Tuesday, August 5, 2025
Guest Post: Much Ado About 'Heading'? Bailable Offences under the NDPS Act
Monday, June 10, 2024
Jail is Not the Rule - Restrictive Bail Conditions in the UAPA and PMLA
Saturday, May 11, 2024
Jail is not the Rule - Stating the Problem (Interlude)
(This is the fifth post in an ongoing series on restrictive bail regimes)
Restrictive bail regimes are arguably one of the most important issues in Indian criminal law and procedure. I use the term to refer to a swathe of statutory provisions through which the judicial discretion to grant or deny bail is curtailed, by mandating that such an exercise requires a court to formulate opinions about the merits of the case against an accused (wherever the prosecution opposes the request for bail). This usually presents itself in a formulation requiring courts must have "reasonable grounds to believe" that the accused is "not guilty of the offence" to grant bail.
The previous posts in the series tried to locate these statutory clauses in Indian legal history. We looked at shifts in the kinds of criminal activity for which legislatures turned to such clauses, as well as shifts in the overall landscape of the general criminal procedure itself which had a bearing on how these clauses may well have worked in practice. Before we turn to the last two posts dealing specifically with restrictive bail regimes in two statutes [India's current anti-money laundering law and anti-terror law], it is helpful to have a summing up of the legal process problems which were flagged earlier. An interlude of sorts.
Such clauses are obviously problematic because they render bail, a pre-trial measure to restore liberty of an accused, entirely contingent upon a premature discussion about the merits of the case even as the trial remains pending. What turns this problematic exercise into a grossly unfair and unconstitutional one is how the exercise is carried out in practice (which, if you read the previous posts, you know has changed over time). This practical aspect is the focus here.
Reducing delays in the trial has been a central theme of legislative changes to the criminal process in India, the thread which unites governments of the 1950s to the present regime. This has a material bearing on matters of bail generally, and naturally also on restrictive bail clauses. The argument flows from first principles. We conduct criminal trials because we accept that to imprison a person the allegations against them must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Till we have managed to do so, it is impermissible to deprive a person of their liberty. At the same time, in exceptional cases, there may be a need to restrain the person temporarily till conclusion of the trial to safeguard the process.
Temporary legal arrangements which shift the status quo are fair because of their explicit acknowledgment to parties that it is only a temporary arrangement. Usually, the fairness of this arrangement formulated on the basis of first-impressions formed on untested material gets diluted as the litigation drags on; and, at some point the arrangement becomes untenable altogether. We usually think in these ways when dealing with civil cases, but criminal cases are no different. The status quo here is a citizen's liberty, and a shift from status quo is the arrest and custody pending trial. What makes this arrest and pre-trial detention on the basis of first-impressions palatable is its transient nature — it is a temporary holding measure, to tide over weeks or months by which point the set of allegations would have been tested on the anvil of beyond reasonable doubt.
If an interim ruling is bound to cause a near-permanent shift in the status quo, a natural follow-up question is to think about how best we can ensure both sides get a fair and adequate hearing to put forth their side of the story. For starters, make sure that the material relied upon by the proponent is made available to the defendant, and hear both sides. The hearing should not be perfunctory but substantial, given its outcome is not a fleeting alteration to the status quo. Lastly, the higher burden is cast upon the party which wants to shift status quo, and must be discharged not by mere opinions and averments but substantive material of a kind that courts can judicially use.
Personal liberty is the default, and causing an arrest and thereafter seeking pre-trial custodial detention is the original shift in status quo, and bail is asking for a reversion to the status quo. This would mean that the State must initially carry the high burden to justify the arrest and discharge it using strong materials. We can see this in play in statutes where subtle differences are prescribed in the standard for justifying an arrest depending upon the kind of offences involved (compare Section 41(1)(b) and (ba), CrPC 1973, as well as Section 19, PMLA 2002). Similarly, the accused would need the ability to rely upon whatever material is necessary to convince a court on why the accusations are not good and the situation must revert to status quo ante. In a restrictive bail regime, given that the merits of the case are determinative, the proponent would need a strong hand to justify its case.
