Showing posts with label 167 CrPC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 167 CrPC. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 16, 2023

The Judgment in V. Senthil Balaji v. State — On Remands to Custody and S. 167 of the Code (Part Two)

 (This is the second in a two-part post. For the first post, click here)

The previous post in this series began a discussion of the Supreme Court's judgment in V. Senthil Balaji v. State [Crl. Appeal Nos. 2284-85 of 2023 (Decided on 07.08.2023) ("Balaji")]. It looked at the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court while concluding that procedures governing arrests under the general law — i.e., the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 ["Cr.P.C."] — did not apply to arrests under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 ["PMLA"] because this was not ordinary police but a 'sui generis' scheme, while at the same time concluding that officers of the Enforcement Directorate arresting persons under PMLA could be granted custody of the arrested person as provided under the Cr.P.C. even though the said provisions applied to police (which the Directorate officials were not).

This post turns to the Court's findings in Balaji on how should we interpret the legal provision pertaining to extended custodial detention of arrested persons during the pendency of an investigation — Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. Before turning to the Court's findings, it will be helpful to extract the relevant portions of the provision:

167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours.—

(1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate. 

(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: 

Provided that — (a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding— 

(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years;
(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence.

What Balaji says on Section 167
The discussion on Section 167 in Balaji takes place at two places — first at paras 50 to 66, and then from paras 73 to 79 of the judgment. The reason the Court wNIas called upon to interpret the provision may first be clarified. Here, the accused was arrested under PMLA, and the agency sought and obtained his custody from the concerned court, but before the agency could seek and actually take custody, the accused had been shifted to hospital for emergency procedures. The accused remained in hospital for the next two weeks. The agency renewed its request for taking custody of the accused upon his discharge. According to counsel for the accused, however, the agency was barred from taking custody now. It was argued that the 'fifteen days' referred to in Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. which spelt out the outer limit of custody possible for an investigative agency was a reference to the first fifteen days of custody, and not any point thereafter. Since the accused had already spent more than two weeks in custody, this period had lapsed, and the Directorate could not be helped. This was not a first principles pitch — it relied entirely upon a previous judgment of the Supreme Court in CBI v. Anupam J. Kulkarni [AIR 1992 SC 1768 ("Anupam Kulkarni")]. 

The Supreme Court in Anupam Kulkarni had explicitly and unequivocally held that the 'fifteen days' were the first fifteen days of custody, and did not refer to a period of fifteen days that applied across the broader time frame of 60 or 90 days. On this reading, the Court in Anupam Kulkarni dismissed applications of the CBI which sought to obtain physical custody of an accused outside of the first fifteen days, on grounds that the accused had been admitted to hospital for a few of those days and thus became unavailable to the CBI for questioning. 

There had been recent rumblings of discontent with the bright-line rule of Anupam Kulkarni emerging from the Supreme Court when in April a different bench agreed to create an exception and grant custody outside of fifteen days because it was of the view that the accused had acted in bad faith. In Balaji, not only does the Court reinforce this view that the fifteen days have to refer to a period when actual custody could be taken (para 60) but it gives the discontent with Anupam Kulkarni much firmer expression. The bench of Two Justices (same as the strength of the bench in Anupam Kulkarni) in Balaji has expressly voiced its disagreement with the view that custody with agencies must be limited to only the first fifteen days, and recommending that the matter be placed for consideration by a bench of larger strength. 

To understand why the Court in Balaji has concluded thus, we must turn to paras 50 to 66, and then paras 73 to 79. The main plank of the Court's reasoning is simple — nowhere does Section 167 itself state that police custody is limited to the first fifteen days. It says that the magistrate may authorise detention in custody from 'time to time', for a term not exceeding fifteen days 'in the whole'. This 'in the whole' cannot be read as the first fifteen days, but must refer to the outer limit of permissible detention in custody during an investigation which is either 90 days or 60 days (depending upon the offence). It acknowledges that the time limits have an Article 21 element and are a means to ensure speedy investigations, but it firmly holds that the Anupam Kulkarni view is principally wrong and this textual / plain / literal reading of Balaji ought to be favoured — "any other interpretation would seriously impair the power of investigation" (para 63). [Coincidentally, the Court was also not keen to provide any notice to prior to arrest on similar grounds of it seriously impairing investigations (para 33).]

Why Balaji is wrong in its reading of Section 167
There may or may not be a hearing on this issue of how to read Section 167 by a bench of larger strength — the Chief Justice may conclude that it is unnecessary, or perhaps the provision itself will be rendered a relic of the past with the new Sanhitas come into force. Nevertheless, it is important to understand why the view taken in Balaji is incorrect.

Let us take the statutory interpretation facets first. Balaji pens an ode to plain / literal / textual reading of a statute to convince us that such a reading ought to be followed in this case. But in tune with the double-speak found elsewhere in the judgment, we find that the Court abandons the statutory text when it suits the conclusions the Court wants to arrive it. In telling us that the limit of fifteen days can span across the overall period of 90 / 60 days, Balaji fails to pay heed to the phrase "the period of fifteen days" which the proviso refers to. This is not "a period" of fifteen days over which detention in custody of an agency can take place, but a definite, "the period" of fifteen days during which the detention can take place. It has to, therefore, be a continuous period, and not one that can be shaved off and broken up across a 90 / 60 day period. 

If the Court in Balaji had engaged more closely with the decision in Anupam Kulkarni, it would have realised that Anupam Kulkarni was not seemingly operating with the old Cr.P.C. in mind, but it was very much aware of the new law. This is where the history behind the provision becomes critical to understand, something which Balaji does a great disservice to, more so because what it offers to us is a half-baked historical approach with the comparison table (para 50) which merely presents the 1898 Code along side with the 1973 Code and plays spot the differences. 

A Short History of Section 167(2)
There is a journey from the old Code to the 1973 Code, a reason behind the choices made by Parliament when it enacted Section 167 and the other provisions of the 1973 Code. Without even attempting to delve into this history, the Court in Balaji could not have made assumptions about what might have been the legislative intent behind the phrasing of Section 167 as it was brought in the 1973 Code.

What is this history? Section 167 of the old 1898 Code permitted only fifteen days of custody during an investigation. This prompted a practice where police filed incomplete chargesheets only to make sure that the accused remained in custody while the investigation could continue, resulting in lengthy detentions at a stage even before the court was anywhere near starting proceedings. Parliament wanted to fix this aspect of the existing setup and speed up the process. 

This is the story that we find in different Law Commission Reports (repeated in judgments later), but none of these detail the drafting process of the new provisions, which is what we now turn to. The result of the initial discussions around a new Code was draft Section 170 in the Criminal Procedure Code Bill of 1970, the relevant portion of which read as follows:

(2) The magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole ... 

Provided that — 

(a) the magistrate may extend the term beyond the period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so; 
 ...  

As can be seen, the idea of 60 / 90 day limits was absent in this first iteration of the new Code. As was the idea of default bail. Instead the idea was to stick to fifteen day periods, requiring constant monitoring by court. The time limits, and default bail, both came into the draft after the Joint Committee of Parliament considered the draft, which also recommended reworking the clauses to retain the old statutory scheme for ease of convenience (something the Sanhitas' drafters may have done well to remember). When the Bill was introduced in Parliament, it contained the time limit scheme and the relevant part read as follows:

(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole ... 

