Guest Post — Conspiracy in times of the Raj (Part III)

(This is a guest post by Madhav Aggarwal, and the third in a series of posts on conspiracy)

The previous post on this blog covered the birth of the substantive offence of Conspiracy in the aftermath of the Delhi Conspiracy Case. This post will focus on the life of the substantive offence of conspiracy in Pre-Independent India. 

Introduction

The insertion of Section 120B in the Indian Penal Code 1860 through Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1913 marked the second departure from Macaulay’s stance on criminalising conspiracies only as a form of abetment. The singing reason for the insertion of Conspiracy as a substantive offence was to ensure that “dangerous conspiracies” like the assassination attempt on the Viceroy are nipped in the bud much before they are executed. Purportedly, it was the inadequacy of Indian law and not the failure of the police to detect these crimes that interventions before the execution of the conspiracies could not be made.

Though, a look at the actual operation of the law would debunk this reasoning. I was able to review most of the reported judgments from High Courts and Chief Commissioners Courts for this period and it appears that the insertion of the clause was not working to forestall serious conspiracies from occurring. Perhaps the only big conspiracy case before commission of the dacoity or bomb-throwing was the Meerut Conspiracy Case [S.H. Jhabwala v. Emperor (1933)], where an array of accused persons were charged as having conspired to overthrow the British Government solely due to their involvement (formal as well as informal) with Communist parties of India or Great Britain. But it may be argued that even the Meerut Conspiracy Case cannot be seen as an example of Section 120-B working as intended, because firstly the accused persons had given various inflammatory speeches, and secondly the accused were not charged with S. 120-B at all but with the offence under Section 121-A of the Penal Code, that initial departure from Macaulay’s scheme. 

Submerging Section 107 within Section 120-A?

While we are aware of the stated reasons for the introduction of Section 120A and Section 120B, it remains unexplained why the legislature chose to retain Section 107. Even a plain reading of the bare act is sufficient to grasp how Conspiracy under Sections 120A 120B is unduly wide and completely engulfs abetment by conspiracy under Section 107 in its scope. 

Firstly, Section 120A provides an extended definition of criminal conspiracy covering acts which do not amount to abetment by conspiracy within the meaning of Section 107. It does away with the need for any overt act as long as the conspiracy involves an agreement to commit an offence as is required by Section 107. Then, Section 120B makes them punishable in the same manner as if they had been abetted (albeit only if the offence conspired to be committed was punishable with at least 2 years of imprisonment). Secondly, Section 120A also brings within its scope criminal conspiracies other than criminal conspiracies to commit offences, which would not have amounted to abetment. 

Conspiracy OR Abetment by Conspiracy?

So if a conspiracy under Section 120B is sought to be proved through overt acts besides the agreement, would it not mean that it amounted to conspiracy by abetment also because an overt act did follow? What decides whether a charge under Section 120B should be framed or Section 109? 

In the initial period, there were attempts to curtail the application of Section 120B by contending that use of the words “where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy” in that clause imply that abetment by conspiracy should be resorted to when applicable. The Courts rejected this interpretation on the basis that the words used in Section 120B refer to Section 121A instead of abetment by conspiracy and concluded that it was optional for the prosecution to proceed under either. [Udhasing Tahilsing v. Emperor, 1916 SCC OnLine Sind JC 11; Kishanchand v. Emperor, 1925 SCC OnLine Sind JC 49].

Soon however, the position of law seemed to drift against this understanding. Courts started considering it appropriate to utilize conspiracy by abetment instead of Section 120B when some offence in pursuance of the conspiracy had taken place. [Jugeshwar Singh v. King Emperior (1935), Mallimoggala Venkataramiah (1937), Satyanarayana v. King-Emperor, (1943)]. 

Conspiracy to commit AND the offence committed?

Let’s now address the foundational question of the appropriateness of charge under Section 120B together with the charge of the offence conspired to be committed. The legal position in this respect remained in turmoil just as the political position of the country. 

