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Sunday, October 13, 2024

Guest Post: How Long is Too Long? - On the Maximum Period that an Undertrial Prisoner can be Detained

(This is a guest post by Hany Babu and Surendra Gadling, who have been detained in prison as 'undertrials' since 2018 and 2020, respectively. This piece is being published simultaneously with the Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy Blog)

Dedicated to the fellow undertrial prisoners languishing in the prisons of India with the hope that the system would sooner than later wake up to their plight; and that one day prisons, if not still obsolete, would at least have become places where those proven guilty are held, and not places that incarcerate those who are presumed to be innocent.

The primary author would like to thank his co-defendants, Arun Fereira and Vernon Gonsalves, for the enriching discussions – stolen at times in the corridors of the court, at times on the drives to and from the court, and at times in the ‘After’ hours; Vernon, for his characteristically incisive remark ‘You need to think more!’ after going through – what I now realise was – a much cruder earlier version of this piece even before BNSS had kicked in; and Arun, whose name may have been among the authors had their Lordships not set him free, for owning the idea that the Code should have more provisions for statutory bail. Needless to say, neither of them is to shoulder the shortcomings of this piece.

Introduction

“How long is too long a period of incarceration as an undertrial for a court to conclude the right of speedy trial is defeated?”

This was a question raised by the Delhi High Court in Mohamed Hakim v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4623, in the context of grant of bail for an undertrial prisoner. We raise a similar question regarding the maximum period of detention permissible by law for an undertrial prisoner. Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), the Section that deals with the question of the maximum period that an undertrial can be detained, largely reproduces the language of its predecessor, Section 436-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), the clause that no person should be imprisoned for a period exceeding the maximum period of punishment specified for his offence.

This essay argues that the existing law, which allows a person to be detained for a period equal to the maximum period of imprisonment specified as punishment for his offence only serves to legitimise the award of “surrogate punishment” equivalent to the maximum punishment to that person, without conducting trial and determination of the question of guilt or innocence of that person according to procedure established by law. Such a law has no place in the statute book if presumption of innocence is one of the cornerstones of criminal jurisprudence.

Further, if “bail, not jail” were followed in letter and spirit, the question of prolonged pre-trial detention would not arise. In practice, however, the combination of the question of ‘prima facie guilt’ – another principle that goes against the presumption of innocence – and the tripod test of the possibility of the accused tampering with the evidence, influencing witness and / or evading trial, together conspire against the grant of bail. In such circumstances, it is only those who can afford to hire expensive lawyers and knock the doors of the Constitutional Courts who can manage to secure bail. For the rest jail becomes the rule.

In such a scenario an act of balancing is called for. We argue for a judicial reading of the BNSS that will provide us with the framework of finding such a balance.

We set out by drawing a comparison between Section 479 of BNSS and its predecessor Section 436-A of CrPC. It can be seen that far from being an improvement on Section 436-A of CrPC with respect to reducing the period that an undertrial prisoner can be detained, Section 479 of BNSS is more restrictive in its application. Be that as it may, what makes Section 479 of BNSS problematic are certain anomalies we discuss below. We shall first take a look at Section 436-A of CrPC and then go on to Section 479 of BNSS before putting forth our suggestions regarding the maximum period of detention for an undertrial prisoner.

Section 436-A of CrPC
Section 436-A of CrPC was inserted in 2006, as it was found that there were undertrial prisoners detained in jails for periods beyond the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the alleged offence. It may be noted that in spite of this, undertrial prisoners are still languishing in prisons for periods longer than the maximum punishment specified for their offence, as in the case of Dipak Joshi in West Bengal, who came out of prison after 42 years following the intervention of the Calcutta High Court.

Apart from the stipulation that an undertrial prisoner cannot be held in prison for a period exceeding the maximum period of punishment for his offence, Section 436-A of CrPC also has a provision that a person who has undergone detention for a period extending up to one half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified as punishment for his offence may be released if the punishment of death is not one of the punishments specified for the offence in question. In the prison parlance, this provision is referred to as ‘half ground’, and we shall use this term to refer to this clause. Unlike the maximum period of detention, the provision of half ground was not a statutory obligation and was subject to the Court’s discretion after hearing the Public Prosecutor.

In this article we shall be limiting our discussion to offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) while discussing CrPC and offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) while discussing BNSS. There are twelve offences in IPC for which death is specified as one of the punishments, and these offences were outside the purview of operation of 436-A for the purpose of half ground.

Section 479 of BNSS
Section 479 of BNSS corresponds to Section 436-A of CrPC. Unlike in the case of most sections, where BNSS just copies the CrPC provisions, in the case of Section 479 there are a few changes and considerable additions. There are three sub-sections to Section 479 of BNSS. While sub-section (1) reproduces the contents of Section 436-A of CrPC with some slight modifications and additions, sub-sections (2) and (3) are entirely new. We shall look at each of the sub-sections one by one.

Sub-section (1) of Section 479 of BNSS

In sub-section (1) of Section 479 of BNSS, offences punishable with death and imprisonment for life are mentioned to be excluded from the “half ground.” On our count, there are as many as 75 offences under BNS that have death or imprisonment for life as one of the punishments. While Section 436-A of CrPC excludes only 12 offences of the IPC from the ambit of half ground, BNSS excludes 75 offences from its ambit. If only offences punishable with death were excluded, by our count 16 offences of BNS would have been excluded from half ground.

As per Section 6 of BNS (which is almost a replica of Section 57 IPC), imprisonment for life is to be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for a period of twenty years for the purpose of calculating fractions of terms of punishment. So, for the purpose of “half ground,” a person who has been detained for an offence for which imprisonment for life is (and death is not) one of the punishments specified under the relevant law, that person would ordinarily have been eligible to be released on “half ground” after ten years in custody. However, that door is closed for such people under BNSS.

