Sunday, September 6, 2020

Guest Post: Neuroscience in Juvenile Policy Making, a Need of the Hour

(This is a guest post by Vatsala Singh Parashar)

The way our brain reacts to minor offenders is a paradox. When we regard them as helpless kids gone wayward, we characterise the offences (allegedly) committed by them as instances of immaturity. However, upon the consumption of society’s sympathy for them, we arrive at the opposite end of the spectrum, where society tends to regard them as "super predators". The lack of compassion towards these children, from the society as a whole, is reflected by the hardened stance taken when it comes to dealing with their crimes.

Indian society is plagued by the same vacillating views. The lawmakers of our country are products of a society which associates the criminalisation of the juvenile system as the only way forward to deal with a new species of super predators. The statute which deals with juvenile offenders in our country is the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (“ The Act” ). It was passed, in largue measure, due to the fact that one of the accused in the tragic Nirbhaya Gang Rape case, was a minor at the cusp of adulthood .

This Act calls for the formation of a Juvenile Justice Board, (“JJB”) formed under section 4 of The Act, for the preliminary assessment of the capacity of the children in the age group of 16-18 to commit crimes. I argue that criminal actions undertaken by juveniles are the result of their interactions with their society, on the one hand, and the gradual development of their brain on the other. The development of a young person's brain during their adolescent years and their psychological and neurological deficiencies mitigate their criminal culpability. I do not argue that children should not be held criminally liable because of their mental insufficiencies; but simply that this suggest reasons for why they are less culpable because of the same reasons and should not be tried as adults. 

Working of the JJB - A Pandora's Box
The JJB, consisting of a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate along with two social workers, takes the assistance of psychologists for performing the preliminary evaluation of children in conflict with law (“CCL”). Considering opinions on the anvil of scholarly articles referred to while writing the blog, I feel that this preliminary assessment fails to stand the basic test of criminal law. The edifice of criminal law is built on the pillars of actus reus and mens rea. Findlay Stark, in "It’s Only Words: On Meaning and Mens Rea", emphasises on the difficulty of establishing mens rea in an adult. Attempts to establish the same in a child are riddled with uncertainties, given the vulnerability and impressionability of a child’s brain. The JJB, in its assessment, disavows the guiding principle of criminal law, innocent until proven guilty by treating the child as someone being capable of committing a crime, even before the trial.

An exacerbating factor to be taken into account is the time lag between the commission of the offence and the interviewing of the CCL. The time lapsed is enough for the child to get influenced by external factors or behave in a way that fails to express the child’s feelings, as is highlighted by Professor Martha Duncan, in her article titled "So Young and So Untender: Remorseless Children and the Expectations of Law". The JJB, during its assessment, is statutorily mandated to undertake a background check on the CCL, which besides being disproportionately invasive of the person's privacy also can perhaps skew the entire process towards assuming culpability. In such a paradigm, the impression casted by the CCL upon the other members of the society are given more importance than the rights of the CCL. This method has the potential to lead the entire investigation towards a manufactured conclusion, one which takes into account the child’s past susceptibility to committing crime and allows the board to take into consideration a wider range of evidence against the child, which would have been inconsequential in the adult criminal court.

Neuroscience and the Adolescent Brain
I would argue that, based on extant scholarship, to come to well informed and correct decisions the people who make the juvenile system need to be aware of the changes that a child’s brain goes through during his adolescence, an age during which a child suffers from risk seeking stimulations projected by the brain itself. This would be in consonance with the principle of not holding someone criminally liable if they are unable to regulate their behaviour, as is the case with a CCL.

Laurence Steinberg, in "Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy", conclusively stated that transferring a child into adult criminal system is punishing them for their brain’s incapability of regulating their actions before a specific age. In line with the set premise is the principle of penal proportionality, which states that people who are less capable of committing crimes should be given lesser punishments for the same. In their research paper on the "Teenage Brain", Richard J. Bonnie and Elizabeth S. Scott emphasised on the difficulties embroiled in the calculation of the mental maturity and capability of a CCL, thereby making them less culpable because of their mental dearthness.

Scientific reports on adolescent brain development convey that criminal acts of children peak between ages sixteen and eighteen but these tendencies go through a rapid degeneration soon after. This can be attributed to the changes in their brain structure and functions during that time. There are two major centres in the brain of a child which go through significant changes during adolescence; these are (a) the cognitive centre of the brain - amygdala, and (b) the self-regulatory centre of the brain- prefrontal cortex.

The amygdala is responsible for all the impulsive decisions under taken by adolescents. Due to the lack of foresight, an impairment exacerbated by an active amygdala, they are more susceptible to indulging in high risk activities. This is worsened by the high production of dopamine, a neurotransmitter which sends signals to neurons. It results in the cultivation of the reward deficiency syndrome, which compels them to undertake tasks which are risky, in order to attain the same amount of thrill as experienced by them during the pre-adolescent stage of their lives.

While the amygdala dominates the functioning of the brain at full swing, the part which is responsible for mature decision making and keeping a check on reckless behaviour , the prefrontal cortex, is still a work in progress. The prefrontal cortex does not mature fully until late adolescence. It is the sad reality attested by neuroscience that adolescents mature intellectually before they mature socially or emotionally. This means that while they have the ability to comprehend that killing someone is wrong, they are incapable of acting on that ability.

An adolescent brain is fuelled by unchecked and immature emotions. Stories supporting this never elude headlines. Any incident of a crime committed by a teenager who is intellectually superior to his peer is accompanied by the inability of the society to reconcile with the fact that an intelligent child is capable of committing an offence. Society forgets that intelligence has nothing to do with the commission for a crime.

The institution of criminal law is built on the foundation of autonomy of actions. A scenario in which the brakes of a person’s car fail and he ends up running over a pedestrian sleeping on the sidewalk will not be attract criminal liability because it was beyond his control. An adolescent’s brain has a similar working principle. Research conducted by the MacArthur Foundation on adolescent development and juvenile justice supported the theory that juveniles lack complete autonomy over their actions because of their brain’s accelerator, that is, amygdala being pushed to its maximum while the engine, that is, the brain is controlled by a faulty brake system or the prefrontal cortex.

Much research conducted in the field of juvenile neuroscience has revealed that adolescents are intrinsically different from adults because of their brain being in its maturation phase. The US Supreme Court through a series of landmark judgments has emphasised on the fact that children are different from adults because of their inability to assess the consequences of their actions. Most of the actions undertaken by children are the result of their “transient immaturity”. Thus, it can arguably be said that adolescents who prima facie appear to have assessed the consequences of their actions can still not be given the same criminal culpability as that imposed on their adult counterparts.