As discussed before, one line of authorities endorsed the view that if the commission of some offence has taken place, the proper charge would be abetment by conspiracy and the offence committed instead of Section 120B. [Jugeshwar Singh (1935), Mallimoggala Venkataramiah (1937)]

The other line of authorities laid down that the accused can be separately punished for the offence under Section 120B because of it being a substantive offence. [Bala Huddar v. Emperor, 1931 SCC OnLine MP 3; Hazari Beria v. Emperor, 1928 SCC OnLine Oudh CC 172; Emperor v. Karamalli Gulamalli (1938)]

A separate, and might I add legally untenable, view was adopted by the Lahore High Court. It endorsed charging with only the commission of the offence on the basis of “shortness of time” between the hatching of a conspiracy and commission of the crime. [Punjab Singh v. Crown, 1933 SCC OnLine Lah 436; Ismail v. Emperor, 1946 SCC OnLine Lah 52]

S. 196-A: A buckler?

A definitive distinction between abetment by conspiracy and Section 120B was that the rigour of Section 196-A in the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 (CrPC) didn’t apply to abetment by conspiracy. The Criminal (Amendment) Ordinance, 1913 had also introduced Section 196-A in CrPC apart from the changes introduced in the Penal Code. The stated purpose was to “provide a safeguard against the vexatious prosecution for criminal conspiracy” with its application expressly limited to Section 120B. It provided for two classes of cases. First, where the object of the conspiracy is to commit an illegal act other than a statutory offence or a legal act by illegal means, the complaint must be made under the authority of the state. Second, where the object of the conspiracy is to commit any non-cognizable offence, or a cognizable offence not punishable with death, transportation or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, a sanction was required. This meant that it couldn’t ensnare anything more than petty conspiracies. 

As can be evinced, the requirement of sanction under Section 196-A in CrPC depended on the object of the conspiracy and not on the offences that may have been committed in pursuance of it. This made it quite simple to sidestep the requirement. Consider this — Even if forgery (non-cognizable offence requiring sanction) was committed in pursuance of a conspiracy, it could be alleged that the object of the conspiracy was to commit criminal breach of trust (cognizable offence not requiring sanction).

The position of law with respect to validity of a trial initiated without a sanction under Section 196-A in CrPC also remained unsettled. There was a line of cases that regarded it merely as a ‘technical defect’ and endorsed that a trial initiated without sanction that ends in conviction should be upheld. [Abdul Rahman v. Emperor (1935)] And that if no objection was taken at the stage of inquiry or trial, a trial cannot be held to be illegal for want of sanction. [Hanif v. Emperor (1932)]. 

On the other hand, there was another line of cases which held that a sanction to prosecute for criminal conspiracy, given after the filing of the complaint, does not fulfil the requirements of Section 196-A in CrPC and that a conviction for criminal conspiracy should be set aside in the absence of proof that prior sanction to initiate the proceedings had been obtained [P. Varadarajulu Naidu v. Public Prosecutor (1918) following Barindra Kumar Ghose (1909)].

“Prosecutor’s Darling” for a reason

Dire warnings of some like Mr. Vijayraghavachariar soon came true and Section 120B acquired a bad reputation. The Calcutta High Court would use the epithet “much misused provision” for it. [Ram Gobinda Ghose v. Emperor (1938)]. It wasn’t just the wide definition clause that made Section 120B prone to misuse but also the procedural advantages that it allowed the prosecution. Firstly, it eased requirements of the preciseness of charges. Secondly, it allowed numerous accused to be tried on a multiplicity of charges. Thirdly, it provided a relaxation in the rules governing evidence. 

The Precision of the charge

The purpose of framing charges is to inform the accused what the prosecution intends to prove against her. From early on, these requirements for the sufficiency of charge for conspiracy were watered down by the Courts. It was held not necessary to state the object of the conspiracy with the same degree of certainty as is required in the charge for the offence sought to be committed [Amrita Lal Hazra (1915)].

Further, it was held that it is unnecessary to specify the date of commencement of conspiracy. [Balmokand v. Emperor, 1915 SCC OnLine Lah 43], or to specify all the persons involved in a conspiracy. And though a conspiracy may be sought to be proved through overt acts committed in pursuance of it, setting them out in the charge was just “surplusage”. [Kishanchand v. Emperor, 1925 SCC OnLine Sind JC 49] 

Numerous charges, Numerous Accused, Numerous advantages

Allegations of conspiracy make it possible to try numerous accused for disparate offences only connected by the common link of conspiracy. The fundamental rule that each offence must be a separate charge and each charge must have a separate trial is laid down by Section 233 of CrPC. Sections 235 CrPC and 239 CrPC allow exceptions to this rule. Section 235 CrPC permits charging with every such offence which is so connected together to form the same transaction. Further, Section 239(1) CrPC allows persons accused of same or different offences forming the same transaction to be tried together or separately, as the court deems fit. 

