Showing posts with label Suspension of Sentence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Suspension of Sentence. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 28, 2022

Guest Post: Understanding the Interface between Statutory and Constitutional Powers of the Executive to Remit, Commute, or Suspend Sentences

(This is a guest post by Pradhyuman Singh)

Introduction
On 18th May 2022, the Supreme Court ordered the release of A.G. Perarivalan, a conspirator in the assassination of former Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi by exercising their inherent power under Article 142 of the Constitution. Perarivalan having been found guilty on a number of charges, the State of Tamil Nadu wished to issue a pardon in his favour. To this effect, the Council of Ministers of Tamil Nadu advised the Governor to issue a pardon. The power of the Governor of a State to issue pardons is traceable to Article 161 of the Constitution. As granting pardons is a function of the Governor, it is also pertinent to read this power/function with Article 163 of the Constitution. Article 163 requires the Governor to exercise her functions on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, the Governor is mandated to act on this advise being the nominal Executive Head of the State. 

In this case, the advice of the Council was tendered on September 9, 2018 and no action was taken by the Governor. Instead, the Governor submitted the matter to the President for his consideration. The Governor used this reason as a justification for the delay in implementing the mandatory advice of the Council. The Supreme Court held that such abstinence was in violation of the Governors duty under the Constitution. Thus, to do complete justice the Supreme Court itself ordered the grant of pardon in favour of Perarivalan, resulting in his release. 

Predictably there has been considerable publicity on this order of the Supreme Court. Amongst the various opinions on the order, (Retd.) Justice V. Parthiban, an erudite judge of the High Court of Madras has also expressed his criticism on many fronts. One particular criticism was that the Supreme Court did not consider the attraction of Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) to the case. This specific contention will be the focus of this post.

Sections 432-434 of the CrPC provides a statutory power to the President/Governor to remit, commute or suspend punishment of offences. Section 435, provides that if the State Government (i.e. the Governor, as per Section 3(60), General Clauses Act, 1897) wishes to exercise power under Section 432 or 433, and-

1. The offence in question has been investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation; or 

2. The offence involved damage to property of the Central Government; or

3. The offence was committed by an employee of the Central Government, 

the Governor would be obligated to exercise such powers only after “consultation” with the Central Government. “Consultation” here has been interpreted to mean concurrence by the Supreme Court (Union of India v. V. Sriharan). In the facts of this case, the investigation of the offences was carried out exclusively by the Central Bureau of Investigation, thus attracting Section 435 of the CrPC.

At first sight, it may seem that such powers of the Governor under the Constitution stand on a different footing from the statutory power. In no manner can the provisions of the CrPC control the ambit of Article 161 of the Constitution (which stipulates no such requirement of consulting/concurring with the Central Government). However (Retd.) Justice Parthiban emphasises that the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Sriharan (by a Constitution Bench nonetheless) requiring mandatory concurrence of the Central Government would then be rendered completely nugatory. All that would be required is for the Governor to claim that her power is being exercised under the Constitution and not the CrPC. The entire scheme of statutory powers of the Governor/President to remit, commute or suspend sentences would become redundant. 

Further, the Supreme Court in another occasion (K.M Nanavati v. State of Bombay) has also held that Articles 72 and 161 embody the “prerogative power” of the President/Governor. Since there is no express provision in the Constitution saving these provisions from legislative interference, the English common law as to Prerogatives applies to the pardoning power under our Constitution. As a result of this, these powers may be fettered and controlled by legislation. Thus, what would otherwise be a simple matter of examining the relationship between statute and the Constitution becomes complex. This is due to the scheme of the CrPC historically having analogous powers of remission, commutation and suspension of sentences ever since its recognition in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (the predecessor to the present CrPC). 

This post will enquire into the context with which parallel powers of remission, commutation and suspension exist in our statutory framework, despite our Constitution exhaustively providing for the same. Accordingly, we may determine the relationship between these laws and the legal implications that follow.

History of the Code of Criminal Procedure

The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (“Code”) first recognised the power of the Governor General of British India to remit, commute and suspend punishments of offences. This power found expression in the form of Section 401 and 402 of the said Code. At the time, there existed no grundnorm resembling the Constitution, and so the power of the Governor General was exclusively governed by the aforementioned provisions of the Code. 