Closing Remarks
It is difficult to wrap one's brain around the fact that children are capable of committing crimes, for the simple reason that we do not expect them to be so. The amicable solution to this dilemma would be to not formulate laws that would push adolescents into adult criminal system, but ensuring that they receive the rehabilitative care that they need if they do end up committing a crime by virtue of their immaturity. There is a stark difference between a mischievous child and one with the intent to commit crime. However, when dealing with a CCL, these differences elide thorough deliberations. The fact of the CCL engaging in conduct which is a serious offence is conflated with him having shown problematic tendencies in the past. The society as a whole treats a CCL as a convict instead of an accused awaiting trial. It is highly unfair for them to be assessed by the elements of the same society, which denies them the right to have an impartial assessment and trial.

Wednesday, September 2, 2020

Dr. Kafeel Khan and Our Punitive Preventive Detention Law

On August 11, the Supreme Court had requested the Allahabad High Court to expeditiously decide the habeas corpus petition filed by Nuzhat Perween for her son, Dr. Kafeel Khan. The petition challenged orders for his preventive detention under the National Security Act of 1980 (NSA) that were passed on February 13, 2020. Initially filed before the Supreme Court in February itself, the petition was sent to the Allahabad High Court in March, where it was heard multiple times before, finally, a Two Judges’ Bench passed a judgment on 01.09.2020 in Nuzhat Perween v. State of UP and Anr., [Habeas Corpus WP No. 264 of 2020 (decided on 01.09.2020)] declaring the detention order illegal and directing Dr. Khan’s immediate release. 

Unlike the last time that a judicial authority directed his release on 10.02.2020, following which Dr. Khan was not released but instead led to the impugned detention order being passed, this time Dr. Khan has indeed stepped out of prison and as of now has not been arrested in any other proceedings.

Background to the Preventive Detention
Dr. Khan’s prevention detention under the NSA is only the most recent episode of the state machinery training its attention on him and depriving him of his personal liberty, only for a judicial authority to direct his release. 

According to the state, what prompted the order on 13.02.2020 was a public speech given by Dr. Khan in Aligarh to a group of students on 12.12.2019, an event more than two months old. It was stated that the speech incited feelings of communal disharmony and also lent itself to violent protests by groups of students on 13th and 15th December in Aligarh District. The proposal for preventive detention, made on the same date as the order, stated that “Since the fierce and communal speech given by him has had an adverse and unfavourable impact on the public order of the District, therefore it is very important to keep this person detained in jail to maintain the public order. (emphasis mine)”

Take a close look at the last line above — preventive detention was necessary to keep Dr. Khan in jail. Why was he in jail, you ask? Because following the speech of 12.12.2019, a case was registered at P.S. Civil Lines, Aligarh, in the early hours of 13.12.2019 alleging inter alia that the speech incites communal disharmony. Dr. Khan was not immediately arrested in this case, but was ultimately taken into custody from Mumbai on 29.01.2020. He filed for bail, a request which was naturally opposed by the state. Despite the opposition, however, bail was granted on 10.02.2020. Two observations in the bail order are important: first, the Court rebuffed the state claim about the accused repeating the offence by stating that this would be grounds to challenge his bail, and; second, the court placed a bail condition upon Dr. Khan to “ not repeat the crime in the future”.

What happened next is in keeping with the worst traditions of how governments run in our republic, witnessed from the days of A.K. Gopalan itself (no, not his Supreme Court case). The bail order was passed but not given effect to by the executive. Two days later, on 13.02.2020, the trial court passed another order directing jail authorities to release Dr. Khan and directed its delivery by Special Messenger. However, the state claimed this was only received at 8:20 PM in the evening, by which time the preventive detention order had been proposed by the Officer in Charge of PS Civil Lines, sponsored by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, and authorised by the District Magistrate, Aligarh.

Therefore, it would be a mistake to think that Dr. Khan’s preventive detention was specifically required because of the incident of December, 2019. Rather, the need was only perceived by the U.P. Government once a competent court had applied its mind to the allegations against Dr. Khan in the regular course of law, and found that there was no reason to prolong his pre-trial custody any further. 

The Allahabad High Court Verdict
Before proceeding to the order that came to be passed in the habeas corpus petition, it must be mentioned that it took close to six months for a decision to be made in the matter. Even if we exclude the time the petition was in the Supreme Court, it is still an inordinate delay for what is arguably the most crucial kind of case before courts — one directly concerning the liberty of a citizen. 

Having said that, the short judgment of 42 pages does not waste too much time in getting down to the matter. The petition challenged the order of 13.02.2020 on three broad prongs: (i) there was no material for ordering preventive detention and it was intended to subvert the judicial process; (ii) the detenue was not supplied with all material thus denied a right to file an effective representation against his detention, and; (iii) the concerned government had unduly delayed the consideration of his representation against detention. I will only focus on (i) and (ii), as the judgment is restricted to a consideration of only these grounds. On both these legal issues, the Allahabad High Court has made some important observations.

Supplying Material
Let’s look at (ii) first because this is a small point. The High Court noted that while Dr. Khan had been given a CD with the speech ascribed to him, he was not given any means to play this disc. Neither was he supplied with any transcript of this speech, which was the primary basis for his preventive detention. This was unconscionable, and the Court rightly held it so, finding that this conduct on part of the state government deprived the detenue of his constitutional right to make an effective representation against his detention. 

Preventive Detention and Subjective Satisfaction
The Allahabad High Court was asked to consider the contents of the speech given by Dr. Khan in December 2019 to decide whether a reasonable person could apprehend any disturbance to public order based on his exhortations. The Court’s approach in this regard is important and requires a brief excursus to explain the legal position on how challenges to preventive detention orders are to be treated by the judiciary.

The law on preventive detention is an executive-driven process: it is an extraordinary power that executive officials in India have to make sure that imminent threats to public disorder etc. can be addressed swiftly without going through the rigour of the regular criminal process. The primacy given to the executive requires that in any subsequent challenge to a detention order, judges cannot substitute their mind for the subjective satisfaction of the executive official who made the decision in the heat of the moment. The judge cannot place herself in the shoes of the police officer. 

At the same time, however, this doctrine of respecting the subjective satisfaction of executive officials is not a license for abdicating the judicial function entirely when considering a challenge to preventive detention. Courts must still apprise themselves of the materials presented before the detaining authority to decide if the decision to authorise preventive detention was arbitrary and unreasonable. There is no running away from the fact that the lines being drawn here are fuzzy, and while it moves some courts to be excessively deferential to the executive, it equally allows other courts to keenly consider the facts without overstepping the limits of the judicial function or abdicating it entirely. 