If BNSS takes a tougher view of offences punishable with imprisonment for life, as it considers them to be offences of a serious nature and wants to show no leniency towards persons accused of such crimes, there is hardly any room for argument. However, a look at Section 474 of BNSS (which corresponds to Section 433 of CrPC), which deals with the power of the government to commute sentences, would make us doubt this. As per clause (a) of Section 474 of BNSS, imprisonment for life can be commuted to imprisonment for a term of not less than seven years. That is to say, if you are convicted for imprisonment for life, you may stand a chance of being freed after spending seven years in prison provided you are in the good books of the government of the day; however, for the reasons set out above, if you are detained as an undertrial prisoner you are not eligible to be released even after spending ten years in prison.

So, rather than treating serious offences with iron gloves, BNSS seems to leave it to the whims of the executive rather than to the wisdom of the judiciary. What this implies for hapless prisoners who cannot afford to engage lawyers to file bail applications on their behalf is that pleading guilty and begging for the mercy of the executive in the form of commutation to a term of seven years of imprisonment would be a more attractive option than languishing endlessly in prison as an undertrial prisoner.

Apart from the “half ground,” BNSS introduces what we shall call ‘one-third ground’ for first time offenders. A first-time offender can be released if he has undergone detention for a period extending up to one-third period of the maximum punishment specified for his offence under the relevant law. The parenthetical clause explains that a first-time offender is a person “who has never been convicted for any offence in the past.” Let us not overlook the inappropriacy in using the term ‘offender’ for a person yet to be proven guilty. The possibility of getting bail after having spent one-third of the maximum period of punishment raised the hopes of so many prisoners who have been behind the bars for years. Their hopes were further raised with the possibility of the retrospective application of Section 479 of BNSS following the ruling of the Supreme Court in W.P. (Civil) 406 / 2013, In Re Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons. It is not surprising that they missed the fine print that said offences that have imprisonment for life as one of the punishments are excluded from the ambit of Section 479 of BNSS. (Ed Note: A similar conclusion was made on the Proof of Guilt Blog here).

Sub-section (2): More than one offence and multiple cases
Sub-section (2) of Section 479 of BNSS is a non-obstante clause that says a person who has more than one offence or multiple cases pending against him is not eligible to be considered to be released, neither on the basis of one-third ground, nor on the basis of half ground. Section 436-A of CrPC had no such restriction.

“Offence” is defined in Section 2(q) of BNSS (a replica of Section 2(n) of CrPC). It says “any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force…” As per sub-section (1) of Section 243 of BNSS (equivalent to Section 220 of CrPC), a series of acts connected so as to form the same transaction can lead to more offences than one being committed. Sub-section (3) of Section 243 of BNSS states that if an offence falls within two or more separate definitions by which offences are defined under any law, the person may be charged with each such offence.

Illustration (1) pertaining to sub-section (3) of Section 243 of BNSS says if a person wrongfully strikes another person with a cane, he may be separately charged with and convicted of offences under sub-section (2) of Section 115 (i.e. voluntarily causing hurt) and Section 131 (i.e. punishment for assault or criminal force other than on grave provocation) of BNS. This would mean that on a literal reading of Section 479 of BNSS, a person who strikes another with a cane would be ineligible to be considered to be released on the basis of one-third or half ground even if the person is a ‘first time offender’.

A combined reading of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 479 BNSS gives us a peculiar situation. The condition in sub-section (1) that a person should be a first-time offender is applicable only for the one-third ground and not for the half ground. Or, in other words, if you have a previous conviction, you cannot be considered to be released on the basis of one-third ground, but you can be released on the basis of half ground. Well and good. Now consider this: as per sub-section (2) of Section 479 BNSS, a person who has multiple cases pending against him (or even more than one offence against him in a single case) cannot be considered either for one-third ground or for half ground. That is to say, BNSS takes a more considerate view of a person who has a previous conviction than of a person who is yet to be proven guilty but has more than one case pending against him in that the former is eligible to be released on half ground, but not the latter. Does this not eviscerate the presumption of innocence?

Sub-Section 3: A silver lining
Sub-section (3) of Section 479 of BNSS is indeed a welcome addition as it casts a duty on the Jail Superintendent to make an application to the Court to release a person who has completed one half or one-third of the period mentioned in sub-section (1), as the case may be. Under the previous scheme, it was left to the accused to move court. Often the persons were hardly aware of such a provision or would not have the legal support to make such an application.

Applying the Law
Having gone through Section 479 of BNSS, which deals with the maximum period that an undertrial prisoner can be detained, we shall turn to two related issues: (1) How to reduce the number of undertrial prisoners in the prisons? and (2) How to ensure that an undertrial prisoner does not get incarcerated for too long a period? Albeit related, these two questions are distinct, and different steps need to be taken to tackle them effectively.

The ABC of reducing the number of undertrial prisoners

If the number of undertrial persons in the prisons is to be reduced, the three necessary steps are:

A: Avoid arrest unless necessary;

B: Bail to be granted unless circumstances warrant otherwise;

C: Conduct speedy trial.

In spite of the repeated pronouncements of the Supreme Court about the need for the police to be judicious in the use of the power to arrest, BNSS makes only a feeble attempt to strengthen the safeguards offered by CrPC. Sections 41, 41A, 41B, 41C and 41D of CrPC, which deal with arrest, are reproduced and renumbered as Sections 35 to 38 of BNSS. The only additional protection BNSS offers – and what perhaps justifies renaming of the Act as “Nagarik Suraksha” – is the addition of sub-section (7) of Section 35, which stipulates that prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police is needed to arrest a person who is infirm or above sixty years of age, for an offence punishable with less than three years of imprisonment.

There are at least more than one hundred offences in BNS (just as was the case with IPC) that have a punishment of imprisonment for a maximum period of less than three years. However, barring roughly half a dozen of the rest are all bailable and non-cognizable offences. Therefore, the introduction of sub-section (7) of Section 35 of BNSS may hardly make a practical difference. Moreover, experience shows that in order to circumvent provisions like those of Section 35(7), police may easily add a Section that provides for punishment of three years or more and may also get away with it.

Going into the issue of grant of bail is beyond the scope of this piece. Some of the recent judgements of the Supreme Court that have upheld the right to life of the undertrial prisoner and granted bail upholding Article 21 as an effective means against the prolonged incarceration and award of surrogate punishment seem to offer a beacon of hope. However, as noted by Abhinav Sekhri in his blog post [‘A curious Constitutionalism’ dated July 19, 2024], it is still as though prolonged incarceration of an undertrial prisoner and the issue of grant of bail are issues only the highest Court has to concern itself with. For those who cannot afford to reach that level, there still isn’t much scope for hope.

