of biased investigations only where the case lacked independent evidence. This, in my view, is an incorrect reading of the paragraph. Rather what the Court seemed to have been at pains to do here, and throughout the judgment, is to narrow down the cases where acquittals might be warranted on grounds of bias / real likelihood of bias on part of the investigating officer. 

With Mukesh Singh, it would seem that this issue of what happens to a prosecution where the same officer who was the first informant continues as the investigating officer has been settled. There is no vitiating of the case on grounds of presumptive bias. But that is the limited extent of clarity on offer, and the practical aspects of raising a plea of bias remain under-explored. 

Monday, August 31, 2020

Snippet: A Constitution Bench Overrules The Mohan Lal Verdict

Just over two years ago, a Three Justices' Bench of the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous verdict in Mohan Lal [AIR 2018 SC 3853]. The judgment endorsed a significant proposition: An officer who was the informant in a case (the facts there had a narcotics investigation) could not continue as the investigating officer for the same case. Wherever the officer was the same, it cast an indelible doubt over the impartiality of the investigation, which rendered all subsequent proceedings illegal in the case. The Court had noted that its observations were not limited to only narcotics cases but also applied to investigations generally (though this was not very clear from reading the judgment as a whole).

This Blog had in its analysis been critical of this view of presumptive bias, arguing instead in favour of an approach which considered the facts to find out if there was a reasonable likelihood bias in the specific case. Not only was this approach unappealing in law, I also argued that the approach would result in several practical impediments given (i) the consequences it would have  on pending cases, and (ii) understaffed nature of police forces, and it would not be unlikely that the pronouncements are revisited. 

It did not take long for a Two Justices' Bench of the Supreme Court to raise some of these doubts in Mukesh Singh and it was requested that the matter be placed before a Bench of appropriate strength to consider the problems. In the meanwhile, a different Three Justices' Bench of the Court delivered Varinder Kumar [(2019) SCC OnLine SC 170] whereby it agreed with Mohan Lal on the issue of bias but rendered the judgment applicable only prospectively, in a bid to insulate ongoing trials and prevent convicted persons from taking this ground for challenge in pending appeals. That decision was deeply problematic for its treatment of the issue, where the bench seemingly likened the procedural rights of accused persons as benefits.

It has been reported that Constitution Bench has decided a batch of matters today, i.e. on 31.08.2020 (including the reference in Mukesh Singh) and reversed the view taken in Mohan Lal, and has held that the facts of the case must be considered before arriving at a finding on the issue of bias. While the judgment is still awaited, on first blush at least this seems like a sensible course to adopt. A more detailed post will follow.  

P.S.: What the judgment will hopefully not disturb, though, are the observations made by the Court in Mohan Lal regarding the right to a fair investigation. The reason for vitiating proceedings as per the Mohan Lal court was the "infraction of the constitutional guarantee of fair investigation".  There can be no qualms with the proposition that there is a guarantee of fair investigations, and I hope that the baby does not get thrown out with the bathwater.  

Thursday, August 20, 2020

Guest Post: Analysing 156(3) Cr.P.C. in Context of Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya

(This is a guest post by Jaiyesh Bhoosreddy)

Introduction
Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Cr.P.C.] confers powers upon a magistrate empowered under Section 190 of Cr.P.C. to order a police officer in charge of a police station to investigate any cognizable offence. The scope of Section 156(3) was always considered as pre-cognizance, which is evident from the numerous judicial precedents stating that the power of the magistrate to order investigation under Section 156(3) is always pre-cognizance. The rationale, for considering Section 156(3) as pre-cognizance only, was that the expression ‘taking cognizance’ was judicially interpreted by the courts to mean the ‘judicial application of mind’ by the magistrate with the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections of Chapter XV of Cr.P.C., and any other action in his judicial discretion such as ordering investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. would be pre-cognizance only [To understand the different stages of a criminal case such as cognizance etc., see here]. 

However, a Three Justices' Bench of the Supreme Court in Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya & Ors. v. State of Gujarat [Criminal Appeal Nos. 478-479 of 2017, decided on 16.10.2019 (“Vinubhai”)], held that a magistrate can order further investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. in the post-cognizance stage. The judgment has, albeit not surprisingly, caused wide-spread confusion among criminal law practitioners with respect to the scope of Section 156(3), and it has also been criticised by some practitioners on grounds that it is contrary to statutory provisions and established judicial precedent.

The present discussion regarding the scope of Section 156(3) is to be viewed in the context of the said judgment. At the very outset, the preliminary issue that bears into mind is regarding the question of propriety of the said judgment, in view of a number of opposing judgments from various courts including the Apex Court itself, which have already laid down the point of law very clearly on the subject matter. The author intends to highlight the problematic issue of noncompliance of a celebrated judicial principle, which should be kept under consideration while pronouncing a judgment. The author will argue that the said judgment is contrary to the very structure of our judicial system which follows the common law tradition, where the previous judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of India under Article 141 and also of High Courts, as Courts of Records, constitutes the “law of the land” in the form of precedents which has binding effect over all lower courts, and also on the coordinate benches of the Apex Court and the High Courts.

Erroneous Interpretation of Section 156(3): Section 156(1) overrides Section 2(h) with respect to interpretation of the scope of application of Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C.

Vinubhai has created adverse ripples in criminal jurisprudence, which is the result of the Bench erroneously observing that the magistrate’s power to order investigation under Section 156(3) is post-cognizance, and in doing so, the Bench has overruled an earlier judgment of the Apex Court in Devarapally Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy [1976 AIR 1672 (“Devrapally”)] and a plethora of other judgments, which had cemented the proposition that the power under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. can be invoked only at a pre-cognizance stage.

The plain reading of the provision also clearly reads that it is pre-cognizance and not post-cognizance. The first and primary rule of construction of statues clearly states that if the plain reading of the statute is unambiguous, then the courts should go by the plain reading and not read beyond the text of the statute. The interpretation provided in Malviya is contrary to the legislative intent, which is evident from the language employed in Section 156(3). Section 156(3) employs the language, “such an investigation as mentioned above” to draw reference to the scope of application of the term ‘investigation’, which is provided in Section 156(1) of Cr.P.C.

The Court was erroneous in holding the rationale of Devarapally as incorrect simply because the Bench in Devarapally did not ‘notice’ Section 2(h) of Cr.P.C., as the proviso attached to the title of Section 2 states that the ‘definitions’ provided in Section 2 are subject to exceptions which is evident from the phrase, “In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires”. The author stresses upon the usage of the phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires” in support of the scope of application of investigation to be done only in the manner prescribed under Section 156(1) of Cr.P.C., where the ‘context’ mandates that the power of magistrate with respect to ordering of investigation under Section 156(3) to be limited only to the pre-cognizance stage. This was consciously provided by the legislature for situations where the police would fail to take cognizance of a cognizable offence under its jurisdiction, and so the victim or any other person could approach the magistrate for legal remedy to ensure dispensation of justice. Therefore, Section 2(h) of Cr.P.C. is irrelevant for the purpose of determining the scope of application of Section 156(3) because it triggers an investigation as provided under Section 156(1).