Provided that — 
(a) the Magistrate may extend the term beyond the period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so; but no magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused in custody for a total period exceeding ninety days ... 

... 

Again, there is another critical difference in how Section 167(2) was in the draft legislation as compared to what was finally enacted. There is no fifteen day limit on police custody in this draft whatsoever. There is a fifteen day period in which custody can be granted, following which there is the possibility of extension, up to ninety days, if deemed necessary by the court. 

In effect, then, the draft of the new law permitted much longer police custody than even the old Code. This problem was not lost on Parliament. When the clause was taken up for discussion on 09.05.1973, the issue was flagged by Dinesh Joarder and was reiterated by other members in their initial speeches. During the clause-by-clause discussions on 01.09.1973, the Government accepted the suggested amendments by B.R. Shukla to draft Section 167, which sought to make it clear that any extension of custody beyond the fifteen day period would be "otherwise than in the custody of the police". (Far more debate took place, and even led Section 167 to be reconsidered later, on account of the introduction of default bail).

Thus, what is clear is this. Parliament knew how the Old Code worked and saw the first fifteen days after an arrest as a period where detention in custody was somewhat permissible. It did not restrict these powers further. However, it sought to put an end to filing of incomplete chargesheets by police through explicitly permitting detention in custody during investigations up to a certain period. While doing so, it created a draft which made it ambiguous as to whether the extension outside the first fifteen days could contemplate detention in police custody. Members of Parliament flagged this ambiguity during debates, and the draft law was suitably amended to make it clear that extension of custody outside of that first fifteen day period could never contemplate detention in police custody.

This was the understanding followed by courts in the aftermath of the new code being brought into force. The Delhi High Court in Dharam Pal [1980 CriLJ 1394] dealt with a challenge by the state to orders of a magistrate refusing to grant police custody within the first fifteen days of arrest as judicial custody had been granted. The High Court held that altering the nature of custody was possible and arguably necessary, but was only possible within the first fifteen days from a plain reading of the law. In setting aside the order, even though the first fifteen days of custody had lapsed, the High Court directed the magistrate to consider the matter as on the date when police sought the remand. 

An even clearer exposition of how Section 167 was understood and applied was seen in the Kerala High Court's judgment of K.V. Sadanandan [1984 CriLJ 1823]. Applying Section 167 was a two-step exercise, as the Court explained. Section 167(2) explained that the first step was first deciding to decide the nature of detention in custody for fifteen days in the whole. Only if at the end of this period the Court remained of a view that further detention was necessary, it could resort to the proviso, and extend detention up to the 60 / 90 days, but the nature of such detention could only be "otherwise than in the custody of the police". 

Therefore, Anupam Kulkarni did not mistakenly apply the law thinking it was dealing with the 1898 Code as Balaji suggests, but it was following what had emerged as an established view across courts, and was also the correct view deciphered from a textual reading of Section 167 itself. 

The Promise of Liberty
In failing to consult the history behind Section 167, it is no wonder that the Court in Balaji commits such serious errors as to assuming the correct legislative intent behind the provision. At no point was it in the mind of Parliament to grant police the custody of persons in a manner even broader than the colonial 1898 Code. The very purpose behind the comprehensive restructuring of Section 167 by Parliament in 1973 was to send a clear signal to police that their languorous investigations spread over months if not years were antithetical to personal liberty that the Constitution respected and guaranteed through Article 21. If such kinds of investigations were in the minds of agencies, then it was precisely Parliament's intent to impair the power of police to continue with such practices. 

That Balaji found it difficult to accept this clear intention is not a unique feat. Similar difficulties were, in fact, experienced in the context of the other part of Section 167 i.e. the insertion of default bail provisions, when they came, which the Supreme Court had gone so far as to comment was Parliament's creation of a "paradise for criminals". Yet, no matter how unpalatable to its sensibilities Court must honour legislative intent, and not find ways to skirt around it as long as it remains palpable to the Constitution itself. And, by all accounts, Section 167 in prescribing a limit on police custody as being permissible only during the first fifteen days of arrest is certainly not contrary to the Constitution. 

The conclusions in Balaji on this aspect of reading Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. are, therefore, incorrect.

Friday, August 11, 2023

The Judgment in V. Senthil Balaji v. State — On Arrest and ED Custody (Part One)

On 07.08.2023, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in a batch of petitions concerning the legality of the arrest and detention of V. Senthil Balaji, a Minister in the State of Tamil Nadu, by officers of the Enforcement Directorate on allegations of offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 ["PMLA"] [V. Senthil Balaji v. State rep. by Deputy Director & Ors., Crl. Appeal Nos. 2284-85 of 2023 (Decided on 07.08.2023) ("Balaji")]. 

The facts are recounted at the outset in Balaji, and in the orders passed by the Madras High Court [here, and here] which ultimately led to the case moving up to the Supreme Court. Rather than set them out in the same extensive, and contested, detail, for this post I will only narrate the most critical aspects of the case: (i) There was an arrest by the Enforcement Directorate, (ii) A judicial order granting custody of V. Senthil Balaji to the Directorate was passed, (iii) The Directorate could not take his custody within the first fifteen days of his arrest because of health issues forcing Mr. Balaji to be admitted to the hospital.  

Mr. Balaji and his family contended before the Supreme Court that his arrest illegal, as well as the order granting his custody to the Directorate, and even if neither of these claims were accepted then Mr. Balaji could only be sent to custody in jail since fifteen days had elapsed since his arrest. In Balaji, the Supreme Court rejected each of these contentions, and went ahead to cast doubts over the existing legal position as per which detention of an accused outside of the first fifteen days of an arrest could only be in jail and not with the investigating agency. 

Through this post and the next, an effort will be made to examine the judgment and the Court's answers. In this post, the focus is on the conclusion that the arrest was legal, and that the Enforcement Directorate could take custody of an accused during the investigation. The next post will specifically engage with how the Court in Balaji construed the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 ["Cr.P.C."] i.e., interpretation of Section 167, Cr.P.C., in respect of the nature of detention after arrest.

A Digression

Before going forward with the discussion, a digression. The opinion in Balaji is divided into sections to deal with specific issues, many of which begin with a quotation, presumably for pithily presenting to a reader the lens through which the Court viewed the issue at hand. Picking quotations, however, is a tricky path to tread; not only must we be careful about who is being quoted, but we must also be careful about not using a sentence or remark out of context. 

The quotations in Balaji, unfortunately, falter on both fronts. "All power is of an encroaching nature" is a quote used at the start of the section in the judgment which hopes to explain how the PMLA contains a set of provisions which place reasonable restrictions on the power of arrest. Not only is it wrongly attributed to Justice Frankfurter's opinion (dissenting, mind you) in Trop v. Dulles [356 U.S. 86 (1958)] — it is in fact attributed in the opinion itself to James Madison (Federalist No. 48) — but the context of this quote is entirely misplaced. The quote is a critique of state power, not a paean to it. 

Later on, a phrase attributed to Sophocles, "Law can never be enforced unless fear supports them", is used to emphasise how the PMLA itself has provisions punishing misuse of arrest powers by officers. This is a surprisingly popular phrase with Indian courts, and its proper context has been detailed elsewhere just to highlight how problematic its invocation in any judicial order within a democratic republic ought to be. And, lastly, there is a quote attributed to Benjamin Cardozo — "Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser too". A remark made in the context of the problems of overturning a conviction for murder on grounds of procedural error comes to justify the vesting of greater powers with the state for restraining personal liberty during the investigation phase.