Which then brings us to how are these burdens discharged by both sides. On this question of materials, the criminal law recognises that different phases in the life of a case would warrant different standards of justification for the State. At the start of an investigation, police necessarily invoke suspicion as a means to justify arrest. But as a case goes on, reasonable suspicion as justification must give way to prima facie proof, where proof is naturally based only on material that is admissible as evidence. This step-wise progression was well-illustrated by the Privy Council in Inspector Shaaban Bin Hussein [1969 3 All ER 1626]. In other words, once an investigation has concluded, suspicion must give way to proof to justify continued detention of an accused during trial. This distinction was of great relevance within the Indian setting where there was a consistent legislative choice distrusting the police. The clearest example being a disavowal of statements recorded by police during an investigation from being used at trial, except as a means for an accused to confront prosecution witnesses.
Crucial changes were made to this legislative scheme by amendments to the criminal procedure code in 1955 which introduced a conflict in the foundational precepts of the criminal process. These changes have been discussed in earlier posts but need more elaboration. Essentially, again frustrated by delays in trials, a comprehensive bill was moved in 1953 which sought to radically reimagine the criminal process. Two key changes being (i) deletion of the statutory prohibition against using police statements, and (ii) active use of such statements to speed up trials where police had investigated the case. In short, from distrusting police the law now sought to imbibe a position of trust. Huge uproar followed, the bill was debated at length both inside the House and before a Joint Select Committee, and ultimately passed after significant modification in 1955. The version of this bill which became law was very different from its initial avatar. Where the bill sought to significantly trust the police, the law diluted this approach and re-instated the barrier on using statements recorded by police. But at the same time, it retained the amendments by which such statements could now be used for substantive purposes such as framing charge and deciding matters of bail.
This inherently contradictory position has remained with Indian criminal law ever since, and has not been addressed in the most recent 2023 laws either. What this means for arrest and bail is that the State can use material which can never be proof to discharge its burden till charge is framed and the evidence is recorded. What may have been a gap of few months or even a year in 1955 till institution of the case and taking evidence has today expanded to consuming several years in the life of a case, and requiring that questions of personal liberty continue to be decided upon untested allegations throughout this duration.
Replacing legal evidence with the police file also carried serious consequences for how an accused can discharge the burden placed on them while seeking bail in a restrictive bail regime. There was no opportunity left to cross-examine prosecution witnesses at a pre-trial stage and introduce doubts in the accusation to convince a court that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the accused was not guilty of the offence.
In other words, while the language of restrictive bail clauses has remained the same over time, the context in which they operate drastically altered the fairness of the regime. The context altered because of the changes made by Parliament to the criminal process, which transformed how the State and accused both discharged their burdens in matters of arrest and custody. While the law made it easier for the State to both discharge its initial burden on arrest and also oppose bail, it made it tremendously harder for the accused to discharge their burden to demonstrate why reversion to the status quo of liberty was necessary. Where the law had recognised a need to give a wide berth only during an investigation, since police were still gathering proof at this stage, amendments to the law post 1955 continued this wide berth till much later on in the legal process without corresponding safeguards to secure the position of the accused.
The amendments did so by removing clauses which required courts to form their conclusions about the sufficiency of a case on the basis of evidence that could be challenged by either party, with new provisions that required courts to form judicial conclusions upon untested police material gathered during an investigation. Material which the law continued to condemn as being inadmissible and untrustworthy. No corresponding shifts were introduced to redress this balance, such as allowing for an accused to lead material in support of the bail to convince a court either. Now, accused persons had to discharge their burdens with both hands tied behind their back, being tasked to demonstrate reasonable grounds of their innocence whilst being unable to question the police material. Leaving us with a peculiar position that the law conferred far greater rights to safeguard personal liberty and civil rights against private parties, but did not confer such protections against the State even as it continued to recognise its potential for malice.
Thus, to simply point to existence of restrictive bail regimes in old laws a la Kartar Singh, is not a good enough basis to sustain their legality, let alone their legitimacy. If anything, Kartar Singh demonstrates the clear tendency on part of successive legislatures to act unthinkingly, introducing an antiquated statutory tool without any appreciation of the contextual requirements needed to secure its fairness.