The culture of seeking adjournments and postponements are usually cited as the main causes of delay in judicial proceedings. Section 309 of CrPC that dealt with powers of the Court to postpone or adjourn proceedings presents a curious case. The Section said that proceedings in every trial or enquiry should be conducted on a “day-to-day” basis and postponement of the commencement of trial or adjournment beyond the following day is to be resorted to only if necessary, and the reasons for the same have to be recorded. However, postponement of the commencement of the trial for months and years and adjournments of proceedings have become the norm rather than exception. There is also a stipulation that trial in offences related to rape should be completed within a period of two months from the date of filing of the chargesheet, which would be a miracle in our trial courts.

Apart from the time limit of 60 / 90 days for the completion of investigation, CrPC had no time limit specified for the framing of charges, commencement and completion of trial, or the delivery of the judgment. BNSS, on the other hand, sets a time limit of “sixty days from the date of first hearing on charge” for framing of charges in Sections 251 and 263 (corresponds to Sections 228 and 242 of CrPC, respectively) and a period of forty five days for pronouncement of judgment after conclusion of the trial in Section 392 (which corresponds to Section 353 of CrPC). The efficacy of these steps, however, will have to be tested in practice as no remedies are prescribed in the eventuality of these limits not being observed. There is hardly any reason to assume that the time limits introduced in BNSS will not remain a dead letter, like the clause about “day-to-day” trial and the sixty day limit for the completion of trial in offences related to rape, which were part of Section 309 of CrPC; or that Section 346 of BNSS will ensure framing of charges and commencement of trial without undue delay. It has to be underlined that no time limit has been specified as to when “hearing on charge” should commence after the filing of the chargesheet.

In reality, as observed by the Bombay High Court while granting bail to the accused in a POCSO case in which charges were not framed even after five years, once the chargesheet has been filed the case is often kept on the back burner and the investigation agency and the court forgets all about the accused after remanding him to judicial custody. The remand gets mechanically extended from time to time in most cases, without the accused person being produced before the court either physically or through video conferencing. This process goes on for months or even years. In order to curb this, effective checks should be built into the system similar to the statutory bail granted to the accused in case investigation has not been completed within the stipulated time. We turn to this issue in the next section.

How Long is too Long
As we argued right at the outset, a law that states no undertrial prisoner shall be detained for a period exceeding the maximum period of imprisonment specified as punishment for his offence is an anathema to the principle of presumption of innocence, as it only legitimises the detention of the undertrial prisoner to a period equal to that of the maximum period of imprisonment specified as punishment for that offence. It thereby provides for inflicting surrogate punishment on those who are considered to be innocent until proven guilty by procedure established by law. The question, then, is how long a period of incarceration is too long for an undertrial prisoner?

In an ideal world, no person should be punished until proven guilty. And without mincing words let us admit that the label ‘judicial custody’ does not make detaining an undertrial person within the confines of a prisonhouse qualitatively very different from punishment. Nevertheless, setting idealism aside, we may still arrive at a reasonable period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained by confining ourselves to the four corners of BNSS. In order to arrive at such a figure, we need to turn our attention to another Section of BNSS – Section 474 (which corresponds to Section 433 of CrPC) that deals with the power of the government to commute sentences.

Unlike most other Sections, Section 474 of BNSS is a considerable improvement upon its counterpart, namely Section 433 of CrPC. Sentences can be commuted as given below as per Section 433 of CrPC:

  • death sentence to imprisonment for life;
  • imprisonment for life to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years;
  • rigorous imprisonment to simple imprisonment; and
  • simple imprisonment to fine.

Section 474 of BNSS offers the following possibilities for the commutation of sentence:

  • death sentence to imprisonment for life;
  • imprisonment for life to imprisonment for a term not less than seven years;
  • imprisonment for seven years or more to imprisonment for a term not less than three years;
  • imprisonment for a term less than seven years to fine; and
  • rigorous imprisonment to simple imprisonment.

As is evident from a glance at the above, BNSS takes a much more liberal view with respect to conviction, in cases where the power to show leniency and commute sentences is vested in the hands of the executive. If we consider the arithmetic behind the calculation involved in arriving at the number of years to which terms of sentences of imprisonment are commuted, we can see that it hovers around one third of the sentence. For instance, imprisonment for life is reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years for the purpose of calculating fractions of terms of punishments (as per Section 6 of BNS / Section 57 of IPC). So, one third of imprisonment for life is six years and eight months. Similarly, one third of seven years is two years and four months. If after conviction, the term of sentence can be commuted to its one third at the sweet will of the executive, we propose that the same formula can be adopted in fixing the maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained.

We propose that seven years be fixed as the upper limit beyond which a person in custody as an undertrial for an offence punishable with imprisonment for life or death cannot be detained. Similarly, for offences punishable with imprisonment for seven years or more, the maximum period that a person can be detained should be three years (in line with clause (c) of Section 474 of BNSS). Since there is no term of imprisonment specified in the case of commutation of conviction for a term of less than seven years in Section 474 of BNSS, we could follow the principle of one third of the maximum punishment in such cases. For instance, the maximum period that a person can be detained for an offence punishable with three years of imprisonment can be fixed as one year.

As the Supreme Court has reiterated in some of the recent judgements, the right to life of the accused cannot be obliterated, no matter how serious the alleged offence. An accused has the right to speedy trials and if the State and the Court cannot provide it to him, they have no right to detain him for a prolonged period and award surrogate punishment, but have to release him after a reasonable time. The bogey of the possibility of tampering with the evidence, influencing witnesses, and flight risk cannot be grounds that trump presumption of innocence and right to life. And fixing the maximum period that an undertrial can be detained as a period equivalent to one third of the punishment for the offence is only a small step to show that fundamental rights are taken seriously and are not to be trampled upon indiscriminately.