Noncompliance of the Principle of Stare Decisis in reference to the expression ‘taking cognizance of an offence’

The Bench in Vinubhai could have avoided the erroneous interpretation with respect to the scope of Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., if it would have exhaustively considered the judicial precedents, including Devrapally, deliberating upon the expression ‘taking cognizance’, then it would have realised that the earlier decisions on the subject matter are cemented as courts have always expressly construed the power of the magistrate to order investigation under Section 156(3) to be pre-cognizance only. This is because a magistrate ‘takes cognizance’ of an offence when he applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections in Chapter XV of Cr.P.C., and only then can he be said to have taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a). However, if the magistrate takes any other action in his judicial discretion, instead of proceeding under Chapter XV of Cr.P.C., then he cannot be said to have taken cognizance.

Additionally, the above stated judicial explanation of the expression ‘taking cognizance’ was reiterated by the Apex Court, in R.R Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1951 AIR 207 (“R.R Chari”) (Three Justices' Bench)], while considering the phrase ‘taking cognizance’, approved the decision of Calcutta High Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee [AIR 1950 Cal. 437], wherein the Court observed that taking an action of the nature of ordering an investigation under Section 156(3) will be pre-cognizance only. The same view was reiterated by the Apex Court in Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal and Anr. [AIR 1972 SC 2639] and Jamuna Singh and Ors. v. Bhadai Sah [AIR 1964 SC 1541].

Thus, R.R. Chari is another judgment pronounced by a three-judge bench, apart from Devarapally, where the Court has affirmed that Section 156(3) is pre-cognizance only. In view of this, the Bench in Vinubhai should have refrained from overruling Devrapally as it is a recognised principle that the views by one Bench is binding upon another coordinate Bench. In Union of India v. Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. [AIR 1986 SC 806] and Union of India v. Raghubir Singh [AIR 1989 SC 1933], the Courts have held that when one Bench thinks differently from another Bench of equal strength, then it should refer the matter to a larger Bench for decision rather than deciding upon the correctness of the view of the earlier coordinate Bench. Therefore, even if the Bench in Vinubhai was possessed by a very strong inclination that the interpretation in Devrapally was flawed, it should have referred the matter to a larger bench for resolution, however the Bench proceeded, on the basis of a flawed reasoning, to overrule established judicial precedents which has caused confusion in the field of criminal law.

Practical Benefits of the Judgment: Positive Impact for Bona Fide Applicants

In Vinubhai, the question of law that the Court had to decide upon was, “whether a magistrate has the power to order further investigation after a charge sheet is filed by the police”. The Court held that the magistrate had power under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. to direct further investigation up to the stage of framing of charges, and simultaneously overruled those decisions of the Apex Court, which interpreted the powers under Section 173(8) in a restrictive manner and thereby providing support to a latest decision of the Court, which construed the power under Section 173(8) to allow the magistrate to order further investigation after a police report was filed and cognizance was taken upon the said police report.

This was a positive step taken by the Bench in the development of law through judicial interpretation, as it resolved conflicting views given by the Court in the past to promote certainty of law, and furthered the interest of justice as a result of liberal interpretation. The judgment enables bona fide applicants to request for further investigation, and this would also lead to a reduction in multiple First Information Reports (FIRs) being filed. However, it should also be noted that the judgment also enables the accused persons and other parties in a criminal proceeding, with the ability to delay and derail the proceedings by filing applications requesting for further investigation to occur, and these orders under Section 173(8) will be subject to appeals which will invariably result in delays of the criminal proceedings causing irreparable loss either to the accused or to the victim.

Conclusion
The author submits that Vinubhai has eroded the principle of ‘Stare Decisis’, which is the foundation upon which the common law tradition exists. The Bench in Vinubhai overruled the plethora of judgments which followed Devarapally. Now, one could argue that the Bench was not improper in overruling the plethora of judgments as the bench strength was higher in Vinubhai, however that logic stands correct only if the Malviya judgment overruled Devarapally judgment which is not the case as the former is a per incuriam judgment with respect to the question of scope of Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., and Devarapally also enjoys support from R.R. Chari which is another three-judge bench judgment, which held that Section 156(3) is pre-cognizance only.

The lower courts can still adhere to the decision in Devarapally despite Vinubhai being a more recent judgment on the ground that the latter is per incuriam as it did not analyse the scope of Section 156(3) in the context of judicial precedents pertaining to the expression ‘taking cognizance’, which is of crucial importance when determining whether the scope of Section 156(3) is pre-cognizance or post-cognizance. This question was resolved by the various High Courts themselves in Amar Singh Yadav v. Shanti Devi [AIR 1987 Pat. 191] and Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge, Hapur [AIR 1991 All. 114], wherein the Courts have held that in the case of conflicting views rendered by different coordinate benches of the Supreme Court of India, then the decision which states the law more elaborately and accurately should be followed, by the High Courts, rather than the view that has been expressed at a later date. It would be prudent to conclude the present discussion on the point that the cardinal principle of the law of precedents is that the superior courts, especially the Apex Court and the High Courts, should settle questions of law in a consistent manner so that the law of precedents attains some degree of certainty, and observance of law is ensured.

Saturday, April 11, 2020

Guest Post: Barb Wiring Free Speech — Criminal Law and Curbing Press Freedom

(I am delighted to present a guest post by Nipun Arora, an advocate practising in Delhi, and Shivkrit Rai, a law researcher at the Delhi High Court)

Recently, the Uttar Pradesh police registered a First Information Report [FIR] against journalists (of The Wire) reporting on apparent violations of the lockdown that has been ordered by the Central Government. Similarly, an FIR was registered against an elected representative from the Aam Aadmi Party (an MLA) for allegedly defaming the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. 

By no means is one state the exception here—there have been several such cases from different states across India in the past as well, with baseless FIRs being registered as part of clear attempts to stifle press freedom and rile journalists who ask uncomfortable questions. Often these incidents are discussed as part of a larger narrative on freedom of press discourse. What is often ignored is the means involved towards this end of silencing journalists: Police questionably using criminal law. This use of police machinery to hamper and obstruct journalistic freedom is a concerning issue that needs to be addressed by both, judiciary and the executive.

Abuse or Misuse? "Cognizable" Offences as Tools for Harassment
These FIRs against journalists / media houses disclose several similarities. Most importantly, we find that a majority of the offences alleged in these cases are "Non-Cognizable". This refers to that category of offences where the police cannot investigate the case without an order from the court, and thus cannot arrest suspects. 