Arrest and Custody with the Enforcement Directorate

On Arrest

Mr. Balaji's arrest was challenged on a very simple point. It was contended that while the PMLA allowed for the arrest of persons by Enforcement Directorate officials under Section 19 of that Act, the procedure for such an arrest was not specific anywhere in Section 19 or other provisions of the PMLA. This silence of the PMLA required consulting the general law of the Cr.P.C., since Section 65 of the PMLA rendered the Cr.P.C. applicable wherever it was not inconsistent with anything in the PMLA. Pursuing the argument to its logical end, it was contended that since the PMLA offences were only punishable up to seven years, the Cr.P.C. arrest procedure (as explained by the Supreme Court itself) required prior notices to an accused under Section 41-A of the Cr.P.C. or specific justifications for departing from this course to jump to an arrest.

Balaji held that this contention was based on a flawed premise, since Section 19 did in fact lay out how the arrest was to be carried out. The PMLA had, in the words of the Supreme Court, a "comprehensive procedure" [para 32] and a "different and distinct methodology [compared to Cr.P.C.]" [para 33] in place on the matter, which meant that resort to the Cr.P.C. would not be permissible as it would create a conflict between the two regimes. A clause which merely (i) lists the officer capable of exercising arrest powers, (ii) reiterates constitutional mandates about informing a person about grounds of arrest and their timely production before court, and (iii) specifies one procedural aspect (sending a copy of the arrest order in a sealed cover to another authority) is a "comprehensive procedure" [This becomes "rigorous procedure" in para 82]. There could not be a lower threshold to cross. Curiously enough, at a subsequent place in the judgment [para 67], the Court says that "Section 19 of the PMLA, 2002 supplemented by Section 167 of the CrPC, 1973 does provide adequate safeguards to an arrested person" leaving one further in doubt as to the comprehensive nature of Section 19.  

The Court offers supporting arguments to justify the interpretive choice being made in Balaji. The Court notes that introducing a requirement of issuing a notice prior to arrest, as under Section 41-A of the Cr.P.C., "might seriously impair the ongoing investigation" by placing a person in the "know-how" [para 33]. In any event, the Court notes Section 41-A was never seen as being applicable to anything other than minor offences [para 37]. Both lines of argument are deeply concerning. In seemingly restricting the scope of Section 41-A to so-called minor offences not only does the Court add context to the text of the statute which is notably absent — the provision does not restrict itself to minor offences, but all offences that are punishable with terms up to seven years in prison — but the Court also betrays its own recent history where it was using this provision to strike a fairer bargain between investigative needs and individual liberty. In promoting secrecy of investigations as a justification for arrest, the Court conflates the presumed need to be discreet about ongoing investigations with the entirely separate issue of considering what are proportionate intrusions into personal liberty to safeguard state interests. We have on display the classic anti-terror / serious crime gambit — the executive raises the stakes so high that courts are cowered into thinking that nothing other than completely sacrificing individual liberty to secure the state's interests is acceptable, lest the very state perish.  

On Custody

Which then brings us to the issue of what happens after arrests of persons. Here, as in most other cases, the Enforcement Directorate sought to take custody of the accused for purposes of investigation. However, the "comprehensive procedure" on arrest which the Court extolled in Balaji was surprisingly silent on such matters, requiring a reference to the general law under the Cr.P.C. 

This meant turning to Section 167 Cr.P.C., and that provision presented a slight issue. Section 167 permits court-sanctioned custodial detentions of persons after their arrest, and says that persons may either be detained in custody of the court by being placed in jail, or in the custody of the investigating agency by being placed in the lockup area that an agency would have. Unfortunately, the provision does not use the phrase "investigating agency", and instead refers specifically to "police custody" on this matter. This is where the problem arises: the Enforcement Directorate, much like many other central agencies, does not want its officers to be called "police" and nor is not seen as "police" in the eyes of courts. But if the Directorate has no police officers, then how can Section 167 which permits "police" custody allow a person to be detained by this agency's officials?

Convincing argument, or mere sophistry? Balaji concluded it was the latter, but without offering any clear reasons. At one place, the Court held that since Section 167 refers to detention in "such custody" as is considered fit by the judge, this would permit detention with agencies other than police as well [paras 45, 55, 85]. At another place, the Court concluded that since Section 167 was indeed applicable to the PMLA context to determine the maximum time of detention post arrest, its provisions permitting the detention of persons in the custody of the agency also had to be applied [paras 26, 70, 83]. And, briefly, the Court also hinted that this issue had already been considered in respect of other agencies in this fashion such as the Customs Act 1962, albeit those specific statutes specifically permitted treating officials as police officers for purposes of seeking custodial detention [para 82].  

Taken separately, or all together, it is difficult to remain convinced by the reasons offered by the Court for concluding that the terms of the PMLA, read together with the Cr.P.C., permit officials of the Directorate of Enforcement to obtain custodial detention of arrested persons. With respect to "such custody" in Section 167(1), it is rather surprising that in a judgment where the Court repeatedly insists upon reading provisions as a whole, on this aspect the Court was more than willing to read one phrase in isolation because it helped prop up its conclusions. Section 167(1) certainly refers to "such custody", but reference to the remainder of the provision makes it apparent that this is a binary between "police" and "court" / "judicial" custody. Reliance upon the 37th Report of the Law Commission on this issue by the Court [para 55] was entirely misplaced, firstly because it considered Section 167 as it was in the 1898 Code which did not contain the remaining clauses clarifying the binary choice before a court today, and secondly because the relevant para of that Report equated "such custody" as being outside of an investigative agency, which is certainly not what the Court in Balaji sought to conclude.

There is no gainsaying that in respect of the several other central agencies, earlier decisions of the Court had permitted custodial detention of an accused to be granted to them. This included even the Directorate officials. Unfortunately, there is equally no disputing the fact that the relevant provisions in those statutes were differently worded than the PMLA. Surely, a "comprehensive" and "rigorous" statutory procedure on the matter of arrests could not have accidentally been left ominously silent on this crucial issue of what happens after an arrest? Where on the one hand the Court emphasises relying upon the plain text of laws to infer legislative intent, one wonders why the same standards do not apply when it was confronted with a clear distinction between the PMLA on the one hand, and earlier laws on such matters on the other.  

If the Court was of the view that Parliament had erred in not repeating the same formula of older laws in the PMLA, it was nevertheless bound to follow the law is it stood or offer strong reasons for filling up what it saw as a gap. It did neither in Balaji.    

Contrary to what Balaji seems to portray, applying Section 167 Cr.P.C. together with Section 19 PMLA without necessarily permitting custodial detention of persons with Enforcement Directorate officers was far from being a strained or piecemeal way of applying both statutes together. Might it have been intended by Parliament to deny the agency investigating PMLA offences custodial detention, because such cases are the product of investigations done by other agencies where accused persons would likely have been arrested and questioned in custody? Considering that arrest powers under PMLA are pegged at a higher threshold than the Cr.P.C. — which the Court in Balaji agrees with — to permit arrest only where officers have reasons to believe a person is guilty of an offence, perhaps Parliament intentionally decided to not permit persons being detained in investigative custody with an agency which already has enough material to conclude the person is guilty of the crime?