Similarly, there is no reason why presumption of innocence should be whittled away due to the subsequent conduct of a person who has been found guilty on a previous occasion. A law that treats a person harshly on the basis of previous conviction when he is yet to be proven guilty on a subsequent occasion is just a legal garb for the prejudice that operates against a who has been found guilty once. It may make sense to treat a person harshly on a subsequent conviction – as in the award of enhanced punishment, but not when the person is yet to be proven guilty. Therefore, the upper limit on the maximum period for which an undertrial can be detained should apply uniformly to all undertrial prisoners regardless of whether they have been convicted earlier or not.

If the clause about the maximum period an undertrial prisoner can be detained has to be implemented effectively, it has to be raised to the level of a statutory obligation on the lines of Section 187 of BNSS (which is pari materia Section 167 of CrPC), which leaves no discretionary power to the Magistrate. If the right to be freed when the investigation is not completed within the stipulated time is a fundamental right and not merely a statutory right as held in Vikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2020) 10 SCC 616, the right to be freed if the trial is not concluded within a reasonable time can be no less in stature. The option of continuing detention after hearing the Public Prosecutor would virtually close the doors of bail as Magistrates more often than not get persuaded by rhetoric of Prosecutors, who at times act as though they were Police Prosecutors rather than Public Prosecutors.

In the current scenario, as there is no statutory limit specified for the conclusion of trial, it is left to the Constitutional Courts to intervene and adjudicate on the question whether the right to life of the accused person has been violated due to prolonged incarceration without trial. And this would happen only in the case of those who can afford to reach up to the Constitutional Courts. As it is left unspecified, the interpretation of what ‘reasonable time period’ is varies according to the vagaries of the varied Benches. It also depends often on how soon or late the file of the accused person reaches before a sympathetic Bench. If in some cases it is a matter of a year or two, in some cases it is nine or ten years or even more. Specifying the outer time limit for the conclusion of trial in the statute would not only make it uniformly applicable, but it would also make it enforceable at the level of the trial court and thereby within the means of those who cannot afford to know the doors of the Constitutional Courts.

Conclusion
The proposal to have parity between the term of imprisonment to which sentences of imprisonment can be commuted and the maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained – both in proportion to the sentence for the offence in question – cannot be repugnant to the spirit of justice the new laws are supposed to usher in. Mandatory release of an undertrial prisoner after the stipulated time period is only part of the commitment to conclude the trial within that time frame, and thereby ensuring justice to both the accused person and the victim of the crime. Keeping an undertrial person in prison endlessly and awarding surrogate punishment is justice to neither parties. And the new criminal laws are all about ushering in an era of justice, aren’t they?

Saturday, June 26, 2021

The Supreme Court and Delays in Cheque Bouncing Cases

This April, a Constitution Bench of the Indian Supreme Court took up the issue of delays in cheque bouncing cases — i.e., complaints instituted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 — and passed some important directions on how such cases should be run [Order dated 16.04.2021 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) 2 of 2020]. It has also constituted a Committee to look at issues beyond these criminal procedure aspects which will take time in formulating its recommendations. On June 21, the Delhi High Court has taken the lead and made efforts (as recommended by the Supreme Court itself) to help secure implementation of the Supreme Court's order by issuing "Practice Directions". 

Given that judges, especially at the Supreme Court, have to budget the very limited time available to them and pick what they think are serious issues, it is great that the issue of delays in cheque bouncing cases caught their attention to this extent. At the same time, I remain extremely skeptical of the directions itself that the Supreme Court has proposed. I've extracted the directions below for completeness: 

1) The High Courts are requested to issue practice directions to the Magistrates to record reasons before converting trial of complaints under Section 138 of the Act from summary trial to summons trial.

2) Inquiry shall be conducted on receipt of complaints under Section 138 of the Act to arrive at sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused, when such accused resides beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

3) For the conduct of inquiry under Section 202 of the Code, evidence of witnesses on behalf of the complainant shall be permitted to be taken on affidavit. In suitable cases, the Magistrate can restrict the inquiry to examination of documents without insisting for examination of witnesses.

4) We recommend that suitable amendments be made to the Act for provision of one trial against a person for multiple offences under Section 138 of the Act committed within a period of 12 months, notwithstanding the restriction in Section 219 of the Code.

5) The High Courts are requested to issue practice directions to the Trial Courts to treat service of summons in one complaint under Section 138 forming part of a transaction, as deemed service in respect of all the complaints filed before the same court relating to dishonour of cheques issued as part of the said transaction.

6) Judgments of this Court in Adalat Prasad (supra) and Subramanium Sethuraman (supra) have interpreted the law correctly and we reiterate that there is no inherent power of Trial Courts to review or recall the issue of summons. This does not affect the power of the Trial Court under Section 322 of the Code to revisit the order of issue of process in case it is brought to the court’s notice that it lacks jurisdiction to try the complaint.

7) Section 258 of the Code is not applicable to complaints under Section 138 of the Act and findings to the contrary in Meters and Instruments (supra) do not lay down correct law. To conclusively deal with this aspect, amendment to the Act empowering the Trial Courts to reconsider/recall summons in respect of complaints under Section 138 shall be considered by the Committee constituted by an order of this Court dated 10.03.2021.

8) All other points, which have been raised by the Amici Curiae in their preliminary report and written submissions and not considered herein, shall be the subject matter of deliberation by the aforementioned Committee. Any other issue relating to expeditious disposal of complaints under Section 138 of the Act shall also be considered by the Committee.

The Court concluded that these directions would help speed up disposal of cheque bouncing cases — only time will tell if that will be the case. What I am perturbed by is how the Court seems to have paid insufficient attention to detail while arriving at these conclusions, and failed to fully think through the kinds of unintended consequences which may ensue due to the proposed interventions in the process.