In a bid to overcome this hurdle, we see that the police simply add one or two offences to the FIR that are "Cognizable". This mere mentioning of a particular section now allows the police to investigate the case without any judicial oversight and now the police can assume powers of arrest and detention in pursuance of the investigation. 

And, worryingly, very oftenthe cognizable offences added to the FIR are hardly applicable to the case at hand. For instance, consider the FIR filed against the Editor of Vishwani, a Karnataka based newspaper in 2019 at the behest of a complaint by the Janta Dal (Secular). Here, allegations of Criminal Breach of Trust—a cognizable offence—were added to what was (at best) a Defamation case, which is a non-cognizable offence. 

A similar trend is on display in the Uttar Pradesh cases against the Aam Aadmi Party MLA and The Wire where a cognizable offence Section 505(2) of IPC (false statement with the attempt to create enmity, hatred or ill-will between different classes), was added to circumvent the need to go the magistrate. This practice of adding cognizable offences where only non-cognizable offences are made out gives the police a cover to ‘investigate’ the case and arrest the accused.

Heightened Problems in Times of Covid-19
The only resort for the accused that remains, then, is to approach the courts, which have often made observations in such cases lambasting the police conduct of registering bogus cases that are all too clearly attempts to stifle the constitutionally protected freedom of speech and expression. Recent examples being the cases of Prashant Kanojia and Priyanka Sharma. But by the time that happens, the aggrieved individual is generally already under arrest, and thus the damage has been done. A chilling message has been sent: Dare to question, then face the music.

At the present moment, however, even approaching the courts is not possible as they have restricted their functioning to cases of utmost urgency due to the Covid-19 outbreak. The guidelines for court hearings suggest that courts are only taking up cases involving matters of life and death, and these more ordinary excess of executive power are, unfortunately, not matters that will be guaranteed a hearing in court. As a result, we find ourselves in the midst of a situation where the police have a carte blanche of sorts, rendering the already vulnerable persons in an even more precarious position.

Designing a Response? An Argument for Constitutional Torts
The much-needed structural reforms in police activity that have been recommended for decades are yet to see the light of day. While a High Court can step in and set aside the FIR in a specific case, it is clear that this strategy has failed to get the message across to police at large, as despite the repeated quashing of bogus FIRs new ones keep registered every other day. We need a different take on this problem, where state agencies are actively working towards dissuading persons from exercising their fundamental rights without any justifiable reason. 

In 1983, in a case titled Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar [(1983) 4 SCC 141], the Supreme Court had held that in cases involving violation of fundamental rights, the court can grant compensation to the victim. In cases of custodial deaths, repeatedly, the state has been held liable to pay compensation for infringing right to life under Article 21. A case of frivolous FIRs which is aimed at infringing the fundamental rights, and registered at the behest of the state itself (as opposed to being registered upon a complaint by a private person), clearly points towards the mala fide of state authorities who use the police to clamp down on press freedom. 

The courts thus need to take note of the growing tendency of the state to register, suo moto, a baseless FIR, aimed at curbing the freedom of speech, and make an attempt to curb the practice. It would be appropriate for the courts to start awarding compensation to the victim against whom the baseless FIR is registered, and to make appropriate orders of recovery of such compensation from the officer on whose instructions the baseless FIR was registered. It would ensure that only those sections which are genuinely made out are included in the FIR. Recovery of the compensation from the concerned officer would of course act as a deterrent and prevent such frivolous cases.

The need of such an institutional response becomes important because it ensures that even in extreme circumstances like the present where the functioning of the courts is also limited, such FIRs are not registered because of the deterrence created. The fear of repercussions once the courts reopen would be sufficient to dissuade an overenthusiastic officer even when the courts are closed. Such a systemic response has been a long-time due, and needs to be considered by the courts now.

Thursday, September 5, 2019

The Supreme Court Order in P. Chidambaram v. ED: Some Thoughts

A Two Justices' Bench of the Supreme Court has decided the appeal filed by P. Chidambaram against an order of the Delhi High Court dismissing his plea for Anticipatory Bail in an ongoing investigation being conducted into what is being labelled as the "INX Media Scam" [Crl. Appeal 1340 of 2019, decided on 05.09.2019. ("Chidambaram")]. The main difference between the two sets of proceedings was that while the High Court order considered bail pleas in two parallel investigations being conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation [CBI] and the Directorate of Enforcement [ED], the Supreme Court hearings were only concerning the ED case. This is because, as many will already know, the CBI arrested Mr. Chidambaram the same night that his bail plea was dismissed by the High Court.

The Gravity and Uniqueness of Economic Crime
I had discussed the High Court order here, and had flagged three issues which I thought were not only central to the hearings but also to the practice of deciding bail applications more generally within the sphere of economic offences. The High Court order had stressed upon the gravity of economic offences and had taken it so seriously that it considered it appropriate to recommend that anticipatory bail be taken away as a possible remedy in any such case. I did not think it was possible but the Supreme Court somehow managed to amp this rhetoric up several notches. 

While the Supreme Court does not expressly recommend removal of anticipatory bail as a relief, it went 9/10ths of the way [See Paragraphs 67 to 82], and almost reached that projected finish line in the specific context of money laundering cases. At the end of Paragraph 34, the Court went so far as to note that "In cases of PMLA, in exercising the power to grant anticipatory bail would be to scuttle the statutory power of the specified officers to arrest which is enshrined in the statute with sufficient safeguards."

The Supreme Court develops the logic adopted by the High Court, and links the rhetoric of economic offences being very grave with the idea that they are also very complex to investigate, and thus, uniquely in need of custodial interrogation [See Paragraphs 76 to 81]. Therefore, the Supreme Court concludes, that "Grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in economic offences would definitely hamper the effective investigation." [Paragraph 81] 

Pause here to see just how lazy this reasoning is. What are "economic offences"? Theft and cheating are economic offences — but are you telling me that they are so complex to investigate that you require custodial interrogation to get to the bottom of them? Of course not, which is why I implored the Court to try and come down from the high altar of principle and delve into the specifics and help give some clarity so that the lowly magistracy can go about applying the law with greater certitude. But this wasn't to be.

The laziness is also on display in terms of the Court unquestioningly accepting this position of cases involving economic offences being so complex as to almost justify custodial interrogation and denial of bail. Granted, some cases can be very complex — for instance, laundering through hawala channels where there were no real paper trails created. But surely this principled stance cannot apply to all cases, and this is why we needed the Court to get messy with detail. Moreover, why should the Court trump up custodial interrogation? What about how this can reduce incentives for independent investigations? This is hardly a novel thought — James Fitzjames Stephen retained the ban on confessions in the Indian Evidence Act because, as a civil servant told him, it made sure that the officers don't sit in the shade all day while rubbing chilli in the eyes of some poor sod trying to get him to confess to a crime, rather than go out and investigate a case.    