This categorization of conspiracy as a “transaction” enabled the Court to try the offence of conspiracy and all the offences committed in pursuance of it together. The breadth of this stance is made apparent by this statement in Gopal Raghunath v. Emperor (1928):

“it was the working, the fruits and the result of the alleged conspiracy and if so, the separate act done by any of the conspirators in pursuance of that conspiracy could be joined in the same trial.”

The legality of this joinder of persons and charges depended on the accusations and not on the eventual result of the trial. Even an eventual failure to establish conspiracy could not vitiate the trial. The prosecution could easily invent theories of a conspiracy for their purpose.

Just at the turn of the century in Subrahmania Iyer v. King Emperor (1901), the Privy Council had disagreed with the similar reasoning advanced in respect of abetment by conspiracy that the conspiracy and all subsequent offences constituted a series of acts forming part of the same transaction. However, this case soon came to be distinguished on the basis that it pre-dated the introduction of the substantive offence of conspiracy by Calcutta High Court in Abdul Salim (1921) engaged in trying 37 charges together. Later, the Calcutta High Court in Giridhari Lal v. Emperor, 1936 SCC OnLine Cal 142, would express unease about distinguishing Subrahmania Iyer solely on this basis. It observed that a judicial committee may soon have to be asked to give an authoritative ruling to lay down the permissible procedure in framing charges with respect to Section 120B. Still, the position of law remained that all persons accused of a single conspiracy could be tried together for disparate acts done in the pursuance of a conspiracy. 

The Section 10 Concession

The old shibboleth goes — “direct proof can scarcely be afforded of a conspiracy”. Since direct proof of an agreement may be difficult to present, a conspiracy is often sought to be established by proof of other circumstances suggesting its existence. These circumstances are burnished by the ability to use evidence of out-of-court statements made by others which, in other cases, would have been inadmissible. 

The provision permitting this is Section 10 Indian Evidence Act 1872 (IEA), which provides that anything said, done or written by any conspirator in reference (not necessarily in furtherance) to their common intention since the intention of conspiracy was first entertained is relevant against each co-conspirator. It could be used for the purpose of proving the existence of a conspiracy as well as for the purpose of showing that any person was a party to it. 

In Amrita Lal Hazra (1915), the defence flagged the concern that the prosecution might indiscriminately charge persons to let their evidence in under Section 10 IEA. The Court dismissed the concern remarking that the defence may insist upon strict adherence to the provision.

Section 10 IEA is even wider than the English counterpart. Recourse to the illustration appended to this section will make its overreaching scope clear.

“The facts that B procured arms in Europe for the purpose of the conspiracy, C collected money in Calcutta for a like object, D persuaded persons to join the conspiracy in Bombay, E published writings advocating the object in view at Agra, and F transmitted from Delhi to G at Kabul the money which C had collected at Calcutta, and the contents of a letter written by H giving an account of the conspiracy, are each relevant, both to prove the existence of the conspiracy, and to prove A’s complicity in it, although he may have been ignorant of all of them, and although the persons by whom they were done were strangers to him, and although they may have taken place before he joined the conspiracy or after he left it.”

Unless the act of B in Europe bears some reference to A in Calcutta, how can it assist in proving A’s complicity? Finding it hard to rationalize the illustration, the Lahore High Court in Balmokand took a circumspect view. It remarked that the “technical relevancy” of a fact under Section 10 IEA wouldn’t amount to much if the fact is insufficient by itself for proving the complicity of the co-accused.

All that was required to open the floodgates of evidence under Section 10 IEA was “reasonable grounds” to believe that the conspiracy existed between such persons. What if the evidence received during the trial displaces this reasonable ground of belief in the existence of Conspiracy? The Privy Council in HHB Gill (1948) confirmed that the Court must later reject the evidence then. But can you really unring the bell?

Conclusion

It will be decades before some of these conflicting positions would be resolved. Some of these issues will even crop up before the Law Commission of (Independent) India. But this should at least explain what made the charge of Section 120B so expedient for the colonial law enforcement to use. Soon, Section 120B will enter the service of the Republic of India which will be covered in the next post.