In Nuzhat Perween, the Allahabad High Court clearly took the latter approach: 

“We are in absolute agreement with learned Additional Advocate General that it is not open for the courts to substitute their opinion by interfering with “subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority”. However, it does not mean that the court cannot look into the material on which detention is based. The expression “subjective satisfaction” means the satisfaction of a reasonable man that can be arrived at on the basis of some material which satisfies a rational man. It does not refer to whim or caprice of the authority concerned. While assessing “subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority” the Court examining a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus has to look into the record to examine whether the subjective satisfaction is acceptable to a reasonable wisdom and that satisfies rationality of normal thinking and analyzing process. … In view of above, we have looked into the speech delivered by the detenue. The closure of examining record as suggested would be nothing but a licence to allow the executives to act at their whims or caprice. This would be against the fundamentals of our constitutional values and provisions. (Emphasis Mine)”

In line with this approach, the High Court looked at materials forming the basis for the detention order in detail. The judgment quotes the entirety of Dr. Khan’s 23 minute-long speech made on December 12, to demonstrate how the police requests for preventive detention in this case had, in fact, not presented the authority with the complete picture. Instead, the police had patched up different parts of Dr. Khan's speech to present a different picture altogether from what appeared to be the speaker’s intention. It held, therefore, that based on this material it was impossible to conclude that Dr. Khan’s activities were such as to prejudice the maintenance of public order. 


Punitive Preventive Detention
The peculiar facts leading up to the detention order of 13.02.2020 have been extracted above, and it was argued that this demonstrates that the two months’ delay in passing the order, and its expeditious authorisation after Dr. Khan’s bail, all went to show that the preventive detention order was actuated by malice and not based on any genuine grounds. 

This is a more tedious issue than what might appear at first blush. It is because the Supreme Court has held, on countless occasions, that it is not illegal to pass a preventive detention order in cases where the person is already in custody and about to be released on bail. Most recently, this was confirmed by the Court in Dimple Happy Dhakad [AIR 2019 SC 3428] (Discussed on this Blog as well). Technically then, preventing Dr. Khan’s release on bail was a legally valid ground for the U.P. Government to take. 

This is really the twilight zone when it comes to preventive detention, where the preventive setup inextricably merges with the regular criminal process. The only justifiable premise for passing a preventive detention order in respect of a person who is about to be released on bail is if the authority can demonstrate that there is a continuing threat which did not dissipate once the regular criminal process has taken charge of the matter. This is not unimaginable — organised crime has many stories of rackets being run from prison. But it must be a very hard sell for the executive and it cannot be a means to pile-on incarceration upon persons deemed undesirable by the state. Not only would such delayed preventive detention orders turn the concept on its head — where is the prevention if the person was already in jail for months after the incident! — but it would also directly subvert the determination made by a competent court that there was no need for a person’s continued incarceration. At a macro-level, repeat occurrences of this phenomenon place an undeniable strain upon the relationship between the executive and judiciary, and give rise to an unconstitutional chimera of punitive preventive detention that hollows out the right to personal liberty from within. 

This is why courts must arguably be more vigilant while entertaining challenges to preventive detention orders in such cases where bail order is passed and, in some way, circumvented — as the Supreme Court has also emphasised on some occasions in the past. This is exactly the kind of approach on display in Nuzhat Perween, where the Allahabad High Court noted that:


“The exact nature of the contents of the lecture delivered by the detenue on 12.12.2019 at the Bab-e-Syed Gate of the AMU (as claimed by the state authorities), even if accepted to be correct, it cannot be overlooked that, that material could not be relevant for the purpose of satisfaction being drawn two months thereafter, inasmuch during that period of two months, undisputedly, the detenue neither visited the city of Aligarh nor he made any further or other speech or lecture connected thereto nor there is any material shown to us that the detenue was about to commit any act in furtherance thereto or was going to deliver any other speech or lecture connected thereto as may have prejudiced the public order.”

There was no fresh alleged illegal activity between December and February which prompted the order of 13.02.2020, even though Dr. Khan had been at liberty throughout that time. There was not even a proposal to pass an order for his preventive detention in that period. The first time when the idea came to the government was after the bail order was passed. For the Court, all this pointed to a conclusion that the gap of two months’ snapped whatever link existed between the allegedly offending conduct of Dr. Khan with a need to require his preventive detention. 

Our Slow-Moving Wheels of Justice 
The story of Dr. Khan and the manner in which the preventive detention machinery was clearly misused by the state government to keep a dissident behind bars is a tale as old as time itself. Small wonder why the writ of habeas corpus has such a celebrated position in societies. Indian courts have not had the most shining of records in terms of processing habeas petitions over the past few years and the delay that it took for Dr. Khan’s petition to be heard speaks to this serious systemic problem. But, ultimately, a court did apply its mind, and restore a person's liberty. 

The episode reminds me of a scene from the movie Shahid, where the young, imprisoned, Shahid Azmi is told by War Saab (played by KK Menon) that the wheels of justice turn slowly in India, but they do eventually turn.

Well, eventually, I guess they do.

Tuesday, September 1, 2020

The Constitution Bench Judgment in Mukesh Singh — A Sensible Retreat from Automatic Bias

On 31.08.2020, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court delivered its unanimous verdict in Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) [SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 39528/2018 decided on 31.08.2020, along with other batch matters]. The Constitution Bench had been assembled to decide on the correctness of a Three Justices' Bench decision of 2018, Mohan Lal [AIR 2018 SC 3853]. 

Mohan Lal had taken up a very specific issue upon which conflicting decisions had been rendered by the different benches of the Supreme Court in the past. This issue was what is the effect upon the validity of a criminal investigation where the investigating officer is the same person who is the first informant. This is not an uncommon instance, mind you. For example, in narcotics cases, it is quite ordinary for the crime to be reported as a result of officers conducting a raid. Can the officer who conducted the raid continue as the investigating officer? And if so, does that have any effect on the validity of the ensuing investigation? The conclusions in Mohan Lal were that (a) the same officer reporting the offence must not continue as the investigating officer of the case, and (b) where this happens, then it vitiates subsequent proceedings, due to a presumption of bias being established. While the facts in Mohan Lal were specific to the NDPS Act, the observations made in the decision were broad and applicable to the context of criminal investigations more generally. 

This author had expressed his reservations about these conclusions in Mohan Lal. The doubts were loudly expressed within the year by a Bench of Two Justices in Mukesh Singh (which ultimately found its way to the Constitution Bench). Then, in Varinder Kumar [2019 SCC OnLine SC 190], a different Three Justices' Bench (Two members of which were part of the Bench in Mohan Lal) supported the conclusions that had been arrived at earlier but with many reservations (and some problematic language on procedural rights of accused persons), and expressly declared that the 2018 ruling would only apply with prospective effect.

It appears that now, finally, the confusion has been put to rest.

The Arguments  
The 62 page long judgment details the submissions of the Appellants from Paragraphs 3 to 4, then narrates the submissions by the Solicitor General [Para 5] and the Additional Solicitor General [Para 6], and finally rounds this up with Rejoinder submissions [Para 7]. 