The House that Vijay Madanlal Choudhary Built

Balaji comes barely a year after the Supreme Court had decided various issues in context of the PMLA in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [2022 SCC OnLine 929 ("VMC")] [Discussed on the Blog here and here]. At the heart of VMC was the Court's finding that the PMLA was not a penal or civil statute but a 'sui generis' legislation. On the strength of this finding the Court constructed a defence of the PMLA's validity, including its provisions on arrest and bail. As argued elsewhere, this defence was high on rhetoric and low on reasoning, deploying phrases like 'sui generis' to evade critical scrutiny of the law and support vesting broad powers with the executive. How does anyone but the creator and framer of a 'sui generis' know what it needs and what it doesn't?  

The 'sui generis' argument could not be tested before the bench in Balaji which was of lesser strength than VMC, but its shadow loomed large over the arguments being made here, and in a sense foretold the result. Because the PMLA is a 'sui generis' regime, even patently limited procedures can appear "comprehensive" and "rigorous" to a Court because these might be exactly what a 'sui generis' regime needs. 

Balaji thus offers a good glimpse of the house that VMC has built for dealing with any future challenges to how the PMLA operates. Persons contesting the government are essentially with an onerous handicap, as the goalpost itself is a perpetually shapeshifting, 'sui generis' one.

Conclusion

The Court in Balaji upheld a reading of the PMLA and the Cr.P.C. which permits Enforcement Directorate officials to arrest persons without notice and in the absence of any compelling justification behind such an arrest without notice. It also upheld a reading of the laws which permit the detention of arrested persons in the custody of Directorate officials. In doing so, it has only reiterated how most courts had been applying the law and not shaken up the status quo to any great extent. What is more interesting is the rather timid set of reasons the Court was able to muster in support of its conclusions. In effect, this is perhaps the state of things to come for all things PMLA, where 'sui generis' can help sustain anything and everything under this statute.

The next post considers the Court's conclusions on a different issue, the interpretation of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C., where the Court has taken big strides towards upsetting the status quo. 

Friday, May 12, 2023

The Doctrinal Discomforts of Default Bail (poked by Ritu Chhabaria)

As the Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy Blog discussed what seems like an eternity ago (it was only twelve days), a peculiar set of events had unfolded in the Supreme Court where a judgment passed by a Division Bench on 26.04.2023 was challenged by adopting a hitherto unknown process of a 'recall' application. The application had not yet cleared the registry to make it to the list of matters was therefore 'mentioned' orally on 01.05.2023 before a Division Bench comprising the Chief Justice, who directed that it shall be reconsidered and in the meantime not given effect to. 

There are rumours about the alleged procedural irregularities associated with the progress of the original case till its ultimate judgment. One does not know enough and therefore cannot comment on whether it was these set of circumstances which prompted the Supreme Court to adopt this unprecedented route thus far. But two wrongs never do make a right. Here, I take a different approach, and engage with the legal issues instead.

The judgment in question was Ritu Chhabaria v. Union of India [W.P. (Crl.) 60 of 2023 ("Ritu Chhabaria")]. The issue that it dealt with was that of bail under Section 167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 [Cr.P.C.], or what is popularly called 'Default Bail'. It is a species of bail which accrues as a right to a person detained in custody during an investigation, and where the investigating agency fails to complete its investigating by filing the police report within the stipulated time-period of 60 or 90 days (depending upon the seriousness of the alleged crime). 

More specifically, the issue in Ritu Chhabaria was determining what amounts to completing investigation for purposes of extinguishing the right under Section 167(2). If triggering this right can be circumvented by police simply filing any collection of papers in court before expiry of the 60 / 90 day period, it renders default bail completely anodyne and illusory. It also undercuts the very intent behind incorporating this set of provisions in the first place: As Ritu Chhabaria and several decisions in the past have pointed out, the point was to try and curb the then-rampant habits of police to file 'preliminary chargesheets' at the end of 15 days (the earlier time limit) only to keep undertrials behind bars. The 1973 Code raised the limits by a wide margin, but this was done while incorporating default bail to ensure that undertrial incarceration is not oppressively long.

Herein lies the problem in this oft-retold tale of Section 167 being a means to rein in bad police practices. The tale is incomplete, giving us only half the picture, because by a sleight of hand it wants us to forget that the process of keeping a person behind bars is not a one-man show but a tag-team event. It needs both the police and the courts. The police will ask for custody, but it is the magistrate who must sanction it, and the tragedy of incessantly and oppressively long undertrial incarceration was as much a product of judicial apathy to personal liberty and treating bail as linked to the merits of a case. To sum up, the introduction of Section 167 was not only to deal with bad police practices, it was also to curb bad judicial practices by taking away fuzzy discretion and introducing a concrete rule for bail.      

You cannot change the stripes on a tiger as they say, and in a way that is the story of what has followed. The time limits were seen as insufficient by many and prompted the Supreme Court to label Section 167 as a 'paradise' for criminals in its first foray into the statutory provision. The sense of panic at the thought of countless 'criminals' being let loose led to amendments in 1978 increasing 60 days to 90 days for a subset of offences carrying higher sentences. In parallel came litigation before high courts where accused persons challenged rejections to their bail applications on grounds that what the police had done was nothing other than file a 'preliminary chargesheet' even at the end of 60 / 90 days. Since the late 1970s till today, we have had courts — both High Courts and the Supreme Court — adopting myriad approaches to deal with this perceived problem of letting the criminals go on a 'technicality'. 

What connected all of these approaches was that all of them concurred in rejecting a bright-line approach that required an investigation to be complete in all respects at the end of the 60 / 90 days period. The stakes were simply seen as too high for the result to be decided on a rule, and so courts did what they do best and brought in wriggle room to make individualised decisions. Instead of demanding complete investigations, the judiciary substituted that rule with one that retained a measure of discretion for itself. Determine for yourself, magistrates were told, as to whether the document before you suggests the investigation is more or less complete. If so, reject the default bail. The result was to open a new arena of litigation within the matrix offering both the accused and police an opportunity to challenge unfavourable orders, and ensure that there can never be a settled law on the point.      

Ritu Chhabaria was the latest chapter in this history and, in that regard, offered an entirely unremarkable conclusion when it observed that any chargesheet or complaint filed without completing the investigation would not extinguish the right to default bail. Rather, the problem I would argue is what the judgment can be seen to stand for — a harkening back to a stricter rule of default bail requiring the agencies do more within the stipulated time period and restore some measure of importance to default bail. This is clearer if we look at the facts, which do not involve an alleged incompleteness because of some forensic reports not being filed, but question the very nature of the investigative exercise conducted which, to the court, was hopelessly short of the standard it considered to be required by Section 167.  

A stricter, more bright-line, rule of default bail in respect of completeness of investigations is a past which is certainly not appreciated by the police and other agencies which continue to decry the shortness of time to complete investigations, never fully answering the more pointed question — why does this require the continued incarceration of the individual as well? But as I suggest, a bright-line approach to default bail is not one that the courts are too fond of either, because they never came around to fully accepting the radical premise behind a concept of bail completely de-linked from the merits of the case (as argued elsewhere on the log). These are serious allegations, and continued incarceration of undertrials is presumably a small price to pay to make sure that courts can apply their mind to these facts to get it right. 