  • Insufficient Data: The Constitution Bench order refers to the absolute number of pending cases (at around 35 Lakh), to remind us about how serious the problem is. But it is unclear whether there was any attempt to probe deeper behind the numbers. At another point in the order, some specific aspects  of the trial process are flagged as contributing to delays, such as the stage of issuing summons. But, these numbers don't tell us anything if we don't ask why are delays happening — is it because there are accused persons evading summons, or because courts are taking too long, or because accused persons choose to challenge the issuance of summons in the High Court which causes the trial to be stuck? All of these are different problems and require different solutions. This is just one example to show the kind of in-depth analysis that was needed to try and tailor solutions for this problem of delays in cheque bouncing cases — and it seems to be wholly absent from the order. It is not that what I am suggesting here is unthinkable; in fact, just recently a pilot study for identifying delays was commissioned by the Delhi High Court where this kind of a granular approach was adopted. The Supreme Court could have also taken the help of experts in the field — organisations such as Daksh have done wonderfully informative work on delays — but instead adopting something close to armchair problem-solving. 
  • Unintended Consequences: Armchair problem-solving led the Court to propose three broad changes to how the existing system works to help reduce delays — directions (1) and (5). I fear that all of these directions might prove counterproductive and increase delays rather than curb them. First, we have the summary trial being converted to summons trial issue. Magistrates are now required to be more strict in converting cheque bouncing cases to summons trial cases, the thought being that more summary trials will obviously speed up disposal — great right? Maybe not. What this creates is yet another significant stage in the criminal process, which will be contested with arguments on both sides, and whichever side looses might well challenge the order before appellate courts which will only contribute to more delays. The same objection applies to Direction (5) which now allows for "deemed service" of summons where complaints are in respect of the same transaction — a court will need convincing of it being the same trial, which will take time, and accused persons will go and challenge that order issuing summons, as they already do. On top of which, I fear that this kind of "deemed service" might well be contrary to law — the Supreme Court has supplanted a judicial determination which occurs at the stage of charge to a prior stage. The key difference between these two is that while at that later stage the accused is present in court to contest the joinder of cases, at the stage of issuing summons we are asking the court to make that determination without giving the accused a right to be heard. 
  • The Inherent Powers Issue: For the number of cheque bouncing trials that are pending, there are a fairly high number of 482 petitions / revision petitions pending before appellate courts where orders issuing summons are challenged — and often are successfully set aside. This is because it is quite common for totally unrelated persons to be summoned in such cases especially when companies are involved — complainants aren't expected to know internal management affairs, and usually arraign all known management personnel, some of whom may have had nothing to do with the cheque. In many of these cases, it is possible to prevent the irrelevant persons being summoned by asking the magistrates to be more careful. But in others, it is simply impossible to secure this outcome without letting the accused bring forth the relevant facts. Since the Supreme Court evidently agrees that the trial process can witness unbelievable delays and cause great hardship to parties, one would think that it would try and sponsor solutions which help curtail that process where possible. Instead, what the Court has done by Directions (6) and (7) is exactly the opposite — render it impossible for magistrates to try and do justice by curbing frivolous prosecutions. The Court could have looked at Section 251 and located therein a power to help magistrates achieve this objective [this issue has been discussed at length on the Blog] and create an environment which would have had beneficial consequences for all summons cases, going beyond the cheque bouncing offence alone. Instead, it chose to double-down on the logic which says magistrates cannot stop summons cases instituted on a complaint at any stage prior to judgment once an accused has been summoned. Not only does this worsen delays for trial courts, but also contributes to more 482 petitions in High Courts, which is where the aggrieved accused persons are likely to go seek reliefs.
Again, it might be that the Committee constituted by the Supreme Court suggests that the directions issued by the Constitution Bench might be reconsidered. It might also be that the directions end up dramatically reducing pendency for cheque bouncing cases and make this post look foolish. Even if that happens, I still think that the process of armchair problem-solving adopted by the Supreme Court in this instance is bound to create more problems than solutions, especially if the exercise is the product of a Constitution Bench.    

Thursday, April 23, 2020

There are No Right Answers: The Supreme Court and the Purity / Mixture Debate under the NDPS Act

On April 22, 2020, a Three Justices' Bench of the Supreme Court decided a reference made to it in Hira Singh [Crl. Appeal No. 722 of 2017, decided on 22.04.2020]. The primary issue before the Court was the correctness an earlier decision by a Two Justices' Bench of the Supreme Court, E. Micheal Raj v. Intelligence Officer [(2008) 5 SCC 161, "E. Micheal Raj"]. There, it had been held that determining whether one was carrying "small" or "commercial" quantity of a drug depended exclusively upon the quantity of the "actual" or "pure" drug content, as opposed to the total quantity of the mixture that was seized. In Hira Singh, the Three Justices' have unanimously held that the view taken in E. Micheal Raj was incorrect, and that the determination of quantities for the purposes of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 ["NDPS"] depends upon the total quantity of the item seized. 

This post explains the issues present in this debate about how to judge a "mixture" of drugs under the NDPS Act. As the title suggests, I argue that the approaches taken in E. Micheal Raj and Hira Singh are both problematic for the administration of the law, for ultimately, the problem is an arbitrariness inherent in the NDPS Act itself. Even so, I conclude by critiquing the decision in Hira Singh for its surprisingly unreasoned, uncritical, and unsympathetic acceptance of an alternative which places the lives of many persons under the sceptre of harsh mandatory sentences.   

The Quantification Approach and Effects of Punishment
The NDPS Act is one of the most stringent laws present in the statute book of India today. Birthed as a result of the "War on Drugs" that captured the international imagination during the 1980s, thanks in no small part to the U.S.A, the NDPS Act sponsored a highly punitive approach towards drug crime. The law sponsored high mandatory minimum sentences, even for possession based crimes, took away the possibility of probation for first-time offenders, made getting bail extremely hard, and explicitly reversed the burden of proof. 

As the global community reckoned with the failure of punitive approaches as a sustainable solution for drug crimes, with the heavy punishments clearly not serving as effective deterrents, the world began to tone down the harshness of these laws. The 2001 amendments to the NDPS were the result of this global trend. They brought in a new scheme for administering the law by introducing a classification of "small" and "commercial" quantities, and varying punishments on the quantity of the drugs involved (An old notification detailing such quantities is here). The amendments also recognised that a one-size-fits-all approach that merely criminalised all drug related issues was not the answer, and brought forth a new process to recognise "Addicts" and treat them differently in the law (how successful this has been is a different issue altogether).