A Carte Blanche to the Police? 
Moving on, we find that the Supreme Court marries this discussion about the position of economic offences with a more general level of argument when it engages with the issue of what to do in situations where an accused denies she is being "evasive". Here, to remind readers, the accused asked the Court to call for transcripts of his questioning as he challenged the assertion that he had not been cooperating with the probe.

The Court refused these requests by turning to the principle that courts and police operate in separate spheres. This forestalls any court from qualitatively assessing the investigation, and so where an agency asserts that an accused is "not cooperating" or "being evasive", a court is supposed to accept these assertions without question. Doing otherwise would sully the principle of separation between the police and the judiciary. 

Alas, the Court forgot about its own prior judgment in Sakiri Vasu, where a different bench had actively authorised magistrates to entertain applications from persons aggrieved by the manner in which police ran an investigation. Or did it? In the section of the judgment which justifies why sealed covers are alright, the Supreme Court notes that looking at confidential material (without showing it to the accused) has always been accepted as long as it is done by a court "to satisfy itself that the investigation has been conducted in the right lines and that there is no misuse or abuse of process in the investigation" [Paragraph 53]. 

So then, how can the Court go ahead and refuse to test the police officer's assertion that an accused was "not cooperating" or "being evasive" in questioning? If a court is going to be deprived of the ability to question police on their stand in such situations, then aren't we effectively condemning a person to custody and surrendering her liberty to the mercy of the executive? The doublespeak on display is astounding, and deeply concerning. 

Conclusion: A Recipe for Disaster
Talk to anyone in the profession and they will tell you that the money laundering law has given wide powers upon executive officers that are capable of being abused. After all, money laundering is not a crime like theft or cheating, but a crime which depends entirely upon creating a narrative about what someone did with the fruits of that previous theft or cheating. The scope for imagination is wide, and in our system of slow-moving justice, the result of this imaginative exercise often results in an unfair onslaught upon the civil liberties of an individual for a significant time of her life.

Rather than take a scalpel and forensically examine allegations in some detail during bail hearings in order to make sure that an innocent person is not ensnared by police agencies on frivolous grounds, and to ensure that custodial interrogations do not become a principle of first resort for investigators, with its decision in Chidambaram, the Supreme Court has taken a leap towards a world where all of this becomes more than possible. It was once said that a draconian law is not only made on text, but also in how it is applied. With this verdict, perhaps the same might soon be said of the money laundering statute. Of course, if it wasn't already the case.  

Wednesday, August 21, 2019

Article Update: Rights or Benefits? The Indian Supreme Court and Criminal Procedure

A few months ago, I wrote on this blog about the Supreme Court's decision in Varinder Kumar v. State of H.P., through which a different bench of Three Justices limited the applicability of the ruling in Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab, which was delivered in early 2018. To quickly recap, the issue at hand was very specific: are investigations by the police officer who was responsible for the initial drug-bust (these were NDPS cases) liable to be set aside on apprehensions of bias? 

In Mohan Lal, the 2018 decision, the Supreme Court said yes and made a new rule that the same officer can't continue to investigate the case. Where the same officer did continue, it would render the entire investigate illegal and, naturally, also render the eventual trial to be set aside. By all accounts this was a pretty drastic set of remedies being judicially created, and back in 2018 itself there was a sense of palpable discontent with the ruling especially because it would potentially affect pending cases. Fast-forward to 2019, and the decision in Varinder Kumar came which explicitly made the ruling in Mohan Lal inapplicable to all pending cases. 

But rather than simply restrict the ruling because of the madness that would ensue in pending cases, the decision in Varinder Kumar engaged in a profound discussion about the need to balance rights of accused persons versus the rights of victims / society. The discussion, as I argued in the earlier post, was horribly misguided and based on unsubstantiated straw-man arguments that ultimately imperil the values of freedom, equality and fraternity sought to be secured through the Constitution by means of a criminal procedure code.  

In a short paper recently published in the Journal of NLU-D (SSRN version here), I engage with the idea that maybe the experience in Mohan Lal and Varinder Kumar is reflective of a deeper, more entrenched trend, of how the Supreme Court has historically dealt with the idea of "rights" in context of criminal procedure. To this end, I draw a parallel with the rights to free legal aid and a speedy trial, both of which were hallmarks of the Indian Supreme Court's Due Process revolution between the late 1970s to 1980s. 

While the Supreme Court certainly spoke a language of "Rights" while dealing with the issues, on closer examination it appears that this was only a tool to help redress the plight of poor and oppressed persons in dealing with the State, a task which the court took on through the vehicle of particular cases before it. The decision by which these "Rights" are created in fact show a surprising disregard for critical issues that would need some thought; for instance, what remedy should follow if the right stands violated? 

That the Court is fashioning the contours of this right as it goes along (or "winging it") becomes clear with each successive case. Until finally, matters reach a head and a petition is brought by a kind of litigant who the Court definitely didn't have in mind when it was fashioning these new rights. For instance, and this is from a Case, the right to legal aid is sought by someone implicated in a case about sexual assault or a socio-economic offence. 

What does the Court do? It doesn't stay true to the logic of "Rights" in these cases and treat all defendants equally, nor does it create rational limits based on economic status etc. Instead, it tells us that these defendants are not getting protections. Without saying it, the Court transforms these rights, into benefits, which it will confer upon classes of persons which it decides are deserving of them.

By no means am I claiming to have studied all the rights-creating exercises of the Court in my Paper. But the similarities in judicial approach in cases that are separated by decades is certainly striking. If nothing else, the paper encourages some reflection about the halo that gets drawn over the judicial excursions of the Post-Emergency era in Indian legal history by many quarters. More seriously, it also invites critical thinking about reform strategies that turn to the Court for help and should make all the stakeholders pay more attention to the means that are employed to achieve possibly desirable ends. 

Wednesday, February 13, 2019

Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right: The Supreme Court's Reading Down of Mohan Lal

A few weeks ago, I had mentioned the possibility of the Supreme Court changing the rule it had laid down in Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab [AIR 2018 SC 3853] [Discussed here]. That possibility became a reality when a Three Justices' Bench handed down its decision in Varinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh [Crl. Appeal No. 2450 of 2010, decided on 11.02.2019], and specifically "read down" the Mohan Lal decision as not applicable to cases pending at the time of that judgment.

Recap: Mohan Lal, and Impartiality in Investigations
The issue decided in Mohan Lal was a very precise one: can the same police officer who served as an informer for a case continue as the investigating officer? Take the following example: Officer X is working undercover and raids a room with five people. All of them flee, and only one is caught. Who should investigate the incident? There are reasons to suggest Officer X should continue: she was at the scene and knows the case the best, presumably, and there are not many police officers out there anyway. But, there are also strong reasons for Officer X to not continue as the investigating officer. Being there at the scene, not only is she a part of the story, but also has her own version of the story. Can she be trusted to disregard her recollection of events when it conflicts with other information revealed through the investigation? Unfortunately, there will continue to remain lingering doubts over the fairness of any investigation Officer X conducts in the case.