Monday, May 6, 2024
Jail is not the Rule - Restrictive Bail Conditions, After Independence (Part 2)
(This is the fourth post in an ongoing series on restrictive bail regimes)
The previous post covered the development of restrictive bail regimes in Independent India up till the 1970s. This post covers the crucial period from the 1970s till the mid 1990s, by the end of which India's Supreme Court, by my reckoning, addressed the legality of restrictive bail regimes for the first time.
The Repressive Laws Playbook
Before this phase, according to my count restrictive bail regimes — i.e., clauses restricting the power of sessions courts and high courts in granting bail — were not operating outside the war-related emergency legislation which we discussed in the previous post. These got a new lease of life in the 1970s, thanks to more war. Fast-forward to the mid-1990s though, and one finds that there were at least ten statutes (some had been repealed, to be replaced with new laws having similar clauses) at the federal and state levels with a restrictive bail regime in place:
- Section 12AA was inserted in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 in 1981.
- Section 5 of the Madhya Pradesh Dacoity Affected Areas Act, 1981.
- Section 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Dacoity Affected Areas Act, 1983.
- Section 5 of the Rajasthan Dacoity Affected Areas Act, 1986.
- Section 439-A was added to the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 by the State of Punjab in 1983 to restrict bail for some offences.
- Section 15 of the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984.
- Section 17(5) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 [see page 140 of the link] (repealed in 1987).
- Section 20 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 [see page 313 of the link].
- Section 37 was amended in the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 in 1989 to add such clauses.
- Section 7A was inserted in the Anti Hijacking Act,1982 in 1994.
- Section 7A was inserted in the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Civil Aviation Act, 1982 in 1994.
- Section 439-A was added to the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 by the State of Tripura in 1994 to restrict bail for some offences.
- There is no problem with the criteria prescribed by the clause as it is a condition similar to that imposed by Section 437(1) of the CrPC 1973 on matters of bail, besides other laws such as the Customs Act, 1962 also carrying a similar formulation in respect of the power to arrest a person. "Therefore, the condition that 'there are grounds for believing that he is not guilty of an offence' which condition in different from is incorporated in other acts such as clause (i) of Section 437(i) of the Code and Section 35(1) of FERA and 104(1) of the Customs Act, cannot be said to be an unreasonable condition infringing the principle of Article 21 of the Constitution."
- As regards the approach which a designated court ought to follow in matters of bail, the Bench in Kartar Singh referred to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon [(1988) 2 SCC 271] with approval. As per Usmanbhai, the "police report along with the statements in the case diary and other available materials should be closely examined" by a court to decide whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is "innocent of the offence".
- First, it did not appreciate that restrictions under Section 437 were historically justified as they curtailed the discretion of magistrates to grant bail in serious crimes. A long-view of the history behind Section 437 shows that there was a conscious decision by Parliament made time and again to unfetter the discretion of senior judges. As opposed to this view expressed under the CrPC, the restrictive bail regime under TADA (and other laws) had constrained the discretion of sessions courts and even constitutional courts. Thus, if anything, clauses under TADA were squarely contrary to the kind of prohibition that the general law imagined.
- Second, the history behind the restrictive bail clause showed that while the language of the clause remained the same from the 1940s till the 1990s, the context in which these clauses operated had drastically changed. The changes had exacerbated the handicap that such clauses cast upon an accused, by requiring courts to form their conclusions on the police file till the trial began.
- Third, in its unreserved affirmation of the Usmanbhai approach to decide bails, the Kartar Singh Court demonstrated its failure to appreciate the legal problems posed by reliance on the police file to administer the clause. While actively suggesting that courts should look at statements recorded during an investigation to decide bails under TADA, the Supreme Court gave Section 162 CrPC and the century-long legislative distrust of such statements a complete go-by.
Monday, March 11, 2024
Jail is Not the Rule - Restrictive Bail Conditions, After Independence (Part 1)
(This is the third post in a series on restrictive bail regimes)
The previous post considered restrictive bail regimes in India's pre-independence context. In the first of two posts, we travel through independent India's history to look at such regimes.