E. Micheal Raj and the Problems of a Purity-Based Approach  
This quantification regime was the focus of the decision in E. Micheal Raj, which involved quantities of heroin seized from an accused person. Lab testing showed that the heroin content of the mixture recovered during investigation fell in the "small quantity" category, while the weight of the entire mixture fell in the "commercial quantity" bracket. This mixture was not of two different drugs but of a drug and a neutral substance. The Supreme Court reversed the finding of the High Court, and held that the accused was only liable to be punished for holding a "small quantity" of the drug in question. This emphasis on the purity of drug content was, according to the Court, a direct consequence of the 2001 amendments and the "rationalising" of the punishment system that they sought to achieve.

The problems of such an approach which focuses on the "actual" drug content in a mixture is that it can defeat the oppressive purposes that the NDPS Act was enacted for in the first place, and which the legislature has not explicitly disavowed as yet. As the Court in Hira Singh has emphasised (more on that in the next section), an approach solely committed to identifying the actual drug content will end up being too lenient on suppliers, especially if the street practices entail that certain narcotics are only ever going to be sold as mixtures with small drug content. 

Hira Singh's return to a Total Weight Approach and its Problems
The opinion in Hira Singh suggests that there were several reasons to disagree with E. Micheal Raj — the Court disagreed with how the legislative intent was inferred and also suggested that this aspect of the opinion in E. Micheal Raj was entirely obiter and based on a misapplication of the law and facts. Having done so, the Court in Hira Singh unanimously and unequivocally rejected the actual drug content approach of E. Micheal Raj and approved of an approach that looked at the total weight of the seized items. This approach, the Court held, was in consonance with the legislative intent behind the NDPS Act. 

The reason was simple: An approach focused entirely upon actual drug content did not sufficiently address local practices of how the drug trade worked. Thus, we are told not only about how some kinds of drugs are more popularly sold as mixtures, but also about how some mixtures are in fact much more harmful and addictive than the pure drug itself. The court uses the example of "smack", a popular drug made by combining heroin with other substances such as chalk powder and zinc. An approach concerned with the actual drug content would allow for misplaced leniency in the system as the dealers of smack and other such deadly substances would not get a sufficiently stiff jail term for their conduct.

This criticism of the actual drug content approach is a fair one. But, at the same time, focusing on the total weight of a mixture brings its own problems which the Court all too conveniently ignores. This is the problem of manifest arbitrariness that, if anything, is now amplified in how the NDPS structure will operate. One side of this arbitrariness problem was aptly highlighted in Hira Singh, which I will call the problem of misplaced severity. Thus, the law now allows for the person who carries 4 grams of pure heroin to be punished for carrying a "small quantity" of narcotics, for a person carrying 249 grams of heroin to be punished in the "intermediate" category, while a person carrying a mixture weighing 251 grams, with 249 grams of neutral substance and 2 grams of heroin, will be punished for carrying a "commercial quantity" of heroin. 

This problem of misplaced severity has a twin — the problem of misplaced leniency — which can be understood in context of the American experience of punishing the trading of the drug LSD. The U.S. Supreme Court in Chapman v. United States had such an issue, where appellants were convicted and sentenced to a mandatory ten-year term for distributing LSD weighing around 1 gram. The appellants argued that they had sold blotter paper which, while weighing around 1 gram as a whole, had a much lower LSD content and would avoid the mandatory prison term. The Court held in favour of a total weight approach and upheld the mandatory sentences. 

Chapman was cited approvingly by the counsel for Union of India in Hira Singh. Sadly though, what was not mentioned before the Court was the problems that Chapman created for the law (succinctly explained in this piece). The problem was simple: As a normal dose of pure LSD only weighed about 0.05 milligrams, the total weight approach of Chapman allowed a person to escape the mandatory sentence even if she engaged in thousands of trades for pure LSD. But at the same time, it gave the mandatory ten-year sentence to those who made even one trade for LSD through the medium of blotter paper. Focusing on the total weight of a mixture, then, also brought with it misplaced leniency for drug offenders. 

Hira Singh — A Critique
These are serious problems and potentially invite a constitutional challenge to the sentencing regime under the NDPS Act — the kinds of issues, you would think, are what a Three Justices' Bench of the Supreme Court ought to be addressing. It is excruciating, then, to see the Court in Hira Singh totally avoid any discussion about the arbitrariness issue and offer its uncritical affirmation to the merits of adopting a total weight approach in the NDPS Act context. 

And here, perhaps a word must also be said about the unreasoned manner in which the Court reached at its final destination of upholding the total weight approach. Thus, as mentioned above, the Court notes the potential deadliness of mixtures such as smack and uses this to justify a rejection of the actual drug content approach [Paragraph 8.3]. But what is the basis for these observations? No reports of any government department or any international body are cited. Surely, details of the drug trade cannot be be assumed as matters of which judicial notice can be taken and thus do not require any material in support. Keen googling skills suggest that rather than government sources, the opinion has possibly relied upon a rather unaccredited source for these observations which, if true, would only serve to delegitimise the strength of these observations. 

And then there is Paragraph 8.5, which justifies adopting a total weight approach by (i) referring to the problem of "drug addicts" and in the same sentence refers to the devious workings of the "mafia" internationally, and; (ii) claiming that the "use of drugs by the young people in India has increased" and that "drugs are being used for weakening of the nation", to finally conclude that "the guilty must be in and the innocent must be out". It is nothing short of remarkable that while Hira Singh held the judgment in E. Micheal Raj as having wrongly read the legislative intent of the NDPS Act, it suggests drug addiction is a problem, which is a direct negation of the intent behind the 2001 amendments. If this was not enough, then a series of stereotypes and bald assertions about immorality and national strength are offered to serve as legal justifications. Thus, what are, at best, pleas by prosecutors to deny bail and, at worst, coffee-table rants by senior citizens, have been given the exalted status of legal reasons justifying why a harshly penal regime must be read in a broad, expansive, and potentially arbitrary manner. 