The Appellants, naturally, argued in support of Mohan Lal and its logic of automatic bias. The thrust of argument was focused around the NDPS Act and a key point was the interplay between Sections 42 and 52 of the Act. Section 52(3) states that an officer who conducts an arrest / search / seizure under Section 42, must turn over the person / items over to an officer empowered to investigate the case. For the appellants, this added statutory gloss to the point of principle that the observations in Mohan Lal were based upon. Surely, the text of Section 52(3) suggested that Parliament was also uncomfortable with the same officer continuing as the investigating officer in a case.    

On the other hand, the Respondents approached the issue from a generalist perspective and delved into the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 to argue that there was, in fact, clear support for the same officer to continue as the investigating officer on a case in Section 157. The Code was also cited to argue that the categories of issues which render proceedings vitiated for "illegality" is clearly set out, and having the same officer continue on the case is not one of the specified grounds. On the scheme of the NDPS Act itself, it was argued that Section 52 did not demand that the officers must be different. 

Reading the judgment, it seems a bit surprising that the central focus of arguments was not the universalist approach of Mohan Lal. The Appellants recorded submissions do not suggest why that specific position is the desirable one. If anything, only the Respondents seem to have tried to explain what are the problems in that approach and why a case by case approach ought to be favoured. The argument in this regard seems to have been purely consequentialist — so many cases with good evidence will be thrown out on a technicality — and not about where this specific issue fits in the larger legal fabric of the doctrine on bias.

The Judgment 
The judicial consideration of the argument begins from Para 8 onwards. The dissatisfaction with Mohan Lal is evident in Para 8.1: 

"On considering the entire decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal (supra), it appears that in this case also the Court did not consider in detail the relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. under which the investigation can be undertaken by the investigating officer, more particularly Sections 154, 156 and 157 and the other provisions, namely, Section 465 Cr.P.C. and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. Even in the said decision, this Court did not consider the aspect of prejudice to be established and proved by the accused in case the investigation has been carried out by the informant/complainant, who will be 35 one of the witnesses to be examined on behalf of the prosecution to prove the case against the accused. This Court also did not consider in detail and/or misconstrued both the scheme of the NDPS Act and the principle of reverse burden."

It is quite evident by this point which way the judgment is going to go, and there are no surprises from here till the conclusions in Para 12. After a detailed discussion of the 1973 Code [Para 9], the judgment turns to the NDPS Scheme. How is the point about Section 42 / 52 dealt with? At Para 9.3.8 and 9.5, the judgment notes that it is nowhere stated that the officers empowered under 53 have to be different / shall be different from those empowered for 42. Thus, to require otherwise would be overstepping the judicial function by inserting words in the statute which do not exist. 

For the Court, the NDPS being a law which casts a reverse burden and carries heavy punishments is not something which warrants a rule of automatic bias in cases where the informant continues as investigating officer. As the judgment notes [Para 10], the accused would have the opportunity to cross-examine that officer and burnish her claim about bias. The judgment also referred to the presumption of regularity that is attached to official acts under Section 114, illustration (e) of the Evidence Act and observed that a rule of automatic bias would run contrary to this presumption. Thus, "the matter has to be left to be decided on a case to case basis without any universal generalisation." [Para 10.1]

Some Thoughts
On the whole, Mukesh Singh is the kind of dour, sensible decision, that we need more of (perhaps without the copious extracts of statutory provisions — Sections 41 to 57 of the NDPS Act are extracted almost entirely!). For this author, the conclusions arrived at mark a sensible retreat from the rule of automatic bias that Mohan Lal had supported. It is impractical for a legal system where law enforcement is understaffed and it did not sit comfortably in a procedural setup where standards always trump rules when it comes to issues about weighing the impact of procedural safeguards. On top of which, I still think that a rule such as this would only have prompted law enforcement to find loopholes to work-around what they saw as a bad rule rather than the rule actually furthering the promise of fairer investigations. Lastly, and the speed with which the issue got resolved by a Constitution Bench is proof of this, the truly awesome nature of reliefs offered for the breach of a procedural rule were bound to make courts have second-thoughts about going ahead and fully implementing Mohan Lal.    

Coming back to a position where accused persons have to demonstrate bias is a sensible retreat. But, what next? How is this task to be carried out by accused persons and the plea determined by courts? And what about reliefs beyond acquittals? It is quite surprising that, much like Mohan Lal which it overruled, the judgment in Mukesh Singh has not offered us any clarity on these important practical aspects. There has been a tendency on part of the Supreme Court to not fully explore the remedial aspect of rights cases, and Mukesh Singh fits the bill. In being concerned with limiting the scope for acquittals on pleas of bias, the Court ended up missing a chance to explore other reliefs that accused persons might be entitled to when a plea of bias is raised at the end of trial or, as is much more common, in an appeal context.  

Let us take the bias point next. The Constitution Bench brackets prior decisions into two buckets — those for an automatic bias rule and those against — and in doing so ignores that there is a fair bit of subtlety involved in the task of determining a plea of bias [For more on the Indian law on bias, see here]. For instance, consider the judgment in Mohan Lal. A key reason for the Three Justices' Bench choosing the automatic bias rule was its mistaken finding that the existing legal position required accused persons to "demonstrate prejudice" and "bias [to] be actually proved". A closer look at the older case law would reveal that none of the decisions had gone ahead and actually dealt with how accused persons were to go and establish pleas of bias. The only real exception being the 2004 decision in V. Jayapaul [(2004) 5 SCC 223], which required that an accused must establish the existence of a "real likelihood of bias" and not existence of "actual bias". 

The only reference we get to this practical side of things is Para 11 of the judgment in Mukesh Singh, where it is observed that: 

... Only in a case where the accused has been able to establish and prove the bias and/or unfair investigation by the informant-cum investigator and the case of the prosecution is merely based upon the deposition of the informant-cum-investigator, meaning thereby prosecution does not rely upon other witnesses, more particularly the independent witnesses, in that case, where the complainant himself had conducted the investigation, such aspect of the matter can certainly be given due weightage while assessing the evidence on record. Therefore, as rightly observed by this Court in the case of Bhaskar Ramappa Madar (supra), the matter has to be decided on a case to case basis without any universal generalisation. As rightly held by this Court in the case of V. Jayapaul (supra), there is no bar against the informant police officer to investigate the case. As rightly observed, if at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating officer the question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and therefore it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition that in every case where the police officer who registered the case by lodging the first information, conducts the investigation that itself had caused prejudice to the accused and thereby it vitiates the entire prosecution case and the accused is entitled to acquittal. (Emphasis supplied)

What we see is that the Court has gone ahead and supported Jayapaul, but observed that the accused may establish bias or its real likelihood, which is a tad confusing to say the least. Furthermore, the observations in the first half of Para 11 are loosely worded and can lend themselves to a view that the judgment goes to limit the significance of biased investigations only where the case lacked independent evidence. This, in my view, is an incorrect reading of the paragraph. Rather what the Court seemed to have been at pains to do here, and throughout the judgment, is to narrow down the cases where acquittals might be warranted on grounds of bias / real likelihood of bias on part of the investigating officer. 