Conspiracy and Abetment - Legislative Oversight or Crucial Distinctions?

The Law Commission of India has twice recommended (in its 42nd and 156th Reports) that Section 107 of the IPC be amended to remove the part of abetment by conspiracy. This recommendation argues that in light of Sections 120-A and 120-B having been inserted into the IPC, there is no need for the abetment by conspiracy clause. But these recommendations have not been implemented. How should we be treating these recommendations? Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes suggests that recommendations not being accepted indicates the Legislature disagrees with the view promoted by the recommendation. So in this case, that would lead us to argue that the Legislature considers the conspiracy clause in Section 107 useful and not redundant. The inertia that plagues India's legislature offers an easy counterpoint; of this being just another instance of legislative oversight with the recommendations having been buried beneath all the protests happening in Parliament at that time. Does retention of abetment by conspiracy under Section 107 IPC together with the independent conspiracy offence under Sections 120-A and 120-B IPC reflect legislative intent or is it mere inertia? This post grapples with this question. Given no parliamentary debates are available online on this aspect, all I can offer is my take.

Demarcating Spheres of Influence
For abetment by conspiracy, there must be a conspiracy, and an act/illegal omission must be committed in pursuance of it. For the offence defined under Section 120-A, there is no need for any act/illegal omission to be committed so long as the conspiracy involves an agreement to commit an offence. Barring this distinction, it is clear that Section 107 and Section 120-A are covering more or less the same field. Interestingly, Section 120-B punishes conspiracy by relying upon the abetment provisions [Section 120-B(1) IPC: "whoever is party to a criminal conspiracy ... shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence."].

Why did the need arise to insert the broader offence? Some answers lie in the position of the IPC before the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1913 inserted Sections 120-A and 120-B. Prior to this, conspiracy was criminalised generally under Section 107 IPC, and also through specific provisions, such as Section 121-A IPC. It was only these specific conspiracy offences that did away with the act/illegal omission requirement. The early 20th century was a time heady with revolutionary movements, especially in Calcutta following the Partition of Bengal. Reading reported decisions on conspiracy from High Courts around this time, one finds the accused persons were nearly always alleged revolutionaries. Section 120-A allowed the police to cast a wider net than before and would have been very desirable from a colonial law-enforcement perspective.

With this context, the demarcation of what Section 107 and Section 120-A cover should be clear. Both criminalise agreements (read conspiracies) to do a thing where some act/illegal omission is committed in pursuance thereof. But Section 120-A also creates an exception for this act/illegal omission requirement, where the conspiracy involves an agreement to commit an offence.

Judicial Appreciation of the Problem
The existence of two separate frameworks criminalising conspiracies was not lost on the courts. Different High Courts came to the conclusion that having Section 107 IPC together with Sections 120-A and 120-B IPC curtailed the application of the latter. Section 120-A was found to be applicable only where the allegations involved a conspiracy without any commission of substantive offences. As soon as any act/illegal omission occurred towards commission of the offence, the case became one of abetment and excluded Section 120-A IPC. This view was held by the Madras High Court in Re Mallimoggala Venkatramiah & Ors. [AIR 1938 Mad 130], by the Patna High Court in Jugeshwar Singh v. Emperor [AIR 1936 Pat 346], and also in S. Satyanarayana v. Emperor [AIR 1944 Pat 67].

This, in my opinion, was a smart move that prevented Section 107 from being rendered completely otiose. What's more, it also led to understanding the 'offence' of conspiracy under Section 120-A in tune with its purportedly inchoate nature. Even in the Law Commission Reports lamenting Section 107 IPC, we find conspiracy is characterised as an inchoate offence. By restricting charges under Section 120-B to cases where there was nothing but a conspiracy, the High Courts merely reinforced this logic. After all, if a person committed an offence pursuant to a conspiracy, it made little sense to charge him for the original inchoate crime too. It made more sense to hold persons liable as abettors, rather than conspirators.

Conclusion - An Opportunity Lost?
India's unintentionally unique statutory framework allows for a lot of clarity in employing conspiracy. There is significant literature in the USA criticising the broad nature of the conspiracy offence, and how it remains separately chargeable despite the main offence having been committed in execution of the conspiracy. Here, the combination of Section 107 IPC and Section 120-A IPC allowed Indian courts to restrict conspiracy to a purely inchoate offence. The prosecutors didn't lose much either, as they could use the abetment route to rope in the various persons jointly liable.