This changed with the eventual enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935 with the enactment of Section 295. Section 295 was the template for the drafting of Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution, which vested the power to suspend, remit or commute a sentence with the Governor General as well. The phraseology adopted by Section 295 is as follows-

“Where any person has been sentenced to death in a Province, the Governor-General in his discretion shall have all such powers of suspension, remission or commutation of sentence as were vested in the Governor-General in Council immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act…” [Emphasis Supplied] 
Thus, the Government of India Act, 1935, a legislation passed in the British Parliament gave deference to ordinary laws to regulate the powers of the Governor General in this respect. The intent behind such a provision in the Government of India Act, 1935 was to merely give passive recognition to the power of the Governor General (which was to continue to operate through the statute, i.e. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898) and to make clear that such powers would not interfere with the Kings power to issue pardons or remit, commute or suspend sentences (as provided in Section 295(2)). In this manner, the statutory framework of the Code had a functional purpose in recognising the power of the Governor General. The provisions of the Code worked in perfect harmony with the Government of India Act, 1935. 

Such was the arrangement until the enactment of our Constitution. Section 295 of the erstwhile Government of India Act, 1935 was significantly changed to give us what we have as Article 72 and 161 today. As is clear from the language of these Articles, the power of the President/Governor to remit, commute or suspend sentences was expressly recognised in the Constitution itself. Marking a clear departure from the previous position, there was no deference given to any statutory framework that would determine the powers of the President/Governor. However, the makers of the Constitution chose to still passively recognise the statutory powers of the Governor to remit, commute or suspend sentences. This was in the form of Article 72(3) which provides- 

“Nothing in sub-clause (c) of clause (1) shall affect the power to suspend, remit or commute a sentence of death exercisable by the Governor of a State under any law for the time being in force.” [Emphasis Supplied] 

The purpose of this clause is to clarify that the power of the President conferred by Article 72(1)(c) should not be construed to exclude the power of the Governor in any manner. However, in stating so, the makers chose to express that the power of the Governor under “any law” was not to be affected. It was equally open for the draftspersons to make a direct reference to Article 161 of the Constitution in this provision. Rather, a conscious decision was made to also recognise any statutory powers vested in the Governor. The implications of this will be examined in the following section of the post. 

Moving along, once the Constitution was brought into force, the provisions of the Code were also amended. Article 72(1)(c) of the Constitution recognised the power of the President to remit, commute or suspend the sentence of death.Ordinarily, the President exercises powers with respect to offences in the Union List and the Governor in the State List respectively. An exception is made in the case of death where both the President and Governor exercise concurrent powers. To accommodate this concurrent power, Section 402A was introduced in the Code vide an amendment. This Section too recognised the concurrent powers of the President and Governor in line with the Constitution. 

The next important milestone in the development of law on this issue came in the year 1969. The Law Commission of India was tasked to review the entirety of the Code and recommend comprehensive changes to the law of criminal procedure. This took shape in the form of the 41st Law Commission Report published in September 1969. This report examined Section 401 and 402 of the Code. It expressly noted how the statutory powers of the Government were ancillary to the Constitutional powers (Refer Page 248, Para 29.1). Interestingly, it also opined that it would be legally impermissible for the Code to be inconsistent with the Constitution (Refer Page 249, Para 29.4). However despite these findings, they expressed a concern with the State Governments power to remit, commute and suspend sentences. It was felt that certain offences significantly affected the interest of the Central Government (offences involving the employees and property of the Central Government and offences investigated by the CBI). If a free hand was given to the State Government to exercise powers in respect of such offences, it would result in “difficulties of administration” for the Central Government, according to the Report (Refer Page 252, Para 29.13).

This formed the basis for them to recommend the insertion of a draft Section 402B in the Code. This Section would require the State Government to consult the Central Government if it wished to remit, commute or suspend sentences in the offences described above. This recommendation was accepted by the Parliament when the Code was replaced with new CrPC enacted in the year 1973 in the form of Section 435 of the CrPC. 

Having a brief idea of the context of this provision, we may now examine the relationship between the CrPC and the Constitution.