With Mukesh Singh, it would seem that this issue of what happens to a prosecution where the same officer who was the first informant continues as the investigating officer has been settled. There is no vitiating of the case on grounds of presumptive bias. But that is the limited extent of clarity on offer, and the practical aspects of raising a plea of bias remain under-explored. 

Monday, August 31, 2020

Snippet: A Constitution Bench Overrules The Mohan Lal Verdict

Just over two years ago, a Three Justices' Bench of the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous verdict in Mohan Lal [AIR 2018 SC 3853]. The judgment endorsed a significant proposition: An officer who was the informant in a case (the facts there had a narcotics investigation) could not continue as the investigating officer for the same case. Wherever the officer was the same, it cast an indelible doubt over the impartiality of the investigation, which rendered all subsequent proceedings illegal in the case. The Court had noted that its observations were not limited to only narcotics cases but also applied to investigations generally (though this was not very clear from reading the judgment as a whole).

This Blog had in its analysis been critical of this view of presumptive bias, arguing instead in favour of an approach which considered the facts to find out if there was a reasonable likelihood bias in the specific case. Not only was this approach unappealing in law, I also argued that the approach would result in several practical impediments given (i) the consequences it would have  on pending cases, and (ii) understaffed nature of police forces, and it would not be unlikely that the pronouncements are revisited. 

It did not take long for a Two Justices' Bench of the Supreme Court to raise some of these doubts in Mukesh Singh and it was requested that the matter be placed before a Bench of appropriate strength to consider the problems. In the meanwhile, a different Three Justices' Bench of the Court delivered Varinder Kumar [(2019) SCC OnLine SC 170] whereby it agreed with Mohan Lal on the issue of bias but rendered the judgment applicable only prospectively, in a bid to insulate ongoing trials and prevent convicted persons from taking this ground for challenge in pending appeals. That decision was deeply problematic for its treatment of the issue, where the bench seemingly likened the procedural rights of accused persons as benefits.

It has been reported that Constitution Bench has decided a batch of matters today, i.e. on 31.08.2020 (including the reference in Mukesh Singh) and reversed the view taken in Mohan Lal, and has held that the facts of the case must be considered before arriving at a finding on the issue of bias. While the judgment is still awaited, on first blush at least this seems like a sensible course to adopt. A more detailed post will follow.  

P.S.: What the judgment will hopefully not disturb, though, are the observations made by the Court in Mohan Lal regarding the right to a fair investigation. The reason for vitiating proceedings as per the Mohan Lal court was the "infraction of the constitutional guarantee of fair investigation".  There can be no qualms with the proposition that there is a guarantee of fair investigations, and I hope that the baby does not get thrown out with the bathwater.  

Wednesday, August 26, 2020

Guest Post: Exploring The Failure of Restorative Thought in the Indian Criminal Justice System

(This is a guest post by Hrishika Jain)


The recent execution of Akshay Singh, Mukesh Singh, Pawan Gupta and Vinay Sharma for the 2012 Delhi rape marks a significant step away from India’s 1980s’ de-facto abolitionist jurisprudence. The death penalty, having no basis in deterrence or reformation, serves no goal other than retribution. In this sense, every deployment of death as punishment, strengthens the hold of the retributive model on a justice system, and weakens any restorative and reformative pretenses. This is particularly true of the state response to the 2012 rape. The 17 year-old juvenile involved in the 2012 case was sent to a correction home for 3 years, triggering backlash against the ‘leniency’ of Juvenile Justice Act’s [‘JJ Act’] rehabilitative frameworks. Consequently, the state responded, not only by executing the 4 convicts, but also by substantively destroying the JJ Act, 2000 – it was repealed, and replaced by a new Act in 2015 which allows minors between ages 16-18 to be tried as adults for heinous crimes.

To me, this series of events poses a larger, more abstract question – about the consistent failure of non-retributive, rehabilitative thinking about justice in India. This failure manifests variously. The 2000 Act, however crucial, was one facet of non-retributive justice which was hastily abandoned. Other examples are: scaling back of the anti-death penalty jurisprudence; public support for ‘encounter’-killings of 4 alleged rape accused in Hyderabad; cases of lynchings of suspected child-kidnappers; inadequate focus on reformative schemes in prison; and a general rise of ‘tough on crime’ legislations with compromised procedures, that extend criminal penalties to pre-criminal or ‘anti-social’ conduct.

In this post, I address one potential cause for this failure. Our current criminal justice policy aims at carving out rehabilitative niches (like the JJ Act 2000, or sporadic rehabilitative programs run at the discretion of jail administrations), within a dominantly retributive framework. I argue that the failure of restorative models is guaranteed because of the sheer impossibility of a truly ‘integrated’ criminal justice system that can reconcile retribution and restoration within itself. I further argue that these efforts for integration in turn are driven by a misunderstanding of what restoration means.

Essentials of Restoration
Any inquiry into the reconcilability of retributive and restorative models first requires clarity about what a restorative model entails. Armstrong argues that the lack of consensus around the core elements and philosophical goals of restoration, renders any claim about the (im)possibility of reconciling restorative with retributive goals, suspect. Thus, according to Armstrong, the debate over reconciliation will remain inconclusive, unless the theoretical uncertainties are resolved. Without this certain agreement over the essentials of restorative models, he argues, the various policy proposals incorporating restoration in an otherwise retributive system run into one of two problems.

First, they may commodify individual practices seen in restorative models, and incorporate them within a retributive paradigm without importing its underlying philosophy. What passes as ‘restoration’ in retributive systems that centre around punishment, are often ‘alternative punishments’, and not ‘alternatives to punishment’. For example, community service under the JJ Act, in a model that does not import its underlying purpose of offenders’ reintegration and moral reform, is effectively only an alternative punishment. Similarly, juvenile special homes—though required to be places of reform, skill-development, re-education and psychosocial care—focus their budgets on security and surveillance instead. This causes tangible lack of reformative care in these supposedly reformative niches, and is in line with the suspicion of the “Otherised” criminal encouraged by retributive paradigms these homes operate in.

Alternatively, second, the policies may discard retributive frameworks, but adopt goals that stretch ‘restoration’ beyond any identity with its original philosophy. An example of this is the community-led justice systems like Nyaya Panchayats. Promoting these systems as inherently ‘restorative’ assumes a Gandhian-utopian idea of village communities, and ignores their casteist and patriarchal outcomes. Such systems may involve non-retributive responses to the offender, like in cases where Panchayat resolves rape cases by marrying the victim and the offender. However, equating such non-retributive systems to ‘restoration’ negates the essentials of restorative justice, as I argue below.