History would suggest that the Supreme Court in reconsidering Ritu Chhabaria will nudge the pendulum back to the perceived centre on this issue. Old habits die hard, after all.

Thursday, May 13, 2021

Muddied Waters: The Supreme Court's Decision in Gautam Navlakha's plea for Statutory Bail

The decision of a Division Bench of the Supreme Court in Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency [Crl. Appeal No. 510 of 2021 (Decided on 12.05.2021) ("Navlakha")] continues the rich tradition of poorly authored judgments which frequently emerge from the Supreme Court of India and other High Courts on matters of criminal procedure and personal liberty. The judgment is unclear, to say the least, and peppered with needless extracts throughout. The result is a laborious 206 page exercise which judges, lawyers, and law students will struggle with for some time to come (and, curious laypersons would be well-advised to avoid reading it altogether).  

The Facts

The Appellant was arrested in August 2018 and transit remand was granted to the police to take him from Delhi to PS Vishrambaug. But the arrest and remand were challenged in a habeas corpus petition filed on the same day before the Delhi High Court. Since it was unable to decide the petition on the same date, the High Court did not order the Appellant's release but directed that he be detained under "house arrest" till the petition could be decided. Later, in a separate public interest litigation, the Supreme Court extended this "house arrest" of the Appellant till it could decide that litigation. 

What we have then is a clear chain of events: the Appellant was arrested and remanded to custody by the trial court, and the terms of this custody were modified by the High Court till it decided a habeas corpus petition. The terms of this detention were clearly spelt out: the Appellant was not permitted to leave or interact with persons save his lawyers or doctors; his house was guarded by police, and crucially; he was not available for interrogation either. This detention was then extended by the Supreme Court. Ultimately, on 01.10.2018, the High Court ruled that the remand order was illegal. 

This did not spell the end of the litigation, of course, and as is well known the Appellant was arrested later and taken into custody in April 2020. In June, the Appellant raised a plea of statutory bail (or default bail) before the trial court in Maharashtra. This is a concept critical to criminal procedure and personal liberty in India. Once custodial detention during investigation crosses certain time-periods and the investigation is yet to be concluded, it triggers a right to bail for an accused under Section 167 of the Code. This "statutory bail" under Section 167 is distinct from the liberty that accused persons have to file bail applications and plead for release, because while judges retain vast discretion to grant or refuse ordinary bail applications, there is no such discretion when it comes to statutory bail. 

The Appellant claimed this right to bail because, according to him, the time spent by him in custody had to include the 34 days of custody he suffered in 2018 as well. Both the trial court and the Bombay High Court disagreed because the "house arrest" suffered by the Appellant could not been as custodial detention of the kinds envisioned under Section 167 of the Code. Even if that kind of detention could be seen as the kind of detention contemplated by Section 167, in this case the Delhi High Court had anyway held that the remand order and subsequent custody was illegal and thus stood wiped out. 

In essence, then, these were the two issues presented before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court's Verdict: A Dishonesty of Convenience 

Navlakha holds that the period of custody undergone by an accused during investigation into commission of non-bailable offences must be counted towards computing the total time spent in such custody as under Section 167 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973, even if a superior court later rules that the accused had been illegally remanded. Furthermore, it holds that confinement in "house arrest" after being apprehended by the police can be a form of custodial detention that is sanctioned in law under Section 167. In doing so, the Court expands the notion of custody beyond the usual dichotomy between "police custody" and "judicial custody", which was traditionally seen as detention in police lock-up and being sent to jail. This custodial detention at one's home would, by extension, also be included towards computing time spent in custody by an accused. Not only this, the judgment in Navlakha goes on the offensive and pushes for looking at house arrest more seriously at all stages of the process as an alternative to traditional judicial custody so as to reduce the prison population [Paras 137-140]. 

In the facts of the case before it, though, the Supreme Court was compelled to conclude that this particular house arrest suffered by the Appellant for 34 days could not have been ordered under Section 167 of the Code. As a result, it could not be said that his custodial detention during investigation had crossed the time-limit which entitled his release on bail.

Why does the Court conclude that the house arrest suffered by the Appellant, though certainly a kind of custodial detention, was not of the kind contemplated under Section 167 of the Code? The best chance at understanding this comes from closely reading the judgment from Para 131 onwards where reasons are offered — which are neither compelling nor consistent. It would be unhelpful to go through each of these individually and instead I'll highlight the underlying point, which is that the terms of this house arrest were such that it would not fit within the framework of Section 167 of the Code. No case diaries were inspected before directed house arrest and, furthermore, there was no possibility of interrogating the accused given the directions of the High Court. Thus, as the judgment puts it at Para 134.

That house arrest, in turn, involved, deprivation of liberty and will fall within the embrace of custody under Section 167 of the CrPC, was not apparently in the minds of both this Court and the High Court of Delhi. This is our understanding of the orders passed by the court.

With due respect, this is bogus. It does not matter what was "apparently in the minds" of judges when they passed certain orders. In fact, because it is impossible to fathom with any degree of certainty what might have been in the mind of an authority when it took a decision, judicial review always implores judges to refrain from engaging in such an inquiry. Instead, judges must locate the decision within the framework of law, and consider whether the exercise of discretion which lay behind the decision was not arbitrary. Thus, once the Court in Navlakha concluded that house arrest is custodial detention within the meaning of Section 167 of the Code, it cannot conveniently revisit this conclusion in the facts of a particular case and locate a specific instance of house arrest outside of Section 167, because of what it thinks was "apparently in the minds" of judges. If the detention was not in terms of Section 167, then it was illegal, but that would not stop the clock for statutory bail under Section 167 as the Court concludes. 

Conclusion

As convenient as it may have seemed, it was still wholly impermissible for the Court to locate the 34 days of custody suffered by the Appellant in a no-man's land which is both within the law and beyond it. This kind of judicial exceptionalism in the face of hard cases not only unmoors the concept of judicial review from its very foundations, but flips it entirely to permit a pick-and-choose of the worst sort imaginable. 

At this point, one would be forgiven to think this is too harsh a criticism of the judgment in Navlakha. After all, and this is a point that the judgment itself puts forth, even the Appellant and other accused persons did not imagine house arrest as a liberty-depriving measure at the time when the orders were passed. I agree; and if the Court was still unconvinced of its conclusion on this front, it could very well conclude that house arrest was not custodial detention within the framework of law. It could do this while also airing its concerns about prison overcrowding to suggest that perhaps the legislature should start to look at house arrest more seriously as an alternative to existing judicial custody detention. 

But the Court chose to not adopt this restrained course of action, which is why its conclusions are a perfect exercise in adopting what I label a dishonesty of convenience. Or, to put it more plainly, an effort to have its cake and eat it too. 

Saturday, July 20, 2019

Dimple Happy Dhakad and Normalising Preventive Detention

“Preventive Detention” is a phrase that is inextricably bound with the history of the Indian Constitution. The Constituent Assembly affirmed the power for future governments to pass such laws, and only later got around to debating the restraints surrounding them. As a result, despite Article 22 having been inserted to serve as the minimal constitutional threshold to check abuse of preventive detention, it has often been treated as a constitutional recognition for the notion that the fundamental right to personal liberty requires restraints “For the good of the people“.

The decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Dimple Happy Dhakad [Crl. Appeal No. 1064 of 2019 & connected petitions, "Dhakad"] shows a clear preference for the latter, mistaken view, over the former. By affirming the use of preventive detention in a situation where no “prevention” was really at stake, while at the same time diluting the high burden usually imposed on the state for requesting preventive detention in such cases, the Supreme Court took a dangerous step towards normalising what was meant to be a measure of the absolute last resort. In doing so, it compounded the slide towards normalising preventive detention already being witnessed across states, which have used this tool to deal with bullying and cattle theft, among other issues. 

Understanding Preventive Detention
Despite the perceived familiarity with preventive detention, it still serves us well to remind ourselves just what exactly is meant by the phrase, and how different this regime is from the normal “punitive” system of criminal justice. 

In the regular course, the police or other agencies can only take steps to restrain personal liberty after some illegal conduct has taken place. There must be something, beyond mere thoughts, to justify why a person should be arrested and thus denied the most basic of freedoms. This regular course is turned on its head under the preventive detention regime. Here, waiting for some conduct to manifest itself is considered a fatal delay, and therefore, the police is allowed to arrest persons merely suspected of engaging in illegal activities, or about to engage in them. 

The dissimilarities with the regular process only increase from this point. In the preventive detention regime, a has no right to be informed immediately about the grounds of arrest and detention, and in some cases might never learn of the grounds if it is against public interest. The detenu can challenge the detention order, but has no right to legal assistance. Further, all hearings take place behind closed doors, robbing a person of the sense of fairness that a public hearing entails. Although one can challenge Detention orders in writ proceedings, the Writ Court can only interfere on limited grounds. 

At its very best, preventive detention is a useful tool to ensure the safety of society. At any other level, it is a convenient means to suppress dissent, disregard individual liberty, and nullify the presumption of innocence. It can very quickly transform into a tool to justify the continued incarceration of “unwanted” persons through a process with minimal procedural safeguards, without ever making efforts to prove their alleged infractions. 

Preventive Detention in the Ordinary Process
The legal position on passing preventive detention orders against persons already in custody, in connection with cases filed in the regular criminal justice system, is perhaps one of the most peculiar aspects of the Indian criminal process. One would think that since a person is already in custody, the urgency surrounding preventive detention is all but lost. This is not so. 

Time and again, detention orders are passed against persons who are anticipated to be released on bail at any moment. The perceived threat from their release is considered so grave as to justify a detention order anticipating this eventuality. 

The litany of judicial decisions covering this peculiar aspect of our criminal process always struggle to maintain a balance between the interests of security and the interests of liberty. It would be fair to say that a common theme through all these decisions is a requirement that the government must clearly establish that there is an imminent possibility of release, and that there is a grave likelihood of the person returning to the prejudicial activities that had necessitated his arrest/detention in the first place. [See, Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244]


Dimple Happy Dhakad 
Having thus fleshed out the basic legal position on these issues, we can now proceed to the recent decision in Dhakad. This was yet another case where persons who had already been arrested under the regular criminal process were made the subject of a Preventive Detention order [Under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA)]. Here, the arrests occurred in March 2019 in connection with alleged gold smuggling. Bail applications filed by the accused in April had been rejected once. When the accused filed fresh bail applications in May, then the government authorised the Detention Order. The Bombay High Court set aside the orders (W.P. 2844 of 2019, decided on 25.06.2019), and this decision is what was overturned by the Supreme Court. 

The arguments in Dhakad were on the lines as above. Appealing against the Bombay High Court order, the Union of India laid stress on the gravity of the allegations and the security interests at stake. The respondents/accused strived to show that the detention orders had not been passed with the required degree of care and attention, and had instead been passed in a most routine and mechanical manner. They were assisted by the fact that the Detention order did not even mention anything about an imminent possibility of release, or about the likelihood of the accused persons returning to their prejudicial activities. 

Moreover, in their haste to pass the Detention orders, the authorities had committed basic errors; such as (i) adding documents created after the decision to pass the detention order had been made, as part of the material relied upon for passing the Detention orders and (ii) not supplying the said relied upon material together with the grounds of the detention order, despite the order stating that this material was in fact being supplied. While it was never expressly mentioned in the Supreme Court’s opinion, the fact that the investigation had been ongoing for almost 2 months before the Detention orders were passed was a circumstance that had found favour with the Bombay High Court, to conclude that there was no reason for any delay in them being supplied with the materials upon which the authorities had relied for passing the detention orders.

Issue 1: Non-Supply of Documents
There is limited value in dissecting all that is wrong with the Supreme Court‘s decision in Dhakad, so let us focus on the core aspects. The Court spends great time in telling us that Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA, and Article 22(5) of the Constitution, have not been breached because all documents were supplied within the statutorily prescribed timeframe of five days. Similarly, it tells us that non-compliance with Executive Guidelines is no grounds for setting aside the Order. Sadly, that is besides the point, because the argument was not about a statutory lapse on part of the authorities or about non-compliance with Guidelines per se. Instead, it was argued that by failing to provide documents, even after specifically noting in the Detention Order that the same are being provided, showed a clear lack of care on the part of the authorities and laid bare the mechanical manner in which the orders were passed. Further, the Supreme Court seems to have ignored the point, that a document prepared after the decision to pass the detention orders was made had found a place in the list of materials relied upon to pass this order, again suggesting that the Detention order had been passed without proper application of mind.

Issue 2: Failure to Consider Pre-Existing Detention 
Which then brings me to the main issue, on the usage of Preventive Detention in cases already being prosecuted under the regular criminal process. The Supreme Court seems to have entirely missed the point about holding the government to a high standard of care in situations where both, the regular criminal process and the extraordinary means of preventive detention, are employed. The recitations of decisions emphasising the urgency of preventive detention, in a case where the accused persons had already been arrested and had been languishing in jail for almost 2 months, is almost laughable if it were not tragic. 

The Court reasoned that the existence of an imminent possibility of release, as well as likelihood of further prejudicial conduct by the accused persons upon release, were issues that depended upon the “subjective satisfaction” of the authority and thus was beyond the scope of judicial review. Now, there is no debate that the scope of judicial review of Detention orders is limited. But, at the same time, it is also true that the Supreme Court has made consistent efforts to expand the possibilities for review to ensure fairness. Two examples are striking. First, the Court judicial created a requirement that the allegation must have a “live link” with the present to justify a need for preventive detention, in a bid to prevent persons being detained on the basis of stale allegations that had not been tested for years [See, Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1979) 1 SCC 465]. Second, the Court also assented to testing the grounds to examine whether they were so arbitrary and vague so as to render it impossible to challenge the Detention order [See, Prabhu Dayal Deorah v. D.M., Kamrup, (1974) 1 SCC 103]. 

This trend of heightened review is what led to the common theme identified in the previous section, of the Supreme Court consistently placing a higher threshold on detention authorities to justify use of Preventive Detention in cases already being processed in the regular criminal process. Requiring that the Detention order explicitly refers to the possibility of release and likelihood of re-offending does not impinge upon the subjective satisfaction of the authority. It only provides a clear basis for assuming that the authority did indeed consider these issues, and prevent the kind of inferential exercises that the Court resorted to in Dhakad.