Relationship Between the CrPC and the Constitution 

The Constitutions passive recognition of the statutory power of the Governor may have one of two implications- 

A. The Statutory Power is merely a formal recognition of the power of a Constitutional authority. It stands on a different footing from the Sovereign power of the Executive Head. As a consequence, it does not dilute or affect the Constitutional powers of the Governor in any manner. Any statutory provision that would be inconsistent with the Constitution would be void. 
B. The Constitutional power is an expression of the Prerogative power of the Executive. Finding its origin in English Common Law, Article 72 and 161 may still be controlled and subject to legislative provisions that may be made to this effect. (This was the reading adopted by the majority in Nanavati)

The first of these two readings would result in the statutory powers of the Governor being completely redundant. If it would be open to the Governor to exercise the exact same powers to remit, commute or suspend sentences in its Constitutional capacity, any restrictions or mandatory procedures imposed in the statute (such as Section 435, CrPC) may be bypassed. Despite such redundancy, reading “A” would still be a more suitable reading of the law. This is due to the following reasons-

  1. It is correct that historically, the power of remission, commutation and suspension of sentences lies with the Executive Head. These are Prerogative powers that identify the source of authority from English Common Law. However, these conventions have been crystalised in the form of express Constitutional provisions. There are various other examples within the Constitution, where principles of common law find express mention. For instance, Article 129 of the Constitutions declares the Supreme Court as a Court of Record. The powers of a Court of Record in English Common Law would include the power to punish for contempt of itself. Despite this, the framers chose to expressly also recognise the Supreme Courts power to punish for contempt in Article 129. The consequence of this express recognition of common law norms is that such principles get the status of Constitutional law. It would follow that such principles/law are granted the protection of the highest law of the land which could only be altered by a Constitutional amendment. Therefore, Articles 72 and 161 are by themselves sources of power for the President/Governor to exercise power. It would not be correct to state that they are a reflection of the Prerogative powers which find their authority outside the Constitution. 
  2. Article 245 of the Constitution confers power on the Legislature to make laws. The provision begins with a subject clause stating, “Subject to the provisions of this Constitution…”. This makes it abundantly clear that any ordinary law cannot be in contravention of any Constitutional provision. Further, there is nothing in the context of Articles 72 or 161 that would suggest that is straightforward interpretation of Article 245 should not be followed in reading them. 
  3. The language of Article 72 and 161 marks a clear departure from their predecessor in the form of Section 295 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The regime before the Constitution in express terms gave deference to the statutory regime of the Code which dictated the extent of powers exercisable by the Governor General. This position no longer stands after independence where the prerogative power has been given Constitutional status. If ordinary legislations may be allowed to control Articles 72 and 161, it would result in the said provisions themselves becoming redundant. 
  4. As mentioned earlier, Article 74/163 requires the President/Governor to exercise their functions only on the binding aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The powers under Article 72/161 being one such function, would also have to be performed only on the aid and advice of the Council. 

If reading “B” of the law is adopted and ordinary laws could independently guide the power of the President/Governor, it may not be necessary to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The statutory framework under which the President/Governor would function, would then allow them to act in their personal discretion free from their Constitutional obligations. This would be in clear violation of the mandate of Articles 74 and 163 of the Constitution which are a reflection of the principles of Executive accountability. The violation of these provisions in this manner would be contrary to the role of the President/Governor envisaged by the framers as nominalExecutive Heads of State. 

For these reasons, the decision of the Supreme Court in Nanavati is incorrect. The passive recognition of the Governors statutory powers in Article 72(1)(c) is only indicative of a parallel legal framework within which the Governor may operate. It cannot be construed to mean that it would be open to the Legislature to dilute and control Article 72 and 161 by an ordinary legislation. Indeed, at the time of commencement of the Constitution, the Parliament made efforts to ensure that no provisions in the Code conflicted with the Constitution. To this effect, Section 402A recognising concurrent powers of the President and Governor to remit, commute or suspend sentences of death was introduced. 