I agree with Armstrong’s thesis that policy proposals that mix-and-match restoration and retribution in India have run into the above two problems. However, Armstrong argues that these problems are a result of theoretical uncertainty over what ‘restoration’ even means, and that, given this uncertainty, the question of whether integrating restoration with retribution is possible is fundamentally inconclusive. Here, I disagree, and argue that retribution and restoration are conclusively incompatible frameworks. I further propose that this inherent incompatibility, and not academic uncertainty over meanings of restoration, is the cause of the two problems outlined above.

I believe Armstrong’s conclusion that the reconcilability cannot be determined, stems from his particular formulation of the minimal elements of restoration as that, per him, relative consensus exists on. He relies on Marshall’s understanding of restoration as “a process whereby parties with a stake in a specific offence collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future”. (p. 363) It is notable that this formulation has no objective metric for assessing a successful outcome, beyond the participatory nature of the process itself. Basically, the outcome is assumed to be restorative, if the process involved collective deliberation by stakeholders. I argue that, while disagreements exist on a full definition, Armstrong’s adopted formulation does not fully encapsulate even those minimal essentials of restorative justice that relative consensus exists for. By neglecting an outcome-based element, as proposed by Walgrave (p.622), the formulation neglects the distinct philosophical goals that form the very essence of restoration - healing social bonds and renewing consensus around the violated social/legal norm (Wenzel et al., p.381, 383). Incorporating these goals in understanding the minimal elements of restoration achieves two purposes. It exposes the incompatibility of restorative and retributive practices even without exhaustively defining the former, and further demonstrates how understanding restoration devoid of its philosophical goals has led to the two problems identified above.

Consider an example where all stakeholders voluntarily resolve that the best recourse after a rape, is to wed the victim and the offender. Victim’s consent in such situations is superficial. Family honour and modesty, reduced self-worth due to victim-blaming, financial dependence, even the guilt of sending a member of the community to prison - coax, without necessarily forcing, consent. A process-based understanding of ‘restoration’ would be compelled to accept this as ‘restorative’. However, introducing goals of healing social bonds, and renewing consensus around the violated norm, changes this analysis. This resolution, while being voluntary, would not renew consensus around the norm against non-consensual sex. Instead, such resolutions would further dilute this consensus each time. This is because, when marriage is understood as resolving the harm caused by rape, it indicates that it is not the victim’s right to bodily autonomy/consent, but her unmarried status or the damage to her ‘modesty’, which makes rape immoral.

Ignoring the philosophical goals of restoration changes its essence, like in the case above. It also risks partial integration of individual restorative practices into a retributive model without importing the philosophy of healing that underlies that practice, such as with community service.

Now that I have established that incorporating an outcome-based element would resolve the problems highlighted by Armstrong and is thus desirable - I will argue why restoration, as understood with its philosophical goals, is necessarily incompatible with retribution.

Incompatibility of Retributive and Restorative Goals
Societal ideas of justice and morality are strongly informed by and inform legal institutions - with different forms of institutions encouraging different social norms, and vice versa. Retributive legal institutions, thus, feed off and feed a retributive society, resting on a clear dichotomy between both the victim and the criminal-Other, and society and the criminal-Other (p.704). This Otherisation of criminality and the criminal can be best explained through Nussbaum’s notion of ‘projective disgust’– disgust projected onto a particular class of people, in order to externalise insecurities about one’s own impurities and moral failings. Ultimately, here lies the appeal of a retributive society that Otherises criminals and paints them like monsters or deviants from (as opposed to products of) human norms. Painting the Delhi rape convicts as the Other, essentially different from the Self, allows everybody else upholding patriarchal structures that justify violence against women, to externalise their own moral failings onto specific particularly egregious acts done by the Other. The Other then becomes the monster-deviant deserving of the worst forms of retribution including the death penalty, in over-compensation for the impunity granted to the Self. Retribution, in other words, becomes a mode of projecting disgust onto the Other - externalising one’s impurities, rendering oneself morally ‘pure’ in the process. Punitive prison systems, for example, help the un-imprisoned to draw a clear moral difference between the incarcerated criminals, and their free selves. So does the death penalty.

This dominant retributive sentiment, and the baggage it comes with, is inherently incompatible with restorative institutions and the kind of society they would arise in and engender. Implicitly, forgiveness is a central moral feature of a restorative society, given its goal of healing social bonds (Wenzel et al., p.377). Theoretically, forgiveness and punishment may perhaps co-exist as compatible notions of justice. However, reconciling these two in a society already deeply invested in retribution and drawing clear boundaries between society and the criminal-Other, will create distortions. Forgiveness is necessarily tied to a wholly different system of social mores – mores that recognise and seek to heal the offenders’ own victimisation at the hands of, inter alia, psychological, socio-economic, and life-history factors, while encouraging the offender to take moral responsibility for his conduct (p.7). This necessitates rejection of the idea of the criminal as an ‘Other’ – instead, it would understand crime as the combined product of a broken society, and individual agency operating within it. The development of these fundamentally different social mores, that is required for any restorative practice to succeed, would remain suppressed under the stronger tendencies to Otherise of the better-established retributive frameworks that restorative practices are embedded in.

This necessary link between retribution and the idea of the criminal-Other also risks creating some distortive consequences when restorative and retributive systems are integrated. Imagine an integrated model that allows victims a choice between penal and restorative remedies. Given the general tendency to construct the criminal as an ‘Other’, what would determine the victim’s choice between restoration or retribution in an integrated model? Wenzel et al. argue that social-psychological factors like the victim’s and the community’s ability to construct a sense of identity with the offender, play an important role in choice of remedy (p.383). This ability to identify with the offender will be particularly critical where restorative options are integrated within a retributive society. This is because, whether an offender faces retributive or restorative remedies, will often be determined by whether the general Otherisation that all offenders face in retributive systems is negated by other factors that allow a sense of identity with the offender. This was reflected during the #MeToo movement in college campuses, where social reactions ranged from ostracisation to forgiveness, and seemed to partly depend on the perception of belongingness of the offender in a largely elite, upper class/caste community. This fallout of integrating retributive and restorative justice is often unaccounted for - the co-existence of the two senses of justice is likely to exacerbate the current discriminatory penal outcomes. While a sympathisable-offender may be humanised and reintegrated, the punitive tendencies will continue to disproportionately further Otherise the offender with whom the victim/the community cannot already identify with. The latter will disproportionately be persons who are already-victimised by structural prejudice - widening the current class/caste/race gap in our criminal justice institutions. This is because the non-marginalised victim is more likely to be able to access justice effectively, as was observed in the #MeToo movement. This means, overwhelmingly, it will be the non-marginalised offenders benefiting from the sense of identity with the victim that allows restoration to succeed – while marginalised offenders are more likely to face retributive remedies. For restorative practices to not exacerbate inequities of the penal system, they must be embedded in a restorative framework that generally allows space for recognition of the victimhood of offenders and their identity with the larger society, regardless of socio-economic factors.