Partition and Post-War Scarcity
It appears that the earliest instance of a restrictive bail regime in post-independence India came a few months after independence, in the form of the East Punjab Armed Bandits (Arrest and Detention) Act 1947. This law was promulgated to replace an ordinance that had come in less than a month after August 15, 1947, and its provisions give a glimpse of the enormity of violence which was unleashed in the wake of partition in the Punjab region, and the kind of measures resorted to by the state to try and restore a semblance of normalcy. Section 3 thus conferred powers of arresting without warrant any member of an "armed band"; and where resistance was offered to arrest, it legalised using violence to the extent of causing death. Arrested persons were to be sent to 'Concentration Camps' as per Sections 4 and 5 - one can only imagine the treatment envisaged by the state which adopted this language even after the war had given this term such monstrous connotations.
In this remarkable statute, what interests us is Section 9, which carried forward the legacy of Rule 130-A of the Defence of India Rules (which had been repealed by now) and prescribed that "no person accused of an offence made punishable by this act shall if in custody be released on bail" unless (a) the prosecution was given an opportunity to oppose bail, and (b) "where the prosecution opposes the application the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence".
Partition was not the only problem for a nascent Indian republic. A serious issue was post-war shortages in the economy which remained regulated through a complicated system of licenses and controls. The acuity of shortages in essential supplies was not helped by corrupt public servants, hoarders, and profiteers. Official sentiment against such undesirables was so severe that debates in India's Constituent Assembly (which functioned in a dual capacity till 1950) and even its Provisional Parliament contain speeches advocating the harshest measures to be deployed, including flogging in the public square.
You can see where this is leading to. The fight to ensure essential supplies are secured was on a 'war-footing' for the country; an emergency requiring emergency legislation. It was with this mindset that, in 1950, the Provisional Parliament looked to amend the war-time Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946 to enhance its deterrent effect. Besides stiffening penalties and cutting corners in trials, what else did the Provisional Parliament do? Introduce a restrictive bail regime for certain specific crimes through Section 13-A of the Act.
The legislative debates around this specific amendment had been discussed on the Blog earlier. The government accepted that the lineage of the amendment went back to the War, but argued that the issue presented a similar emergency. There were attempts to change the 'not guilty' framing, which placed the burden on an accused, with the old Criminal Procedure Code framing which required the prosecution to first demonstrate that there were reasonable grounds to believe a person was guilty. But these attempts were in vain, and Section 13A was added to the law without any modification.
What the earlier post on amendments to the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946 did not consider was its history outside of the Provisional Parliament. This suggests that prior to amendments in the central law, there were already provincial statutes covering the same field which had introduced the Rule 130-A style restrictive bail regime, and extended it to any crime under these laws making it much more expansive than the central law introduced later. Furthermore, the proposal to insert a clause identical to Rule 130-A for the central law appears to have been refused initially. Instead, the government seems to have been happy with only adding the requirement for courts to ensure the prosecution was heard, while leaving out the problematic 'not guilty' clause. What prompted the change of heart in the few months leading up to the amendment bill being introduced in the floor of the house? I am sure the answer is in the archives, but I have not been able to locate it yet.
There are some judgments applying the restrictive bail regime found in provincial laws dealing with essential supplies, as well as the central amendment brought in 1950. In Rajulal v. State (1950), the Rajasthan High Court commended on the undesirable state of affairs created by the regime which allowed one party to exercise an undue influence over the course of bail proceedings. Similarly, in Abdul Shakoor (1951), the Rajasthan High Court confirmed that the restrictive bail regime of the central law was comparatively more limited in its reach than the prior state laws. The task of interpreting the central law fell to the Calcutta High Court in Badri Prosad (1951) where a lorry driver was arrested, having been found in possession of bags of rice without a permit. While he claimed lack of knowledge, both the magistrate and sessions court denied bail holding that the presence of rice meant there were no "reasonable grounds" to believe the applicant was not guilty of the offence.