Despite the view of the Court in Nanavati, the Supreme Court has subsequently moved away from this approach. In the case of Maru Ram v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench considered the validity of Section 433A of the CrPC, 1973. This provision disallowed the President/Governor to exercise powers under Section 432 and 433 (for convicts sentenced to a certain class of sentences) if the convict had not served at least fourteen years of imprisonment. The Court held that Section 433A would not be attracted when the Governor exercised powers under Article 161. Both provisions stood on a different footing and it would not be open for a statute to control the Executive Power conferred by the Constitution in absolute and unqualified terms. 

This position was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh which involved the interpretation of paragraphs 516-B and 631 of the Manual for the Superintendence and Management of Jails in Punjab. These provisions required Jail Superintendents to submit applications for remission to State Governments after the convict served fourteen years of imprisonment. In the course of interpretation, the Court enquires into the relationship between the said Rules and Section 433A of the CrPC. By relying on Maru Ram, it too came to the conclusion that no legislative scheme (in this case, the Prison Manual) may be inconsistent with the Governors powers under Article 161. 

For these reasons, the Constitutional powers must be read to exist independent of the CrPC. The statutory powers may not serve any functional purpose by existing parallelly and ought to be understood in the historical context with which they find their place. At the time of the commencement of the Constitution, the provisions of the Code were modified to perfectly align with the Constitution. Thus, it was always the intent of Parliament for both these powers to harmoniously co-exist.

Accordingly, Section 435 of the CrPC too cannot be construed such that it controls the absolute powers of the Governor under Article 161. The Governor would not be required to concur (or even consult) the Central Government for the purposes of issuing any pardons in furtherance of Article 161. In this light, the Supreme Court was correct to not consider the involvement of any provisions of the CrPC in the case of A.G Perarivalan.

Wednesday, April 29, 2020

Guest Post: Suspension of Sentence and the NDPS Act — An Unhappy State of Affairs

(I am delighted to present a guest post by Nipun Arora, an advocate practising in Delhi, and Shivkrit Rai, a law researcher at the Delhi High Court)

The Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) provides for securing liberty of persons in custody at various stages: individuals named as an accused in cases where the trial is pending can seek bail in terms of Sections 437 & 439 (Regular Bail); and convicts can seek a stay on execution of sentence under Section 389 (Suspension of Sentence). Jurisprudentially, there has been a difference between the two and the factors that the court must consider while deciding upon either of these. However, for the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act), the situation is different. This post discusses how the distinction becomes diluted in cases under NDPS Act and leads to serious trouble.

Understanding the two stages of liberty for an accused. Bail v. Suspension of Sentence
During the trial, an accused person can seek bail. For a bailable offence, this can be availed as a matter of right, whereas in a non-bailable offence, bail depends on the discretion of the court after considering various factors such as the possibility of fleeing, chances of tampering the evidence, gravity of the offence, etc.

If found guilty, the convict can make an appeal before the appellate court, and during the pendency of this appeal, the convict can seek suspension of the sentence imposed by the trial court. The logic is similar as that of bail: if there is a possibility that the person might not have committed the offence, it would not be proper to confine them in custody.

However, the factors to be considered for suspension of sentence are different from that of bail. At this stage, the trial is over, evidence has been recorded, and a competent court has found the person guilty after application of judicial mind. The factors such as possibility of tampering evidence do not exist anymore. The decision to suspend the sentence or not has to be based on different factors: primarily on how long it would take for the court to decide the appeal. For instance, it would not be proper to suspend the sentence if the appeal is to be heard next week; whereas it would be desirable for the sentence to be suspended if the appeal might not come up for several years. The Supreme Court has reiterated these principles several times [Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1999 SC 1859; Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 291].

The distinction between bail and suspension of sentence has also been recognised by courts multiple times in Anil Ari v. State of WB [AIR 2009 SC 1564]; Atul Tripathi v. State of UP [(2014) 9 SCC 177]; Jagdip Beldar v. State of Bihar [Crl. App. (SJ) 2319/2017 (Patna HC)]. The logic is the same as discussed above: the trial has ended, a competent court has found the person guilty, the presumption of innocence does not exist anymore. The situation at pre-conviction and post-conviction stage is thus different.

Bail & suspension of sentence under NDPS Act
In cases under certain special statutes, the standard principles of bail as discussed above do not apply. These are the offences that are considered “grave” such as those under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act), the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA), the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), etc. Under the NDPS Act, bail can only be granted if “the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail” (Section 37, NDPS Act). The embargo is problematic and has been discussed earlier on this blog. In brief, it requires the court to adjudge the guilt of the accused even before the trial has commenced and mostly without adequate material before it.