There is another concern with such an integrative paradigm. While victim satisfaction surveys indicate positive results for restorative options, they leave another question unanswered - whether restorative practices installed in retributive societies will satisfy the society. The purpose of criminal law is not only to remedy the harm to the victim, but also to reinstate society’s sense of security. Thus, arguably, state-reaction to crimes must also ensure that the criminal justice system, in general, nurtures society’s sense of security. This is not to say that judges validly account for public opinion during sentencing in specific instances. Rather, the criminal justice machinery as a whole must inspire faith in the community – and thus, has to match the community’s notion of justice. Why is it important that the community feels secure, and has faith in the criminal justice system? Where legal system’s attitude to crime is seen as inadequate, crime can lead to more violent crime as a mode of privately dispensing justice. Further, a society that is insecure about its safety, is also likely to generate unsafe conditions for its Otherised/marginalised sub-sections. For example, the discourse of ‘security’ around terrorism, has been politically used to engender insecurity – this, in turn, has led to a rise in tolerance for Islamophobia and violence against Muslims. None of this is to say that retributive societal norms justify a retributive legal system. However, given the importance of criminal justice systems nurturing this sense of security, restorative practices will remain ineffective, without changing surrounding retributive mores.

Thus, finally, the question is whether the shift from punishment to healing as our idea of justice, first need us to be a fundamentally different society? I answer this in the affirmative. Naturally, however, this is a chicken-and-egg question – should reform in legal institutions drive the change in social mores, or the other way around? This is a common dilemma in questions about law and society and the way they influence each other. To me, the most pragmatic answer is that reform in both must go hand-in-hand.

Conclusion
The question remains, what does this inherent incompatibility between restorative and retributive justice mean? It certainly does not mean that we give up on reform, in face of the retributive mores that pervade our society and law. What this incompatibility does mean, however, is that all facets of our interaction with crime needs to forego retribution as even one aspect of their goals, and focus on reform, rehabilitation, and restoration. These facets range from social education about crime, to prevention policies, to policing institutions, to criminal courts, and finally, post-conviction legal responses.

I will begin with post-conviction legal responses. While restorative models will incorporate alternatives to incarceration, they are not, I believe, theoretically inconsistent with the institution of prison. Practically, however, things change. Prisons in India are governed by the arcane Prisons Act, 1894 and respective state Prison Manuals. The 1894 Act contains no provisions for mandatory rehabilitative/reformative programmes – making prisons tools for inflicting punishment, not facilitating reform. Similarly, there are no uniform provisions made that encourage linkages with the community outside – despite such linkages being integral to restoration by healing social bonds. In the absence of provisions in the 1894 Act, attempts towards offenders’ restoration are isolated and discretionary – such as the gala bhet initiative started by Maharashtra that allows prisoners to meet their families without a dividing barrier. This is again a mere commodification of a restorative-like practice, in a prison system that is otherwise harshly punitive. The only way to systematically transform prisons into institutions of development, reform, and restoration, not punishment, is by shifting to open prisons, allowing prisoners to maintain their social and economic ties with the least hindrance on their liberty. Further, any idea of prisons as restorative spaces must also adequately provide post-release counselling and aid – check-ins to help the offender integrate back into society, financial assistance, career-counselling to enable the offender to economically support himself and forge a new life.

However, it is clear that any shift towards restorative justice in post-conviction legal responses will suffer from the problems pointed out in this paper, unless there is a parallel shift in all other spheres of criminal discourse and regulation. For example, media-reporting on crimes is sensationalised and deeply emotive – often evoking the imagery of ‘monsters’ and ‘evil’ while talking about crime and criminals. Negating the Otherisation that fuels retribution will necessitate media sensitivity guidelines and suitable changes to graduate curriculum in media courses – given the critical role of mass media in social education about crime. Further, media-reporting that attempts to humanise the perpetrator, highlighting his own victimhood, his life before the crime, while still not simply denying his agency in his conduct - will actively help in a shift towards a restorative society. Similarly, incorporating sociological understandings of the causes of crime and criminality, in police/judge manuals and training will initiate a shift towards kinder policing/judicial institutions.

The hope is that we move away from the isolated islands of restoration within retributive paradigms that characterise current criminal justice reform. Instead, we must aim for a holistically restorative system that detaches itself from retributive goals, and shifts to frameworks based on healing and forgiveness.

Thursday, August 20, 2020

Guest Post: Analysing 156(3) Cr.P.C. in Context of Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya

(This is a guest post by Jaiyesh Bhoosreddy)

Introduction
Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Cr.P.C.] confers powers upon a magistrate empowered under Section 190 of Cr.P.C. to order a police officer in charge of a police station to investigate any cognizable offence. The scope of Section 156(3) was always considered as pre-cognizance, which is evident from the numerous judicial precedents stating that the power of the magistrate to order investigation under Section 156(3) is always pre-cognizance. The rationale, for considering Section 156(3) as pre-cognizance only, was that the expression ‘taking cognizance’ was judicially interpreted by the courts to mean the ‘judicial application of mind’ by the magistrate with the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections of Chapter XV of Cr.P.C., and any other action in his judicial discretion such as ordering investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. would be pre-cognizance only [To understand the different stages of a criminal case such as cognizance etc., see here]. 

However, a Three Justices' Bench of the Supreme Court in Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya & Ors. v. State of Gujarat [Criminal Appeal Nos. 478-479 of 2017, decided on 16.10.2019 (“Vinubhai”)], held that a magistrate can order further investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. in the post-cognizance stage. The judgment has, albeit not surprisingly, caused wide-spread confusion among criminal law practitioners with respect to the scope of Section 156(3), and it has also been criticised by some practitioners on grounds that it is contrary to statutory provisions and established judicial precedent.

The present discussion regarding the scope of Section 156(3) is to be viewed in the context of the said judgment. At the very outset, the preliminary issue that bears into mind is regarding the question of propriety of the said judgment, in view of a number of opposing judgments from various courts including the Apex Court itself, which have already laid down the point of law very clearly on the subject matter. The author intends to highlight the problematic issue of noncompliance of a celebrated judicial principle, which should be kept under consideration while pronouncing a judgment. The author will argue that the said judgment is contrary to the very structure of our judicial system which follows the common law tradition, where the previous judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of India under Article 141 and also of High Courts, as Courts of Records, constitutes the “law of the land” in the form of precedents which has binding effect over all lower courts, and also on the coordinate benches of the Apex Court and the High Courts.

Erroneous Interpretation of Section 156(3): Section 156(1) overrides Section 2(h) with respect to interpretation of the scope of application of Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C.