Post-Script
The most telling circumstance in Dhakad only emerged after the Detention orders were passed and thus is not expressly mentioned in the Supreme Court decision: The customs authorities failed to complete their investigation within the statutorily prescribed time limit, entitling Dhakad and others to statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C.. The only reason why they were not released was the Detention orders. Thus, the customs authorities had used Preventive Detention to cover their inability to finish an investigation in time, and also deny the accused yet another vested right in the criminal process. It is practice that has been chided by the Delhi High Court on different occasions (See, here, and here), but has not been the subject of consideration in any reported Supreme Court opinions that I could find. 

Thankfully, the opinion in Dhakad does not expressly record that the possibility of being released on statutory bail is a compelling enough reason to invoke Preventive Detention. But this is perhaps the only positive note that the decision strikes. Yet again, the Supreme Court ended up being drawn in by the lure of preventing a politically undesirable outcome — the possibility of releasing alleged gold smugglers on bail — and in the process ended up glossing over the procedural safeguards that are the bedrock of the liberty it is constitutionally committed to protect.

Monday, August 28, 2017

Supreme Court Clarifies Default Bail and Section 167 Cr.P.C. - Or Not?

If criminal procedure is an exercise of the law regulating how power (the State) can take away an individual's liberty to compel her to participate in the criminal process (as Foucault suggests), then Section 167 perhaps is the most important provision in the Indian Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 [Cr.P.C.]. In a country rampant for high rates of pre-trial detention, this provision limits how long such detention can (ordinarily) last during an investigation after arrest. The primary limit of 24 hours is honoured only in breach, and from there we move to steep cliffs: limits are placed at sixty days and ninety days depending on the kind of allegations initially levelled. If the police do not complete an investigation within this time by filing a Final Report / Chargesheet, then the accused is entitled to bail. This is popularly called 'default bail'. 

The Questions
Here, the devil is in the detail, and I've fleshed it out below to highlight the interpretation issue that arises:
  • Detention can last up to ninety days for offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term not less than ten years; 
  • Detention can last up to sixty days for any other offence.
Now, how do we construe the phrase "imprisonment for a term not less than ten years"? Does it include offences punishable with a term from zero to a maximum of ten years as well, or does it only cover offences with at least a ten year prison term? I have briefly discussed this issue on the Blog, and very recently it was taken up by a three judges bench of the Supreme Court in Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam [SLP (Crl.) 2009 of 2017, hereafter Rakesh Kumar Paul]. A two judge majority held that only offences punishable with at least a term of ten years imprisonment could lead to detention for up to ninety days. The majority also held that it is not really necessary to file a specific application under Section 167 Cr.P.C. for being released on default bail, oral arguments could cover it too without specific written averments. In fact, the majority suggested that a court was required to assess the circumstances and apprise an accused if she was entitled to default bail and grant bail if an accused could furnish sureties. In this post, we focus on the first of these issues in detail.

Procedural History 
Why was a bench of three judges hearing the issue? Because two different division benches had come to seemingly different conclusions in Rajeev Chaudhary v. State [AIR 2001 SC 2369] and Bhupinder Singh v. Jarnail Singh [(2006) 6 SCC 277]. In Rajeev Chaudhary, it appears that the Court held that offences must have at least a ten year term (I say 'appears' as the procedural history is dodgy and the majority and minority in Rakesh Kumar Paul fence over what the decision actually held; the majority found it prescribed a mandatory minimum while Pant, J. suggested the holding was ambiguous). As against this, in Bhupinder Singh the bench made obiter remarks implying that a mandatory minimum was the incorrect interpretation (Obiter, since the offence there was punishable under Section 304-B IPC with punishments ranging from a mandatory minimum of seven years to life imprisonment, thus placing it squarely within the ninety days column).

In Rakesh Kumar Paul, the allegations were under Section 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 which carries punishments ranging from a mandatory minimum of four years to a maximum of ten years. The Petitioner had filed a bail application after completing over sixty days in custody, which was dismissed. No Final Report / Chargesheet had been filed yet, but one was filed before expiry of the ninety day period. The High Court also dismissed the plea for bail. No specific averments were initially made in the bail application on 'default bail' but the plea was purportedly raised during oral argument, and addressed by the courts which held that an offence punishable up to ten years imprisonment was part of the ninety days category. Since the police filed a Final Report / Chargesheet within ninety days, there was no merit in the default bail claims.*

Majority v. Minority in Rakesh Kumar Paul
Lokur, J. has written the main majority opinion with which Gupta, J. concurs, while Pant, J. penned a dissent. Their conclusions have been mentioned above, but how did they arrive at these? The majority bases the holding on two prongs: (i) tracing the statutory history of Section 167, and (ii) locating this within a larger argument that personal liberty is prized under the Constitution and the Cr.P.C. The development of Section 167 Cr.P.C. unarguably shows how the provision came in 1973 to remedy a problem caused by the tight limits of a fifteen day detention period under the 1898 Code which were never honoured. The sixty - ninety day distinction came in through subsequent amendments in 1978, and Lokur, J. considered the text of the Amendment Bill (ultimately not fully incorporated) which read "imprisonment for not less than ten years or more" to conclude that the legislative intent was to only have offences with a clear sentence of at least ten years. He then grounds his argument in the idea that the Constitution and Cr.P.C. stress on preserving individual liberty, and a broader reading of Section 167 Cr.P.C. would defeat this larger objective. Both judges suggest that their interpretation honours the idea that only serious offences get the possibility of lengthy detention. 

Before moving on to the minority opinion, a word about the concurrence by Gupta, J. According to him there is no ambiguity in the text of Section 167 Cr.P.C. which bars resorting to external aids to interpret the provision (for some reason the opinion keeps referring to the 1898 Cr.P.C. in this context and how 117 years have passed since the enactment without appreciating that Section 167 never existed in the erstwhile Code). However, he expressed concurrence with the reasoning of Lokur, J. which did not think so. This makes it difficult to understand the place of the concurrence itself.

The minority opinion does not think that the text is clear and again revisits the legislative history to draw legislative intent. But now Pant, J. turns to the speeches of the particular member of Parliament who moved the Amendment Bill in both houses of Parliament. He emphasises a count given by S.D. Patil that specifies to which offences would the ninety days clause apply - which lists out thirty-six offences as punishable under the category of "imprisonment for not less than ten years". Scanning the Indian Penal Code 1860 [IPC], Pant. J. demonstrates how this could only be if we include offences that also have a maximum of ten years imprisonment. Therefore, he disagrees with Lokur, J. that the legislative intent pointed to the opposite conclusion and finds that the plea for default bail ought to be dismissed in the present case.

Evaluating the Decision
The majority decision in Rakesh Kumar Paul is, unfortunately, rather problematic when one goes beyond the rhetoric of individual liberty that it offers. For this comes at the expense of engaging with the legal issue at hand. A broader problem is that while Gupta, J. agrees with the conclusions of Lokur, J., his reasoning on this issue differs materially but this remains unacknowledged and thus makes his concurrence carry a different weight. I highlighted one conflict above. The other comes when the judges compare the views in Rajeev Chaudhary and Bhupinder Singh. Lokur, J. suggests there is a conflict and specifically agrees with the view in Rajeev Chaudhary while Gupta, J. (correctly) finds there was no conflict, as the remarks in Bhupinder Singh were at best obiter. 