This conflict between realities of investigations and the lingering problem of fairness is what the Three Justices' Bench of the Supreme Court sought to address in Mohan Lal. It rightly identified a conflict between earlier decisions of the Court on the point: some benches had held that an investigation conducted by the same officer would be unfair and illegal, but others had held that there was no grounds for complaint unless there was some perceptible bias shown in the conduct of the officer. Mohan Lal decided this issue by agreeing that the fairness issue was paramount, and held that there was no need to show any perceptible bias. Not only this, it held that any investigation done by the same officer was unconstitutional, and could vitiate the entire trial that follows. As the decision did not specify otherwise, this rule would apply to all pending cases and appeals as well, and threw them all into doubt.

The Problems with Mohan Lal: Too Bitter a Pill 
A decision that says fair investigations are a constitutional right sounds amazing, and few would have any qualms about this aspect of Mohan Lal. The problems with the case — as discussed at length in an earlier post — were in the remedies it prescribed for violations of this right. The case held that an unfair investigation vitiated any subsequent proceedings, including a trial. Problematically, there was no clarity on (i) the kinds of unfairness that can lead to throwing out subsequent proceedings, and (ii) when can the individual seek these remedies (i.e., could this be done during a pending trial or only at the appellate stage).

The problem with remedies such as the one prescribed in Mohan Lal is that they encourage what has been called "remedial deterrence". The criticism that fundamentally good prosecutions are being thrown out on technical grounds stings, and deters courts from finding breaches of the right to avoid using these awesome remedies. In the past few weeks, this was amply on display in, first, the decision in Mukesh Singh (17.01.2019), and now Varinder Kumar (11.02.2019). In fact, the latter invokes this issue expressly, where Sinha, J. expressly suggests that a fundamentally good prosecution against a notorious offender will be thrown out because of a technicality unless the Mohan Lal rule is watered down. This is what it did, only, it did not do so with much grace. 

Varinder Kumar and the perils of a Balancing Approach
The Bench in Varinder Kumar thought a solution to the bitterness of Mohan Lal was to limit it as a rule that did not apply to pending cases. All that was needed to achieve this is a line saying "Mohan Lal does not have retrospective effect". But the decision goes further and explains why this needs to be done, and in that process, undoes whatever credit it deserved.

The analysis of this issue begins from Paragraph 9. At Paragraph 11, Sinha, J. very fairly notes that in Mohan Lal the Court did not go ahead and fully develop the remedial tool it had crafted because the need for such an exercise was obviated by the facts. Through Paragraphs 12 till 18, the opinion takes up that mantle and begins crafting the remedy. In this effort, the decision roots itself in the logic of "balancing" the rights of an accused with other stakeholders in the system. The broad argument is straightforward: Mohan Lal disturbed the ideal balance and allowed the system to "veer exclusively to the benefit of the offender", and "societal interest therefore mandates that [the rule] cannot be allowed to become a springboard ... for acquittal ... irrespective of all other considerations". 

The notion of balancing rights has frequently come to the fore when the Supreme Court has discussed victims' rights — most recently in Mallikarjun where it expanded the contours of a victim's right to appeal. Here, the active victim is replaced by the passive society, whose interests are jeopardised by the release of persons like Varinder Kumar on supposed technical flaws in the prosecution. But if you chase this argument, aren't persons like Varinder Kumar also part of that same society, and is it not in society's interests to prevent flawed and unfair investigations? Undoubtedly so. Adherence to proper procedure is not a matter of "benefit" to an offender, or creating a "springboard" for acquittals. It is a commitment of a law-abiding society, that the State's power will be wielded in a particular manner, without looking at who is the target, and is the only real guarantee of personal liberty that exists. 

Thus, while a balancing logic might — and I stress on might — be appropriate in context of a victim's right of appeal, it is thoroughly out of place when at issue is the procedure for wielding state power. In a similar vein, Mathew, J. in Prabhu Dayal Deorah v. District Magistrate [AIR 1974 SC 183] lamented the tendency to sacrifice procedural law while prosecuting "anti-social activities". The observations really do deserve being quoted in full:

The facts of the cases might induce mournful reflection how an honest attempt by an authority charged with the duty of taking prophylactic measure to secure the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community has been frustrated by what is popularly called a technical error. We say, and we think it is necessary to repeat. that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti- social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws. The history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure. Observance of procedure has been the bastion against wanton assaults on personal liberty over the years. ... The need today for maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community cannot be over-emphasised. There will be no social security without maintenance of adequate supplies and services essential to the community. But social security is not the only goal of a good society. There are other values in a society. Our country is taking singular pride in the democratic ideals enshrined in its Constitution and the most cherished of these ideals is personal liberty. It would indeed be ironic if, in. the name of social security, we would sanction the subversion of this liberty. We do not pause to consider whether social security is more precious than personal liberty in the scale of values, for, any judgment as regards that would be but a value judgment on which opinions might differ. But whatever be its impact on the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community,'when a certain procedure is prescribed by the Constitution or the laws for depriving a citizen of his personal liberty, we think it our duty to see that that procedure is rigorously observed, however strange this might sound to some ears. [Emphasis mine]

Conclusion: Saving Criminal Procedure from the Courts
Most observers would have said that the absoluteness of Mohan Lal will be tempered to make way for a more practical remedy, and Varinder Kumar takes some steps in that direction. Whether this is the last step is something only time will tell, though I would suggest otherwise — remember that the reference made in the earlier case of Mukesh Singh is pending. In this respect, then, Varinder Kumar is frankly unremarkable.

Perhaps the balancing approach of the opinion is also unsurprising. It relies upon observations made by a different Bench of the Supreme Court in Sonu v. State of Haryana [(2017) 8 SCC 570], where the issue was limiting retrospective operation of another procedural rule arising a judicial decision: The necessity of Section 65-B Certificates for admitting electronic evidence as held in P.V. Anvar v. P.K. Basheer [(2014) 10 SCC 473] [For discussions, see here]. On that occasion as well, the Bench lamented about the fear of letting criminals go on technicalities, and posing procedure as an honour among thieves. 

While it may be unsurprising, this repeated invocation of a balancing act is alarming. By subscribing to this argument of fear, where adherence to procedural law in establishing guilt is belittled as a mere "technicality", and nebulous societal interests are used to balance away what are perceived as "benefits" to an accused, the Supreme Court is not only betraying the Constitution but unknowingly setting a body of precedent that might return to come back and haunt all of us one day. 