Both Justices Mukharji and Mookerjee agreed that the applicant ought to be released on bail, but the seriousness of Section 13-A prompted them to write separate opinions. Mukharji J. stressed on the limited reach of the clause, and cautioned courts to ensure that allegations against an accused genuinely fit the contours of the specific offences to which the restrictive bail regime applied. In respect of the application of Section 13-A itself, Mukharji J. noted that there were similarities between the Section 13-A and Section 497 of the Code, but went on to observe that:
Here, however, a word of caution is necessary. It is time that there under Section 497, Criminal P. C., what prevents bail is the reasonable ground for believing that the accused is guilty. That in actual practice works more favourably to the accused in the sense that at the early stages, before the regular trial has started, it is easier for the Court without the full materials to say that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that he is guilty and thus admit him to bail. But in a case, however, under Section 13A, Essential Supplies Act, it is the converse and more difficult case of reasonable ground for believing that the applicant for bail is not guilty. It is difficult because in actual practice it is bound to be unfavourable to the applicant for bail in the sense that at the early stages, before the regular trial bas started, it will ordinarily be difficult and may in some cases be impossible for the Court to say without sufficient materials that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty. But that is the handicap which the statute has imposed in this case. [Emphasis mine]
It is stated that this Rule is quite unreasonable and repugnant to the elementary notions of Criminal Jurisprudence that a person is presumed to be innocent until it is proved that he is guilty. Neither the Act nor the Rules indicate any attempt to depart from these well-settled principles. Rule 155 merely indicates that where a person is accused of an offence under the Rules the court may not liberate him on bail pending the trial, except when it has reasonable grounds to believe that he is innocent. When the court comes to decide the case, it must acquit the accused if the prosecution has failed to establish the charge. Whether unreasonable or not laws lawfully made have to be given effect to by courts. It must be remembered that many provisions which would appear very harsh or unreasonable in peace time may be justified by necessities of war [Emphasis mine].
War, followed by a tragedy that was nothing short of a war, and then a war again. These were contexts in which a restrictive bail regime was prescribed which circumscribed not just powers of magistrates to grant bail, but also sessions courts and the High Courts. Besides the social and political context surrounding these statutory clauses, attention must also be paid to their catchment area. Even the Defence of India Acts did not introduce a catch-all clause that made the restrictive bail regime applicable to all crimes. Instead, the idea was to pick and choose the kinds of offences justifying these harsh measures. When it came to circumstances akin to war in the eyes of the legislature — essential supplies and the Punjab agitations — the catchment area of the restrictive regime was even narrower, and applied to crimes which had a prima facie element to them which gave the accused at least some chance to be able to discharge the onerous burden placed upon him. Thus, being caught with goods without a license was a situation which the accused could very well explain. This was unlike the wartime measures which imposed restrictions on bail for conduct such as publishing 'prejudicial reports', proving which relied a great deal on the subjective satisfaction of wartime censors and the courts as to the contents of materials.
The next post will turn to statutory developments from the 1970s and thereafter, bringing us to the most recent avatars of the restrictive bail regimes.
Monday, March 4, 2024
Jail is Not the Rule — A History of Restrictive Bail Regimes Pre-Independence
(This is the second post in a series discussing restrictive bail regimes)
This post looks at restrictive bail provisions through Indian legal history, drawing the line at India's independence. The next post will look at post-independence history. A similar exercise was attempted several years ago on the Blog, and a gradual increase in digitisation has meant that even within this short span of a decade, one can try to offer a more nuanced and textured presentation of the issues involved here. However, since this post is, again, based on publicly available material, it may have missed out on some facets, and readers are advised to keep that caveat in mind.
Restrictive Bail Provisions and the Criminal Procedure Codes pre Independence
If we look at bail provisions in the Criminal Procedure Codes of 1882 and 1898 (prior to 1923) in terms of non-bailable offences, it would appear that bail really was the exception for the colonial regime when it came to magistrate courts [the gradual changes to the regime are captured in this paper]. Section 497(1) in the 1898 Code (common in material aspects with the 1882 Code) stated that a person brought before magistrate's court after arrest "shall" not be released on bail if "there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of the offence of which he is accused". This was different from situations where during investigation / inquiry / trial the material only showed "sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt" [Section 497(2)]. Such restrictions were absent when it came to courts of session and the High Court, upon whom Section 498 of the Code conferred an unfettered power to grant bail.