That there is perhaps no decision today that questions the usage of Section 120-B where offences committed pursuant to a conspiracy are complete shows how the logic that I advertise has been significantly brushed aside. Rather than having a line of cases where the boundaries of Section 120-B were clearly drawn out, we find that today the opinion of the Law Commission seems to have become received wisdom. An opportunity lost, then, for the IPC provided a unique solution to some common problems faced by various jurisdictions while prosecuting conspiracies.

On Abetment and the IPC

The fascination of this Blog with inchoate liability continues, and this post dips into the concept of abetment. One might say this fascination is being reflected across the board, with a high-profile investigation recently grabbing headlines for making use of abetment. This, admittedly though, is a diversion from the current project of considering criminal conspiracy on this blog. But the diversion is purposeful, as I hope will become clear during the course of this post.

Statutory Framework
I refrain from providing regular dictionary definitions of abetment, since Section 107 IPC does the defining for our purposes. According to this provision one can 'abet' a thing in one of three ways: (i) by instigating any person to do that thing, (ii) by engaging with another in a conspiracy for the doing of that thing with some act/illegal omission occurring pursuant to this conspiracy towards doing that thing, or (iii) intentionally aiding by act/illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Section 108 IPC tells us that an abettor is liable regardless of whether the principal acts on the abetment. Liability is thus one step removed from the ultimate commission of an offence, making clear the 'inchoate' nature of abetment. So, to use the statutory example: if A instigates B to murder C, and B doesn't do so, A is still liable for abetment. The commission of offences makes a difference for punishment - this is explained by Sections 109-117 of the IPC. Most prosaically, Sections 109, 115 and 116 IPC provide that different punishments are inflicted where a principal commits the offence being abetted and where no offence is committed. This provides a neat method to proceed with this post; we will first jump to rules creating liability and then turn to rules defining the extent of that liability.

Defining Abetment and Abettors
Section 108 IPC tells us that an abettor faces inchoate liability. We've discussed inchoate liability in context of conspiracy, so lets compare. Section 120-A defines conspiracy as agreeing to commit 'illegal acts', and the explanation renders conspiracies to commit offences punishable without any subsequent act resulting. Abetment by conspiracy as per Section 107 IPC always requires the occurrence of an act/illegal omission pursuant to the conspiracy. But, notice a more basic difference. A conspiracy to commit an offence means both parties have agreed at the outset that they will be committing offences. This planned cooperation is only one means of abetment, and the other forms do not require abetment of offences, but abetment of acts. So an abettor need not know the 'thing' being abetted is an offence. Section 108 supports this, and defines an Abettor as one who abets an offence, or acts that would be offences.

So, an abettor's mental element need not be that well-defined. But, given how liability can arise even if there is no act consequent to any abetment, it makes sense to demand nothing short of intention on part of an abettor to hold her liable. Further, to ensure the net of criminal law is not cast too wide, it becomes necessary to demand some acts/illegal omissions towards the doing of something for establishing abetment. Section 107 supports this conventional theory. Instigation cannot exist without intention, and always involves some express physical act. Using several synonyms, the Supreme Court has explained that 'instigation' means to "goad, urge forward, provoke, incite, or encourage" the doing of something [Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 (3 Judges), at paragraph 20]. The conspiracy clause in Section 107 specifically requires that an act/illegal omission accompany a conspiracy, and this act/illegal omission must be towards the commission of the thing abetted. A pure conspiracy is not enough, contrary to the crime of Section 120-A IPC [Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, 1962 Supp. (2) SCR 297 (3 Judges), pages 318-320]. Finally, there is aiding by act/illegal omission clause which is prefaced by a requirement of intention, meaning that one must intentionally aid, not merely aid, for acts/illegal omissions to be considered abetment [Shri Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1975) 3 SCC 495].