Vinubhai has created adverse ripples in criminal jurisprudence, which is the result of the Bench erroneously observing that the magistrate’s power to order investigation under Section 156(3) is post-cognizance, and in doing so, the Bench has overruled an earlier judgment of the Apex Court in Devarapally Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy [1976 AIR 1672 (“Devrapally”)] and a plethora of other judgments, which had cemented the proposition that the power under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. can be invoked only at a pre-cognizance stage.

The plain reading of the provision also clearly reads that it is pre-cognizance and not post-cognizance. The first and primary rule of construction of statues clearly states that if the plain reading of the statute is unambiguous, then the courts should go by the plain reading and not read beyond the text of the statute. The interpretation provided in Malviya is contrary to the legislative intent, which is evident from the language employed in Section 156(3). Section 156(3) employs the language, “such an investigation as mentioned above” to draw reference to the scope of application of the term ‘investigation’, which is provided in Section 156(1) of Cr.P.C.

The Court was erroneous in holding the rationale of Devarapally as incorrect simply because the Bench in Devarapally did not ‘notice’ Section 2(h) of Cr.P.C., as the proviso attached to the title of Section 2 states that the ‘definitions’ provided in Section 2 are subject to exceptions which is evident from the phrase, “In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires”. The author stresses upon the usage of the phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires” in support of the scope of application of investigation to be done only in the manner prescribed under Section 156(1) of Cr.P.C., where the ‘context’ mandates that the power of magistrate with respect to ordering of investigation under Section 156(3) to be limited only to the pre-cognizance stage. This was consciously provided by the legislature for situations where the police would fail to take cognizance of a cognizable offence under its jurisdiction, and so the victim or any other person could approach the magistrate for legal remedy to ensure dispensation of justice. Therefore, Section 2(h) of Cr.P.C. is irrelevant for the purpose of determining the scope of application of Section 156(3) because it triggers an investigation as provided under Section 156(1).

Noncompliance of the Principle of Stare Decisis in reference to the expression ‘taking cognizance of an offence’

The Bench in Vinubhai could have avoided the erroneous interpretation with respect to the scope of Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., if it would have exhaustively considered the judicial precedents, including Devrapally, deliberating upon the expression ‘taking cognizance’, then it would have realised that the earlier decisions on the subject matter are cemented as courts have always expressly construed the power of the magistrate to order investigation under Section 156(3) to be pre-cognizance only. This is because a magistrate ‘takes cognizance’ of an offence when he applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections in Chapter XV of Cr.P.C., and only then can he be said to have taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a). However, if the magistrate takes any other action in his judicial discretion, instead of proceeding under Chapter XV of Cr.P.C., then he cannot be said to have taken cognizance.

Additionally, the above stated judicial explanation of the expression ‘taking cognizance’ was reiterated by the Apex Court, in R.R Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1951 AIR 207 (“R.R Chari”) (Three Justices' Bench)], while considering the phrase ‘taking cognizance’, approved the decision of Calcutta High Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee [AIR 1950 Cal. 437], wherein the Court observed that taking an action of the nature of ordering an investigation under Section 156(3) will be pre-cognizance only. The same view was reiterated by the Apex Court in Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal and Anr. [AIR 1972 SC 2639] and Jamuna Singh and Ors. v. Bhadai Sah [AIR 1964 SC 1541].

Thus, R.R. Chari is another judgment pronounced by a three-judge bench, apart from Devarapally, where the Court has affirmed that Section 156(3) is pre-cognizance only. In view of this, the Bench in Vinubhai should have refrained from overruling Devrapally as it is a recognised principle that the views by one Bench is binding upon another coordinate Bench. In Union of India v. Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. [AIR 1986 SC 806] and Union of India v. Raghubir Singh [AIR 1989 SC 1933], the Courts have held that when one Bench thinks differently from another Bench of equal strength, then it should refer the matter to a larger Bench for decision rather than deciding upon the correctness of the view of the earlier coordinate Bench. Therefore, even if the Bench in Vinubhai was possessed by a very strong inclination that the interpretation in Devrapally was flawed, it should have referred the matter to a larger bench for resolution, however the Bench proceeded, on the basis of a flawed reasoning, to overrule established judicial precedents which has caused confusion in the field of criminal law.

Practical Benefits of the Judgment: Positive Impact for Bona Fide Applicants

In Vinubhai, the question of law that the Court had to decide upon was, “whether a magistrate has the power to order further investigation after a charge sheet is filed by the police”. The Court held that the magistrate had power under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. to direct further investigation up to the stage of framing of charges, and simultaneously overruled those decisions of the Apex Court, which interpreted the powers under Section 173(8) in a restrictive manner and thereby providing support to a latest decision of the Court, which construed the power under Section 173(8) to allow the magistrate to order further investigation after a police report was filed and cognizance was taken upon the said police report.

This was a positive step taken by the Bench in the development of law through judicial interpretation, as it resolved conflicting views given by the Court in the past to promote certainty of law, and furthered the interest of justice as a result of liberal interpretation. The judgment enables bona fide applicants to request for further investigation, and this would also lead to a reduction in multiple First Information Reports (FIRs) being filed. However, it should also be noted that the judgment also enables the accused persons and other parties in a criminal proceeding, with the ability to delay and derail the proceedings by filing applications requesting for further investigation to occur, and these orders under Section 173(8) will be subject to appeals which will invariably result in delays of the criminal proceedings causing irreparable loss either to the accused or to the victim.

Conclusion
The author submits that Vinubhai has eroded the principle of ‘Stare Decisis’, which is the foundation upon which the common law tradition exists. The Bench in Vinubhai overruled the plethora of judgments which followed Devarapally. Now, one could argue that the Bench was not improper in overruling the plethora of judgments as the bench strength was higher in Vinubhai, however that logic stands correct only if the Malviya judgment overruled Devarapally judgment which is not the case as the former is a per incuriam judgment with respect to the question of scope of Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., and Devarapally also enjoys support from R.R. Chari which is another three-judge bench judgment, which held that Section 156(3) is pre-cognizance only.

The lower courts can still adhere to the decision in Devarapally despite Vinubhai being a more recent judgment on the ground that the latter is per incuriam as it did not analyse the scope of Section 156(3) in the context of judicial precedents pertaining to the expression ‘taking cognizance’, which is of crucial importance when determining whether the scope of Section 156(3) is pre-cognizance or post-cognizance. This question was resolved by the various High Courts themselves in Amar Singh Yadav v. Shanti Devi [AIR 1987 Pat. 191] and Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge, Hapur [AIR 1991 All. 114], wherein the Courts have held that in the case of conflicting views rendered by different coordinate benches of the Supreme Court of India, then the decision which states the law more elaborately and accurately should be followed, by the High Courts, rather than the view that has been expressed at a later date. It would be prudent to conclude the present discussion on the point that the cardinal principle of the law of precedents is that the superior courts, especially the Apex Court and the High Courts, should settle questions of law in a consistent manner so that the law of precedents attains some degree of certainty, and observance of law is ensured.