Significant amendments were made to the 1898 Code in 1923. One such amendment was to Section 497(1) which changed the restriction upon magistrates in granting bail only for offences punishable with death or with transportation for life as opposed to all kinds of non-bailable offences. Thus, the policy towards bail was greatly liberalised, but it was felt that some fetters ought to be remain on how magistrate's exercised their discretion. After all, some members called the magistrates 'stupid' and 'weak' during the course of the legislative debates surrounding the 1923 amendments [discussed here at pp. 61-63]. Importantly, this test in Section 497(1) of the 1898 Code was retained in the 1973 Code as well, under Section 437(1).
Old commentaries on the 1898 Code (see p. 1474 here and p. 1183 here) suggest that the legal position prior to 1923 was that bail ought not to be granted by magistrates in non-bailable cases, and that while such restrictions were absent in provisions pertaining to superior courts it did not mean that this was treated as a license to grant bail liberally. The changes in 1923 were acknowledged by the commentators as having liberalised the bail regime and having been interpreted by courts to that effect as well. However, it was a mistake to think that the 1923 amendments had liberalised the regime to such an extent that the merits of the accusations were now altogether irrelevant.
What is important for us here is the discussion on how to construe the test laid down by Section 497(1) which required magistrates to ask whether "there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of the offence of which he is accused". There are two perspectives from which this restriction ought to be considered: first, how did courts read the letter of the law, and second, how was it applied in practice. The old commentaries referred to above offer some insight as to the first aspect, confirming that 'reasonable grounds' was a judicial determination based on the available material which was highly fact-specific. The second aspect, of how courts then applied this vague test, therefore turned on the practice of criminal law at the time. To appreciate this requires some elucidation as it is quite different from how things are done today when it comes to the investigations generally, and specifically the prosecution of serious crime that is punishable with death or transportation for life (today, life imprisonment).
In respect of investigations, police were notorious for not maintaining proper records of statements of witnesses recorded during investigations under Section 161 of the Code. Legally, there was no clear obligation on police to record statements separately within the case diary, and there was absolutely no obligation akin to Sections 173(5) or 207 of the 1973 Code to supply a copy of the police report and all statements of witnesses to the accused upon completing the investigation. The only obligation to supply copies of witnesses arose when the accused wished to cross-examine the witness who took the stand where a witness claimed to have made a prior statement and was now deposing contrary to it.
How would courts deal with framing of charge or appreciating any aspect of the case pre-trial you might wonder, considering how ubiquitous the Section 161 statements are for these issues in the administration of criminal law today. Well, the answer lies in the committal process [see Section 206 of the 1898 Code]. It was not the unsigned, unsworn testimony of the witness which determined issues such as charge and the sufficiency of material prior to trial proper, as it is today. Instead, the committal hearings before the magistrate required the prosecution to examine, on oath, the witnesses that it sought to rely upon to establish its case. The accused had a right to cross-examine these witnesses as well. To help imagine this process, consider what happens today in proceedings instituted upon a complaint in warrant triable cases under the 1973 Code. There are no Section 161 statements in such cases, and the prosecution must examine its witnesses on oath prior to framing charge, with the accused having a right to cross-examine these witnesses as well.
What this trip down memory lane shows us is that while the test as it was under Section 497(1) of the 1898 Code may have been carried forward by the 1973 Code as well in Section 437(1), but the material which formed the basis for applying the test was fundamentally different when it came to applying the test within the 1898 Code's context. Sworn testimony of witnesses who were available from cross-examination was replaced with unsigned, unsworn statements recorded by police officers which the law itself declares ought not to be used as substantive evidence. I will return to this point later on in the series, but it is so significant and rarely raised that it merits being flagged at the outset itself.
Restrictive Bail Provisions and Special Laws
The previous part referred to the classification drawn by Section 497(1) and (2) of the 1898 Code. The former (at least till 1923) restricted the power of magistrates to grant bail where reasonable grounds existed to support a belief that the accused was guilty, while the latter permitted bail if the material was only enough to suggest further grounds for inquiry into guilt.
Keeping this in mind, perhaps the first proper restrictive bail regime we encounter was under the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908, one of the harshest statutory measures crafted by the colonial regime to punish revolutionaries at the time. Amongst its provisions was a clause, Section 12, which stated that a person shall not be released on bail "if there appear sufficient grounds for further inquiry into the guilt of such person." The reference to Section 497 helps appreciate the draconian nature of this threshold. Having 'sufficient grounds for further inquiry' was nothing but a polite way of allowing bail rejections where the police averred that they had a case. These parts of the 1908 were repealed in 1922, while the remaining parts of it pertaining to declaring certain associations as unlawful and proceeding against them remain in force even to this day.