Conclusion
Hira Singh has taken the law on how to assess the quantities of drugs seized in an NDPS case to the position before the intervention made in E. Micheal Raj. In no uncertain terms, the Supreme Court has held that the total value of the seized items will be considered to decide whether or not the case was one of "small" or "commercial" quantities. But while the legal position has merely reverted to what it was a decade ago, the manner in which the Court has arrived at this conclusion is nothing short of extraordinary. The Court failed to address the one serious issue it was presented with — if the total weight approach rendered the NDPS sentencing regime arbitrary — and instead offered a litany of unreasoned assertions to justify its conclusions. After reading Hira Singh, I was left thinking that the Court appeared to have forgotten that underneath all this rhetoric of action and bluster in the context of drug laws, there are actual lives which are seriously affected by the interpretive choices that are being made. It is this lack of compassion that marked Hira Singh as a truly odious opinion.  

Thursday, November 7, 2019

Section 251 CrPC and Discharge in Summons Cases: Part IV

[This is the fourth and final post in a series. The earlier posts can be accessed here, here, and here.]

The issue being discussed in this series has been given a sense of urgency, because a trial court in Delhi was pressed to make a reference under Section 305 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 [Cr.P.C.] to the Delhi High Court, raising the following questions which I've paraphrased below from the High Court's order: 

Q.1 Can a court discharge the accused after appearance in in a summons triable case based upon a complaint in general, and in a case under Section 138 NI Act in particular? 
Q.2 If so, under which Section of Cr.P.C. does such a power lie? 
Q.3 Further, at what stage can an application for discharge be entertained i.e. before framing of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C., or before / at the time of framing of notice, or even after the framing of notice? 
Q.4 Finally, if the answer to Question 1 is yes, what shall be the scope of such a power of discharge? Will it be similar to discharge proceedings in Sessions / Warrant Cases? Can documents produced by the accused be considered at this stage? 
Q.5 On the other hand, if the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, does the accused have no remedy at the trial court, which must begin a trial after process has been issued and accused has been summoned under Section 204 Cr.P.C.? 
Summing Up the Legal Position
The previous three posts have sought to sum up the legal position on this issue of whether Summons Cases — prosecutions for offences punishable with up to two years in prison, as defined under the Cr.P.C. — can be ended prior to the stage of an acquittal / conviction by a court if the case appears to be groundless. This review could be seen as supporting the following broad conclusions:
  • There is clear statutory basis to end proceedings in Summons Cases instituted upon complaints by private persons if they are baseless, before issuing process to an accused to come to court and answer the allegations [Section 203, Cr.P.C.].
  • There is clear statutory basis to end proceedings in Summons Cases instituted otherwise than on a complaint, even after an accused person has been called to court. This may or may not be because the prosecution is baseless — something we can't know because the statute does not require a court to give reasons [Section 258, Cr.P.C.].
  • The Supreme Court has expressly held that in Summons Cases instituted upon complaints, the trial court cannot recall the process issued to an accused, in the event of being convinced by the accused that the proceedings were baseless [Adalat Prasad, (2004) 7 SCC 338]. 
  • Further, in Subramanian Sethuraman [(2004) 3 SCC 324], the Supreme Court refused to permit a discharge in a case where the request was made after notice was framed and the accused had entered a plea of not guilty.
  • At the same time, the Supreme Court has not expressly considered whether a trial court could end proceedings under Section 251, Cr.P.C., by permitting the accused to address arguments on whether the proceedings are baseless. While the opportunity arose to consider the issue in Amit Sibal v. Arvind Kejriwal, that petition was ultimately decided by consent of both parties.  
Thus, the legal position as I understood it helps to partially answer some of these questions. But the materials that I examined left the essential question unanswered, i.e., whether or not a trial court has the power to end Summons Cases instituted upon complaints without conducting a full trial, even after the court has considered the Complaint for purposes of issuing process to an accused and calling her to court. 

Making the Case for Permitting Discharge in Summons Cases
But must the absence of clear statutory authority and / or judicial precedent lead to a conclusion that trial courts cannot pass an order of discharge in Summons Cases? If we consider this as purely being a point of law, then I think that the weight of authority in favour of granting trial courts the power to end Summons Cases instituted upon Complaints by discharging an accused person is quite weak. 

Strictly Legal Approach 
It is no accident that the Cr.P.C. does not contain any express provisions for discharge in Summons Cases instituted upon complaints. After all, the Cr.P.C. is designed to achieve a balance between two interests — expeditious disposal of cases, and ensuring that persons are not unnecessarily dragged to face the punishing procedure of a criminal case. 

Thus, while this sense of balance led Parliament to create multiple critical stages before judgment in Sessions Cases and Warrant Cases, where prosecutions could be terminated if found groundless, the same was not chosen for Summons Cases. The 14th and the 41st Law Commission Reports had also earmarked the procedure in Summons Cases for its ability to get quick verdicts, mainly because this procedure was not designed to have all the trappings of a full trial. This promise of speedy trials is what propelled Parliament to enhance the jurisdiction of Summons Cases from only catering to offences punishable with imprisonment for up to six months, to the position today where prosecutions for offences punishable with up to two years in prison are tried as Summons Cases. By creating an additional critical stage, we would end up dragging Summons Cases on for too long and slowly erode the very purpose behind having procedural distinctions between a Summons Case and a Warrant Case which led to expanding the ambit of the former class of cases.

Criminal Process Approach
Unfortunately, the criminal process does not always work as it is imagined in statutes or in opinions of the Supreme Court. The same goes for the gap between the ideals guiding the Cr.P.C., and how far these are realised on the ground. 

Thus, while the Cr.P.C. was modified in 1973 to help speed up the trials of various cases, NCRB data shows that delays have only gotten worse in the decades since 1973. Furthermore, very often the discretion vested in trial courts to weed out groundless cases at different critical stages is not properly exercised. This is often compounded by delays plaguing the system, requiring superhuman capacity of judges to separate the grain from the chaff. This ultimately forces aggrieved persons to move an appellate court in the judicial ladder for seeking justice by way of immediate remedy against what is perceived as an unfair prosecution that will take years to resolve. All of which, in turn, clogs appellate courts by burdening them with such matters and taking away time to finally decide pending appeals. 