Sunday, January 20, 2019

Update: Less Than a Year and Clouds Already Over the Mohan Lal Judgment

In August 2018, a Three Justices' Bench of the Indian Supreme Court decided Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab [Criminal Appeal 1880 of 2011, decided on August 17, 2018]. The case decided the issue of whether the police officer who was the informant in a case could continue as the investigating officer, and held that this was prohibited and any such continuation would make the subsequent trial invalid. The case was discussed in detail on the Blog and while I agreed that a resolution of the legal issue was required I disagreed with the approach. The reason for this was a perceived mismatch between the problem and solution.

The problem here was a possible bias in the investigating officer's mind, and the likelihood that this could taint the entire case and lead to an unjust conviction. If you agree that this is a problem and a likely one at that — which I argued it is — there are still different remedies that can be imagined to help address it. Primarily, courts can either engage in a factual appreciation to examine the claims of bias, or can engage in a thumb-rule kind of approach which says that all such cases call for remedial action. The remedy that the bench in Mohan Lal considered fit was the latter: it held that there was no need for factual determinations to determine the likelihood or appearance of bias. Instead, the very fact, of the informant officer continuing on with the investigation, was good enough to deem the proceedings as tainted. 

I argued that this wasn't the correct cure for the problems, for several reasons. On the one hand, the rule places an extra burden on the police which is already acknowledged as poorly resourced when it comes to officers who can take up investigations. I also argued that this gave the police perverse incentives to lie and fudge records to be compliant with the law and simply change the name of the officer on paper rather than actually invest and get more officers to conduct investigations. Then there was the perception issue: defendants would be seen as getting away on technicalities, even if the entire case was conducted immaculately. 

It appears that the last of these has now stung a different bench of the Supreme Court. On 17.01.2019, a two Justices' bench in Mukesh Singh v. State [an appeal in an NDPS case] cast doubts over the validity of Mohan Lal and said that the remedy was "too drastic". They have placed the case before another Three Justices' Bench. We cannot know when that bench will preside and hear the case, and till then Mohan Lal remains good law. But it is telling that a decision that was passed to resolve a legal issue has already attracted the dissatisfaction of other members of the Supreme Court. 

It will be very interesting to see how this prickly debate is settled. One hopes that whatever ultimate judicial treatment the issues get, they are better than the manner in which the aftermath of another problematic opinion in Girish Kumar Suneja was addressed by the Court in Asian Resurfacing.

Saturday, September 29, 2018

The Supreme Court and Criminal Investigations - Romila Thapar v. Union of India

Today, a Three Justices' Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed that writ petition filed by Professor Romila Thapar [Romila Thapar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., W.P. (Crl) No. 260 of 2018, decided on 28.09.2018]. Two members of the Bench found that there was nothing to show mala fide exercise of power by the investigating officers [Khanwilkar J., writing for himself and the Chief Justice], while Chandrachud J. dissented from this view. The interim relief of house arrest will last for another four weeks, during which time the arrested persons can seek appropriate remedies. This short post is not about the facts and the allegations involved, but rather, about the larger legal issues of setting up an SIT and the monitoring of criminal investigations by the Supreme Court. 

Background
A month ago on 29.08.2018, a group of "eminent academics" led by Professor Thapar rushed to the Supreme Court in a "Public Interest Litigation" [PIL] seeking directions to ensure an independent investigation into a case being investigated by the Pune police. This is Case FIR No. 004 of 2018, registered at P.S. Vishram Bagh, Pune. The trigger behind the petition was the country-wide arrests of persons, who were notably critical of state policies on several issues, conducted by the Pune Police while investigating the case. As the Supreme Court ordered house arrest of the five arrested persons, they also joined the PIL, and the prayers were revised asking the Court to transfer the investigation to a "Special Investigation Team" [SIT] monitored by the Supreme Court. 

To someone unfamiliar with the Indian legal system, this will - and should - seem bewildering. Why is the highest constitutional court being asked to interfere with criminal investigations and direct how they should be conducted? Moreover, how is this happening in petitions not filed by the aggrieved persons? Nothing in the Constitution expressly permits either course, and such a scenario would be beyond the wildest dreams of the framers as well. Yet over the last three decades (almost), amidst great fanfare, the Supreme Court has arrogated to itself this unbridled power to stop and start criminal investigations. Local state police are taken off a case and it is either transferred to a central agency or an SIT, periodically reporting to the Court itself. Further, the broadening of locus standi rules has also happened during the same era, and a PIL for monitoring investigations is actually quite common. Two famous instances in recent memory where the investigations were monitored by the Court were the 2-G Scam and the Coal Block Allocation Scam cases.      

The Disagreement Over Mala Fides in the Decision
But there was to be no SIT in Romila Thapar. As I mentioned at the outset, the majority and dissent mainly diverged on whether the petition showed existence of mala fide in how the investigation had proceeded. Naturally, the point here was not that the Pune Police was legally incompetent to conduct the investigation, but that the manner in which it had proceeded showed elements of bias and bad faith. At Paragraph 26 of its opinion, the majority held that all that the accused persons could show was a lack of material against them, and procedural errors in their arrest and search. Such arguments did not satisfy a claim of mala fide investigation, and these issues were fit to be agitated before the proper courts. 

This conclusion seems quite unbelievable after reading the dissenting opinion. Out of the many things that it points to, one circumstance is clinching. Chandrachud J. notes how, hours after the first day of hearings in the Supreme Court, the police held media briefings sharing privileged material to suggest that the arrested persons were culpable, although the said material had not even been tested for its veracity [Paragraphs 22-24]. This is galling, for the police in India are not adversaries but agents tasked with unearthing the truth of the matter. After all, this is why the procedural law envisages a possibility of the police concluding that no case is made out against persons after investigations. If the police is holding media briefings on the first day, convinced about guilt, then what is the point of the investigation?

An Unfortunate Omission - The Right to Fair Investigations
This idea of bias in investigations, and pre-judging the matter, was something that the Supreme Court dealt with front and centre in another recent Three Justices' Bench decision in Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab [Crl. Appeal 1880 of 2011, decided on 17.08.2018]. There, the Court held an investigation cannot be conducted by the same officer who was also the informant in the case. There was no need to prove bias or mala fide: the circumstances were bad enough for the Court to assume bias and label any such investigation to be unfair. Even more significant was how the Court located this issue within Article 21 of the Constitution. It held that every individual had a right to a fair investigation, and that a biased or unfair investigation would contravene this right.

Mohan Lal is not mentioned even once throughout the decision in Romila Thapar, and it is very hard to understand how this point went missing through the hearings and the opinions. After all, here was a clear chance to develop this right to fair investigations under Article 21, and link it to the prevailing mess that is the SIT jurisprudence. The Court could have clarified, for instance, whether individuals had the right to raise an Article 21 challenge of this nature in a pre-trial setting - unlike Mohan Lal which was a post-conviction appeal. It is no doubt unfortunate that the opportunity went begging, but observers of the Supreme Court should be alarmed at how often this is happening. While the Court has expanded the scope of Article 21 over the last two months, the Court has not been savvy enough to apply its jurisprudential innovations and develop them further. As the dissent itself notes, there is no point to lofty constitutional rhetoric if it is not applied productively.   