Perhaps it was the presence of the 1908 Act that did not necessitate further restrictions upon the bail regime during the First World War. Its repeal in 1922, coupled with the liberalising influence of the 1923 amendments, meant that when the Second World War reached the subcontinent, the colonial regime was without comparable legislation to curb the grant of bail. When the War came to India, the government responded with the Defence of India Act 1939 and rules made thereunder, which allowed for a truncated trial for many crimes that had any bearing on the war effort. Still, in 1939 itself, this war-based procedural regime did not have a dedicated restrictive bail regime. That came in February of 1941 with the introduction of Rule 130A which read as under (p. 192 here):
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, no reason accused or convicted of a contravention of these Rules shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond, unless —
(a) the prosecution has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and
(b) where the prosecution opposes the application and the contravention is of any such provision of these Rules as the Central Government or the Provincial Government may by notified order specify in this behalf, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such contravention.
The archives suggest that the proposal emanated from provincial governments which were troubled by how quickly bails were granted by courts without adequately hearing the prosecution. They do not offer much by way of discussion on the specific test that was added in clause (b). Is this because the test was no different from the existing regime under the 1898 Code? I would caution against such a reading, because Rule 130A inserted a rather different set of restrictions.
First, Rule 130A applied to all courts, which was a significant departure from the existing position that did not fetter the discretion of sessions courts and the High Courts to grant bail no matter what the allegations were. Second, Rule 130A now vested great power with the government, by placing a premium on its decision to oppose the plea for bail. If the prosecution did not oppose bail, then the additional restrictions would never come into play. Third, the test itself was worded differently than Section 497(1) which cast different obligations on the players. Section 497 of the Code was read as placing the onus upon the prosecution asking it to furnish material to show reasonable grounds existed to believe a person was guilty, whereas Rule 130A placed asked the accused to establish reasonable grounds to believe that he was not guilty. The former resembles the burdens at trial - if the prosecution did not establish its case first, the accused would not have any case to answer. The latter invited the court to assume the truth / veracity of what the prosecution brought forth, and burdened the accused to demonstrate the grounds within this material which supported his innocence.
The validity of the provision was challenged in re V. Bhuvaraha Iyengar [AIR 1942 Mad 221], where it was argued that the clause departs from the "fundamental principle" that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The Madras High Court rejected the contention, stating that the impugned Rule did no such thing but only indicated "that where a person is accused of an offence under the rules the Court may not liberate him on bail pending the trial, except when it has reasonable ground to believe that he is innocent. When the Court comes to decide the case, it must acquit the accused if the prosecution has failed to establish the charge." That is a non-reasoned answer if there ever was one. The Court also rejected the bail request, noting that "grave charges are alleged against the petitioner by a responsible police officer and a the stage at which the applications for bail were made it was impossible for the magistrate or the sessions judge to be satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner was not guilty of a contravention of the rules, and that is the position now."
The above extract gives us a glimpse of what Rule 130A was meant to achieve: a practical annulling of bail prior to the cross-examination of key witnesses at trial for the offences which were designated as being important to the war effort. In an already truncated legal procedure the court would never be faced with a situation where grave charges were not levelled by responsible officers with some material to support their claims, except for the most egregious of false cases. A court would presumably only be able to develop reasonable grounds to believe that the person was not guilty during a trial due to cross-examination of witnesses as at trial the burden still lay upon the prosecution to prove guilt as held by the Madras High Court.
Next Post
This post has surveyed the historical position in the general law and the special law on matters of bail, drawing the line at 1947. We saw how the general position on bail changed from being a very restrictive one — at least in respect of magistrate courts — to a more liberal one during the inter-war period. The onset of the Second World War brought with it a new set of restrictive measures and introduced Rule 130A in the Defence of India Rules. In the next post, we will see how the memories of this wartime measure would continue to echo all through the history of the constitutional republic of independent India.