Besides the strict threshold for bail, the legislature also tried to place a blanket prohibition on suspension of sentence. By an amendment in 1989, Section 32A was inserted in the NDPS Act which took away the power of the court to suspend the sentences awarded under this law. This provision was challenged before the Supreme Court in Dadu @ Tulsidas v. State of Maharashtra [(2000) 8 SCC 437]. The full-bench of the Supreme Court held that the restriction on the power to suspend sentences is unconstitutional as contrary to Articles 14 and 21. The Court approved the judgement of Allahabad High Court in Ram Charan v. Union of India [AIR 1990 All 1480] that taking away the possibility of suspension of sentence renders the right to appeal meaningless.

While holding the provision unconstitutional, however, the Supreme Court noted that it would not automatically entitle an appellant to have the sentence suspended. It observed:

Holding Section 32A as void in so far as it takes away the right of the courts to suspend the sentence awarded to a convict under the Act, would neither entitle such convicts to ask for suspension of the sentence as a matter of right in all cases nor would it absolve the courts of their legal obligations to exercise the power of suspension of sentence within the parameters prescribed under Section 37 of the Act.

The Court then misquotes a division-bench judgement of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ram Samujh [(1999) 9 SCC 429] to apparently substantiate the position that restrictions of Section 37 would apply to suspension of sentence as well, though that judgement related to regular bails and did not deal with suspension of sentence at all. Regardless of the misquote, the law as it stands is that the threshold required in regular bail needs to be met for suspension of sentence as well. This makes things peculiar.

The Problematic Misinterpretation of the Court in Dadu @ Tulsidas
In theory, the extension of restrictions of Section 37 would make suspension of sentence impossible and could lead to certain illogical conclusions. For starters, the threshold for bail as per Section 37 requires the court to be of the opinion that the person “is not guilty of such offence”. The same threshold cannot be applied in a case of suspension of sentence, as the person has already been convicted by a competent court. Thus, the moment an order for suspension of sentence is passed, which matches the threshold of bail i.e. “not guilty of such offence”, the entire appeal will have to be allowed. This is because a conviction can only stand if the guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt, and if there could be any opinion that the convict is not guilty (as required under Section 37), there clearly exists a reasonable doubt (or perhaps much more than a mere reasonable doubt).

It is absurd that a person can be said to be reasonably not guilty (in the order for suspension) but be a convict (in the final order) at the same time from the assessment of the same material by the same court. The extension of Section 37 to suspension of sentences makes the issues of the interim order so connected with the issues of the final judgement, that they cannot possibly be separated.

This paradox does not exist (or is not as apparent) at the stage of trial, perhaps because of the distinction in factors under consideration as discussed earlier: The trial court has to make a prima facie determination before or during the trial, and there is a possibility of adequate material emerging showing the guilt of the accused. However, that is not the case at the appellate stage – once it can be concluded in the interim order that there are grounds to believe that the accused is innocent, that view ought to be extended even at the final stage.

Even besides the resultant illogic, restrictions of Section 37 were not supposed to apply to suspension of sentence. It states that “no person accused of an offence” shall be released unless the conditions are satisfied – the subject of the section here is an accused, not a convict. The scope of the section is clearly limited by the words of the legislature. The legislature has not laid down any additional requirement for suspension of sentence. By extending the scope of Section 37 to apply to suspension of sentences as well, the paradoxical situation has emerged.

Conclusion
There has been a distinction in regular bail and suspension of sentence, and the factors relevant to both. However, the Supreme Court in Dadu @ Tulsidas appears to have overlooked this distinction and artificially created further restrictions which should not have applied otherwise. There was no especial requirement for the Supreme Court to have engaged in the unnecessary academic exercise of whether the restrictions of Section 37 would apply or not, when the scope of the challenge before it was limited precisely to the constitutionality of Section 32-A. Dadu @ Tulsidas, thus, appears to have been decided incorrectly to this extent and needs to be reconsidered. The embargo of Section 37 should not apply to cases of suspension of sentence.