Conclusion - Towards a Sounder SIT Jurisprudence?
The SIT jurisprudence emerged in an era where the Supreme Court ran roughshod over the separation of powers enshrined within the Constitution and paid lip-service to legal principle and procedural propriety in the pursuit of populist solutions to problems of governance and state capacity in India. Often, the solutions are not legally or procedurally sound, and the same goes for the SIT. I have said this before: The Supreme Court is horribly ill-equipped to monitor criminal investigations and the SIT makes no sense. That is a function of the local police and trial courts, because crime is local. Taking an investigation out of the regular course is not only an indictment of the local police, but also the Trial Courts, and High Court, who would otherwise have opportunities to review the progress and fairness of investigations. 

But since the Court has been granting prayers for creating an SIT and / or monitoring investigations, my principled opposition is not going to matter much. In that event, all one can ask for an attempt to help remove such cases from being purely fact-specific and having some clear basis for future courts to decide when should a request for creating an SIT or monitoring an investigation be allowed. In this regard, an admirable effort is made by the dissenting opinion in making sense of the earlier cases to try and cull out broad themes. This minimal level of consistency will help both litigants and the court by giving some much-needed certainty to the field, while reducing the politicisation of such requests. 

Saturday, August 18, 2018

Impartiality in Investigations - The Three Justices' Decision in Mohan Lal v. Punjab

Yesterday, a Three Justices' Bench of the Supreme Court delivered its decision in Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab [Criminal Appeal 1880 of 2011, decided on August 17, 2018]. The Appellant successfully challenged his conviction and sentence - 10 years in prison + Rs. 1,00,000 fine -  under Section 18 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 [NDPS Act]. This post discusses the judgment. Readers who've already read the case can skip consideration of the facts and an overview of the judgment and directly jump to the critique.

The Facts and Arguments
The facts take us back to 1997, when on 03.02.1997 Sub-Inspector Chand Singh of Balianwali Police Station lodged an FIR. In it, he stated that while on patrol together with Darshan Singh (Sarpanch), and Asst. Sub-Inspector Balwant Singh, they saw the Appellant Mohan Lal and seized him. Having doubts, they called a gazetted officer in whose presence Mohan Lal was searched, "leading to recovery of 4 kg of opium in a bag carried by him." A "consent memo" was drawn and signed by the Sarpanch Darshan Singh and S-I Chand Singh, and the seized opium separated into two samples (20 gms and 3.98 kgs). A "rukka" was handed over to AS-I Balwant Singh who then returned to the police station to register the FIR. An investigation was conducted, which ended in a Final Report being filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., and ultimately led to Mohan Singh's conviction.

Counsel for the Appellant raised a multitude of grounds as per the judgment. He argued that evidence was insufficient; both the Sarpanch and AS-I Balwant Singh were not examined as witnesses. The chain of custody for the seized opium was dubious, as it was never deposited in the official police storage facility (Malkhana). Further, there was an unexplained delay of 9 days in sending the sample for chemical analysis. On top of which counsel relied on decisions in Bhagwan Singh v. Rajasthan [(1976) 1 SCC 15], Megha Singh v. State of Haryana [(1996) 11 SCC 709] and State v. Rajangam [(2010) 15 SCC 369] to argue that "the investigation was fundamentally flawed" as S-I Chand Singh could not have been the investigating officer after being the informant. Counsel for Punjab responded that the evidentiary lapses were inconsequential as those witnesses were relevant for facts already proved sufficiently. Further, she relied upon the NDPS Act casting the burden of innocence on an accused, under Sections 36 and 54, to argue that this had not been discharged. Lastly, she cited State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh [(1999) 6 SCC 172], Bhaskar Ramappa v. Karnataka [(2009) 11 SCC 690], and Surender v. Haryana [(2016) 4 SCC 617] to argue that the police investigation is not flawed or illegal merely because the informant continued as investigating officer.

The Decision in Mohan Lal
Justice Sinha delivered the judgment for the bench. Having heard the arguments, he noted that 

The primary question for our consideration in the present appeal is, whether in a criminal prosecution, it will be in consonance with the principles of justice, fair play and a fair investigation, if the informant and the investigating officer were to be the same person. In such a case, is it necessary for the accused to demonstrate prejudice, especially under laws such as NDPS Act, carrying a reverse burden of proof.

The judgment doesn't jump right to this "primary question" but deals first with other arguments first. Justice Sinha zeroes in on the many gaps in the prosecution case: (i) an illiterate person (Darshan Singh) has signed the consent memo, (ii) the seized narcotics were never sent to the Malkhana (the illegality of which he elaborates on further), (iii) non-examination of key witnesses, and (iv) delay in sending samples for analysis. None of these lapses were explained by the prosecution. For Justice Sinha, all these appear to be the result of that "primary question". He notes that: "had the investigator been different from the complainant, the issues for consideration may have entirely been different."

In Paragraphs 10, 11 and 12, the judgment seems to return to the "primary question", and reminds us how harsh the NDPS Act is with its minimum 10 year prison term and reverse burden of innocence. It notes that a fair trial, "a constitutional guarantee" to an accused, "would be a hollow promise if the investigation in a NDPS case were not to be fair or raises serious questions about its fairness apparent on the face of the investigation." He notes that a fair investigation is imperative, and then gives us a hint on how he will answer the question he framed: 

If the investigation itself is unfair, to require the accused to demonstrate prejudice will be fraught with the danger vesting arbitrary powers in the police which may well lead to false implication also. Investigation in such a case would then become an empty formality and a farce. Such an interpretation therefore naturally has to be avoided. [Paragraph 12]
In the circumstances, if an informant police official in a criminal prosecution, especially when carrying a reverse burden of proof, makes the allegations, is himself asked to investigate, serious doubts will naturally arise with regard to his fairness and impartiality. It is not necessary that bias must actually be proved. It would be illogical to presume and contrary to normal human conduct, that he would himself at the end of the investigation submit a closure report to conclude false implication with all its attendant consequences for the complainant himself. The result of the investigation would therefore be a foregone conclusion. [Paragraph 14] 
After sharing with us excerpts from the decisions cited by counsel, and others given by the Supreme Court and other High Courts, the judgment suggests the prior cases are contradictory. Megha Singh and other cases cited by the Appellant seem to conclude that an investigation carried out by the same officer who was the informant is illegal, while others such as Bhaskar Ramappa hold that this alone is not enough and the Appellant must show bias. This lasting controversy is resolved in Paragraph 25 of Mohan Lal for clarifying the law as the present situation "may not only lead to a possible abuse of powers, but more importantly will leave the police, the accused, the lawyer and the courts in a state of uncertainty and confusion which has to be avoided." The answer is as follows:

It is therefore held that a fair investigation, which is but the very foundation of fair trial, necessary postulates that the informant and the investigator must not be the same person. Justice must not only be done, but must appear to be done also. Any possibility of bias or a predetermined conclusion has to be excluded. This requirement is all the more imperative in laws carrying a reverse burden of proof.