Another interesting facet of Section 107 is its recognition that abetment can occur at any stage of the doing of some thing. I argue that there is a neat three-step division reflected in the three categories of Section 107. Instigation usually is the outset and represents a situation where A provokes/goads B to do something. Conspiracy indicates a plan between A and B to do something rather than one person provoking another towards it. Aiding indicates a situation where B is already doing something and A comes in later. Section 109 IPC seems to support me here with its explanation: "an act or offence is said to be committed in consequence of abetment, when it is committed in consequence of the instigation, or in pursuance of the conspiracy, or with the aid which constitutes the abetment." In this account of abetment the abettor's liability itself is linked to the principal. I argue that this is important, and keeps the scope of abetment reigned in. Pedantically, then, I argue that A cannot instigate someone who is already doing that thing, when Section 107 requires the instigation must be to do that thing. Basically, if A walks in on B repeatedly stabbing C, if A now encourages B to keep on stabbing it cannot be read as being an instigation to do something [stabbing here], since it is already happening. Abetment by conspiracy is also limited to situations where the thing is yet to be done - the conspiracy must be "for the doing of that thing". Once the 'thing' is already in motion, all that is left is intentionally aiding its 'doing', either by acts or illegal omissions.

My argument on the three-step division lacks support in case law, due to my poor research (another way to say that comments are welcome!). On to more surer footing then, where we consider how the IPC accounts for the possibility of dissonance between the acts of abettor and principal.

Liability and Accounting for Variance
If we see abetment as requiring complete harmony between the acts/intentions of the abettor and principal, then we come dangerously close to conflating abetment with conspiracy. Abetment doesn't always involve an element of planning, and the law must account for imperfect associations between abettor and principal that are being created. How does it account for this possible variance? At the first step of different intentions, the law privileges the acts/intentions of the abettor. Section 110 IPC provides that where the principal carries out an act with an intention different from the abettor, the law will operate on a fiction that the principal acted with the intention held by the abettor in order to punish the abettor.

At the second step of different physical consequences resulting from abetment, the law inserts a requirement of knowledge as to probable consequences to go along with the initial requirement of intention. Recall that an offence consists of conduct, consequence and circumstance requirements acting together. For instance, certain kinds of conduct - say, sexual intercourse - becomes an offence (rape) when it is committed in certain circumstances - in the absence of consent. Similarly, certain conduct is only an offence where it results in certain consequences - murder comes in, when acts result in causing death. What mental states are associated with conduct, consequences and circumstances? The law moves on a presumption that only voluntary conduct can be considered to hold someone liable (thus creating various exceptions for insanity and intoxication). Consequences are ordinarily intended: A intends to cause death by shooting C with a gun. Circumstances are known: A proceeds to have sexual intercourse with C despite knowing there is no consent or is reckless as to existence of consent. In abetment, there is a gap between the conduct and consequence elements. The acts of firing a gun or reckless/forcible sexual intercourse are not committed by A but by another person, B. The possibility of B realising the desired consequence becomes yet another circumstance, that can only be probably known.

Thus, under Section 111 IPC an abettor is liable for even those acts that are different from the ones abetted, so long as that different act was a probable consequence of the abetment and had a relation to it. Similarly, under Section 113 IPC, where acts are abetted with the intention of causing a particular effect but result in causing a different effect, the abettor can be liable even for the different effect if she knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect. Interestingly, all the illustrations to Sections 111 and 113 IPC are restricted to abetment by instigation, although the proviso to Section 111 specifically lists all three forms of abetment. Going back to the argument in the previous section, can it be said that a dissonance is possible where I am aiding the doing of something by acts/illegal omissions, as the thing is already in the process of being done?

An example to round things up. If A encourages her friend B (a 15 year old)  to take her car out for a spin, A abets B 'to do a thing', i.e. drive a vehicle. This is an offence, and so A can be held liable as an abettor. If A tells B that she will arrange for a fake license to help her drive whenever needed, A now abets by intentional aiding 'the doing of that thing', i.e. continuing driving while she is not authorised. A knows that B has a habit of driving fast - B got challaned on previous occasions - but lets her continue. Tomorrow, then, if B gets into an accident while driving rashly which leads to the death of a pedestrian C, can A be held liable as an abettor? The answer would turn on whether A knew that the act abetted (B driving, in a manner known to be rash), was likely to cause that effect (causing an accident while driving). Certainly, this is not implausible by any means.

Conclusions
This post hopefully cleared some ground on abetment, and created new doubts as well. What is more important for the larger scheme of things on this blog currently is the relationship between abetment and conspiracy, which we touched on. The next post will get back to discussing this relationship more thoroughly.