The deeper problem with the majority opinion is the lack of intellectual rigour on display.  Any law student will tell you that Pant, J. did not uphold the canon of statutory interpretation which says that the views of a large legislature cannot be attributed to the voice of a single participant in the house. Further, the minority opinion does not offer an explanations on why the words were dropped either. But the mere presence of those speeches in the minority opinion severely lessens the credit of the majority opinion. Not only does it convincingly show there is an ambiguity, but also shows us that Lokur J. did not fully engage with the legislative history before speculating on legislative intent. That doubt is damaging and one then can't stop wondering what else was missed out by the majority.

While I firmly believe that the possibility of pre-trial detention must be narrowly construed, the sad truth is that currently Section 167 Cr.P.C. does not allow this. The majority does not engage with the most important point made by the minority - that no offences in the IPC ever prescribed a minimum of ten years imprisonment. Which begs the question that why would the legislature use a language to describe the kind of offences that our penal code has never seen. Following the majority logic leaves out some serious offences - Attempt to Murder punishable under Section 307 IPC for instance - and therefore betrays the logic of the sixty - ninety day distinction being tied to the gravity of the offence which both majority opinions adopt.

Conclusion
Given that there was no prevailing conflict between the views of the Supreme Court in Rajeev Chaudhary and Bhupinder Singh, we can say that the Court has simply upheld the view in Rajeev Chaudhary by a 2-1 split in the present case. Sadly for us, the majority opinions lack conviction on the issue that was under discussion. Both Lokur, J. and Pant, J. hinted at the language of Section 167 Cr.P.C. being problematic, and it is apparent that the problems will persist without clear legislative intervention. Given how this opinion has simply upheld status quo - for Rajeev Chaudhary had already curbed the powers of investigative agencies on this front, it is unlikely that this will happen. Teleologically, perhaps that is for the best after all.

On another note, the majority opinion does warrant applause for liberalising the regime of default bail by placing a greater onus on the courts. It has long been acknowledged how accused persons continue to languish in custody despite being entitled to default bail, only because of poor legal assistance. While I have often seen trial courts apprising accused person's of their rights, a strict honouring of the Court's observations in Rakesh Kumar Paul can certainly further the cause. 


*The Petitioner had also made an argument trying to construe the maximum period of punishment as seven years using the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act 2013, which was roundly rejected by all courts hearing the case. 

Sunday, February 7, 2016

Custody and Section 167 Cr.P.C.

Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. has been subjected to a lot of interpretation over time due to the nature of the subject matter. The provision concerns remanding a person to custody by a court, when the police present said person before the court within 24 hours of an arrest. Nonetheless, two very interesting interpretive questions remain largely unexplored when you scan through Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. They are quite fascinating. I thought they merit some discussion.

Enter, the 'accused'
Our criminal law confers several rights upon an accused person. For instance, the accused has a constitutional right against self-incrimination [Article 20(3) of the Constitution]. But, nowhere do we have a definition of who is an 'accused'. The Supreme Court helped out by giving an explanation in 1954, when it held that one is an 'accused' when there is a formal accusation which may in the normal course result in prosecution [M.P. Sharma v Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300]. Later, though, it held that persons taken into custody and interrogated by customs officers are not 'accused' [Romesh Chandra Mehta v State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 940]. The problems arising from this stand have been discussed here before. Suffice to say, that it remains unclear from the decisions who is an 'accused'. Which is why Section 167 assumes significance. This is the first time when the Cr.P.C. mentions an 'accused'. Section 167(1) says "whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody ... and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded ... shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate" [Run a ctrl+f search to test me]. Before this, the Code speaks of arresting a person "accused of" a certain offence. Now, that person becomes the accused. 

Lets try line-drawing. Before this, what has happened? Arrest, and some (not more than 24) hours in custody. One conclusion which emerges is that only after the police seek formal custody from court does one become an accused. The first 24 hours are not included because they are needed to determine whether the accusation is well-founded. We can perhaps say that the test in M.P. Sharma could be modified to define the accused as a person against whom a well-founded accusation, as opposed to an accusation, has been made. This also invites a problematic reading of Article 20(3) which would then exclude the protection from persons for that initial 24 hour period and incentivise under-reporting of arrests. Before you disregard the idea, remember that the Court has already sanctified this exclusion for periods longer than 24 hours where the detaining authority is not wearing khaki but a better fabric [i.e., its a customs officer and not police officer]. Keeping that important development aside for a moment, what is important here is the possibility to use Section 167 for providing a clear, consistent idea of who is an accused.

Interpreting The Proviso 
The proviso to Section 167(2) creates 90 day and 60 day limits on detention in custody. 90 days where the offence is one punishable with death, imprisonment for life "or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years". 60 days for "any other offence". Death and life imprisonment are clear enough, but how do we read "imprisonment for a term not less than ten years" in Proviso (a). Our drafting style for offences has been quite standard over time: there is always a maximum, there may be a minimum. The Proviso is based on the nature of offences, but no offence in the IPC is defined as having a punishment "not less than ten years". So why choose such perplexing language! The courts are left to make good of what they have. The Supreme Court has considered the proviso in detail twice to my knowledge; Rajeev Chaudhary v State [AIR 2001 SC 2369] and Bhupinder Singh v Jarnail Singh [(2006) 6 SCC 277]. Both decisions are problematic.

Rajeev Chaudhary required deciding whether Section 386 IPC fell in the 60 day or 90 day category. Section 386 is punishable up to ten years imprisonment. The Court held that in the Proviso "the expression not less than would mean imprisonment should be 10 years or more and would cover only those offences for which punishment could be imprisonment for a clear period of 10 years or more." In Bhupinder Singh, the Court was faced with a resulting problem. Section 304-B IPC allowed a minimum imprisonment of seven years and a maximum of life. This meant imprisonment was not "for a clear period of 10 years or more". Justice Pasayat decided that custody could still be for 90 days by wisely noting that "merely because the minimum sentence is provided that does not mean that the sentence imposable is only the minimum sentence". The only way to arrive at this conclusion was to overrule the clear period test of Rajeev Chaudhary but this never happens.  

I would therefore regard Bhupinder Singh as per incuriam, and address the position as it remains from Rajeev Chaudhary. The position is unacceptable. Not only does it re-write the text, but (a) plainly illogical and (ii) contrary to how we read the Cr.P.C. elsewhere. On logic, this reading potentially excludes offences such as Section 307 IPC and a host of other grave offences under special laws [NDPS Act, for instance] by this clear period test. Surely, that could not have been the legislative intention. On interpreting the Cr.P.C., turn to the Part-II of the Schedule to the Cr.P.C. [its right at the end] which explains how offences under laws other than IPC are normally tried. Offences punishable for 3 years form one category of cognizable and non-bailable, and those for less than 3 years form a separate one of non-cognizable and bailable. Non-IPC offences punishable up to 3 years have been consistently treated as cognizable and bailable (unless specified otherwise) illustrating that courts include the maximum punishment while understanding the offence (see decisions on Section 63 of the Copyright Act 1957). Similarly, not less than ten years in the Proviso, must mean to include all offences punishable with up to ten years.