Some Points of Critique
It is with some regret that I have to critique a judgment that confers more rights on accused persons in the Indian criminal process, especially because I will certainly be trying my best to use it to further that cause. But it must be said that for a decision resolving a controversy, Mohan Lal contains nearly no legal reasoning and instead is built almost entirely upon assertions, to create a rule that might well be useless. In no order of importance, I have listed out the points of critique below.

First, was deciding the appeal on a constitutional issue necessary here? It is a standard legal rule that the court avoids broad constitutional arguments if a case can be decided on narrower grounds. Here, the judgment engages with the many fundamental flaws in the prosecution case. Perhaps most notable was the police failure in securing the custody of seized narcotics. In a narcotics case, Mohan Lal did show that the police illegally kept custody of the drugs, that cast doubt on whether the eventual items sent for sampling were in fact what was seized from him. Isn't that enough grounds for acquittal? The judgment seems to think so. Moreover, it also thinks the other lapses are crucial. If so, why decide a constitutional issue?

Second, the Court notes in Paragraph 24 that "a fair investigation and fair trial guaranteed under Article 21" will be negated if the FIR is treated as gospel truth, and again in Paragraph 25 says that "fair investigation from the point of view of an accused (is) a guaranteed right under Article 21". But when and how did a "fair investigation" become part of Article 21? Although there are some earlier decisions of the Court where something to the effect of "fair investigation is implicit in Article 21" is said, I am not aware of any case where this was the central issue. In any event, none of those cases are cited. Thus, a Three Justices' Bench of the Court simply asserts that a fundamental rights exists. This lack of reasoning extends to why the Court thinks that the informant continuing as investigating officer is not a fair investigation. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court contradicts itself. On the one hand, it tells us that by definition the police is not partisan and must ferret out the truth. But on the other, it says that such cases carry a presumption of bias. Why? Is there an inherent distrust of the police? If so, why continue with the fiction of them working towards getting any truth at all?

Third, the Court held that the accused does not have to "demonstrate prejudice" from the informant and investigating officer being the same and that it is unnecessary that "bias be actually proved". But was an accused required to do so earlier? Not at all. In this regard, the Court's failure to fully engage with the decision in V. Jayapaul [(2004) 5 SCC 223] costs. The Court in Mohan Lal conveniently noted that the case dealt with corruption offences to move on, but Jayapaul is perhaps the only decision that really engages with the issue at hand and also explained the law on alleging "bias". It held that the accused must show a "real likelihood of bias", and that the mere fact of the informant and investigating officer being the same was not enough. By no means did this mean showing actual prejudice, as the Court in Mohan Lal seems to have thought.  Rather, it required an accused to show a Court that any reasonable person looking at the investigation might think the officer was biased towards a certain conclusion. At some level, even the Court in Mohan Lal engages in this reasoning where it notes that the many lapses in investigation would not have happened with a different officer. But rather than stick to this fact-specific rule, the Court chose an absolute rule that requires nothing further to be shown. [For more on the Indian position on "bias", see here].   

Fourth, the absolute rule neither helps the police nor the accused, and might be rarely used by courts. It is impractical for a police which has a limited number of officers on hand to fully implement such a mandate and will therefore try and find loopholes rather than actually conduct fairer investigations. The easiest being a fudging of the initial documentation upon arrest and seizure (which often already happens) to have that separation of officers. This means that the rule confers an empty promise on the accused person and in some ways might only worsen the present scenario as the police resort to illegal means to avoid the rigours of Mohan Lal. Given the absolutely awesome nature of the remedy - the prosecution is vitiated if the informant and investigating officer are the same - courts are bound to be hesitant in frequently throwing out cases on a technicality of this sort and so will possibly treat the accused' claims of fudged records with more suspect than otherwise warranted. 

Fifth, in Paragraph 15 of Mohan Lal, the Court notes that "the discussion in the present case may not be understood as confined to the requirements of a fair investigation under the NDPS Act only carrying a reverse burden of proof." But nearly every other aspect of the decision seems driven by the fact that this is an NDPS Act case with a reverse burden of proof:

  • Paragraph 5: " ... is it necessary for the accused to demonstrate prejudice, especially under laws such as NDPS Act, carrying a reverse burden of proof"; 
  • Paragraph 11: the fair investigation guarantee "would be a hollow promise if the investigation in a NDPS case were not to be fair ..."; 
  • Paragraph 14: "in the circumstances if an informant police official in a criminal prosecution, especially when carrying a reverse burden of proof ... serious doubts will naturally arise ...";
  • Paragraph 24: "The right of the accused to a fair investigation ... will stand negated ... with arbitrary and uncanalised powers vested with the police in matters relating to the NDPS Act and similar laws carrying a reverse burden of proof.";
  • Paragraph 25: (After giving the holding) "This requirement is all the more important in laws carrying a reverse burden of proof."       


Could this lead to further controversy later, with this rule being watered down to only these kinds of cases?

Conclusion
In 2015 [(2015) 3 SCC-J 24, "Investigations and Impartiality: Only Confusion Here Supreme"], I had argued that a higher bench of the Supreme Court must clarify the legal position on the consequences of the informant continuing as investigating officer in criminal investigations. The decision in Mohan Lal does exactly that. But as suggested above, there are some gaping holes with respect to how the Court arrived at its holding and the ultimate rule itself might not be very useful for accused persons as it might encourage deception by the police. 

This is not all that Mohan Lal does, though, which brings me to the good parts. Potentially the more lasting impact of this decision is not this elaboration on the right to fair investigations, but the remedy for its breach. 

Seemingly unknowingly, the Court has opened a brand new gateway for defence-oriented litigation based on the result in Mohan Lal. In Paragraph 26 the Court held that "the prosecution was vitiated because of the infraction of the constitutional guarantee of a fair investigation." (emphasis mine). Thus the remedy for violating the right to a fair investigation under Article 21 is to throw out the prosecution. In the hands of inventive lawyers and willing courts, this remedy can be used to achieve some significant results to help transform criminal investigations. I say this, because the scope of "fair investigation" is quite broad. In Mohan Lal, the Court relied on its earlier decision in Babubhai v. Gujarat [(2010) 12 SCC 254], which said that "fair investigation" protects defendants against "any kind of mischief or harassment" by the police. This phrasing carries a much more robust meaning than merely imposing procedural limitations on who conducts investigations, to addressing the substance of what goes on during investigations as well to curb police brutality, illegal detention, and the forging of records that are a frequent cause for concern.