It is for these reasons that incorporating a critical stage akin to discharge for Summons Cases, even if they are instituted upon a complaint, becomes necessary to help maintain that balance between the ideas of efficiency and justice in the criminal process. The same logic is what propelled the Supreme Court to gradually enhance the powers of magistrates during criminal investigations, first in Sakiri Vasu [(2008) 2 SCC 409] and more recently in Vinubhai [Crl. Appeal Nos. 478-479 of 2017, decided on 16.10.2019]. 

Considering the Reference Issues
Once we agree that having a stage akin to discharge is necessary, the answers to the remaining issues are easier. The decision in Adalat Prasad confirms that a court cannot recall a summons, and the decision in Subramanian Sethuraman similarly tells us that there is no going back on a trial once the accused has entered a plea. Which leaves a small window open for a court to consider a discharge plea — after an accused appears in court, but before the notice is framed under Section 251, Cr.P.C. 

The power to end cases must be implied as existing in the same provision, by empowering a court to not frame notice, if no basis for accusations is made out. And the scope of these discharge hearings must be more progressive than those under Section 239, Cr.P.C. for Warrant Cases. Thus, while an accused will not have carte blanche to bring in materials, there must be scope for a court to consider materials of sterling quality, the provenance of which cannot be doubted. For instance, a government document like a Form 32, confirming that an accused person arraigned in a cheque bouncing case for being the director of a company, was in fact not a director of the concerned company at the relevant point in time.

Conclusion
Criminal trials are long processes that involve serious costs for the litigants and the courts, in terms of time and money. The lengthy nature of criminal trials can often be the tradeoff society must give to prevent wrongful convictions by allowing courts to take their time. The same breath carries the idea that since not all cases will be merit-worthy, perhaps a trial could be avoided to decide patently bogus cases. Allowing courts this power goes a long to way to ensure that the process does not become the punishment for innocent persons.

In Summons Cases instituted upon complaints, statutory provisions today expressly require courts to consider whether the case has sufficient basis to proceed before calling an accused to court. The sheer number of Summons Cases and their pendency rate, when compared with the rate of conviction, suggests that courts are perhaps not able to perform the task of weeding out the bad cases from the good in the most optimal way possible. 

This is hardly surprising given the burden that every court must shoulder. So, one wonders, given that a court cannot be expected today to provide each case with the time it requires, would it not help the process if the court can secure the benefit of a proper adversarial hearing to help make its decision? Would it not help the court carry out its judicial function of securing justice without sacrificing all concerns of efficiency, if two parties committed to their position make their case and guide the court to consider all relevant facets for making a decision? It certainly would, and therefore, it is necessary that the criminal process legitimises such proceedings in Summons Cases instituted upon complaints. 

Of course, there would be no need for lengthy and dense essays on the subject if the statute could just be drafted with more clarity. Considering how these gaps in the statutory framework have been the topic of comment in judicial decisions at least since the 1980s, it cannot be said that Parliament has not had enough time to consider the issue. It is inconceivable that Parliament has chosen to stand by and not iron out the creases even after the discussions in K.M. Mathew and Adalat Prasad. Even now, any solution that the Delhi High Court offers by answering the Reference, would only help to solve these issues in one part of the vast Indian legal system. It will not, and cannot, supplant the persisting need for legislative consideration of the problem.

Friday, November 1, 2019

Section 251 CrPC and Discharge in Summons Cases: Part III

[This is Part III in a multi-part series. The previous posts can be accessed, here and here]

The previous post in this series traced how the statutory text pertaining to the procedure for trial in Summons Cases developed from 1861 till the late 1960s. This historical arc was traced to identify how, at different points of time, Summons Cases had provisions for ending a case before the final stage of judgment. In other words, to examine whether the critical stage of discharge was present for these cases, in any shape or form. 

Recap
The historical review confirmed that explicit provisions for discharge have never been part of the trial procedure for Summons Cases. But, the gradual development of statutory text definitely suggested that legislators intended to provide for a critical stage permitting that a Summons Case may be ended without having to go through the rigmarole of a full-length trial. This evolution was seen in how, after the 1861 Code, successive Codes permitted magistrates to undertake a more detailed inquiry before issuing process to an accused, calling upon her to answer the allegations in the complaint. Further, it was also seen through provisions that permitted magistrates to end the case before judgment after an accused had come to court, by dismissing complaints that were frivolous or vexatious. 

However, by 1898, the power to dismiss frivolous cases after an accused had entered appearance was taken away, to be replaced by a power to end only those cases that were not instituted upon a complaint. One way to read this development would be to argue that since in complaint cases the law now provided for an inquiry before issuing process, it made sure that only genuine cases were going to trial. And since this setup was not available for the cases not instituted upon a complaint, it made sense to empower magistrates to end only those cases not instituted upon complaints after process had been issued to compel an accused to appear in court. 

Judicial engagement with these provisions, especially after 1950, suggested that even though there was no exact substitute of the discharge stage in Summons Cases, magistrates were taking steps that had similar effect. Further, in some cases, accused persons were indeed appearing at the inquiry stage to assist the court, before they were formally summoned to appear and answer the allegations against them. This judicial engagement meant that even in the Summons Case, a critical stage was very much present, which permitted a court to terminate proceedings without having to conclude a full trial.

The 1973 Code
The 1973 Code [Cr.P.C.] retained most of the scheme as present in the erstwhile 1898 Code. This was by design, as made clear by Chapter 20 of the 41st Law Commission Report [The Chapter starts at page 12 of the PDF]. However, it did go ahead and refine some parts of the process. Some notable revisions were:
  • Summons Cases were no longer those punishable up to six months. This limit had been extended to one year by an amending act of 1955, and was now extended to a maximum of two years imprisonment, with or without fine [Sections 2(w) & 2(x), Cr.P.C.]. While this is not discussed in the 41st Report, a reading of the 14th Report [Page 723 of the PDF] and the 37th Report [Page 44 of the PDF] suggest this was done to expand the number of offences triable as Summons Cases, and reduce the arbitrariness within the Code which permitted largely similar offences to be tried differently;
  • The provision for guilty pleas was refined to exclude language which required that an accused answer "if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted", as this language was found to be confusing by the Law Commission [Sections 251 & 252, Cr.P.C.];
  • The provision for awarding compensation to accused persons for frivolous or vexatious cases, was shifted out of the procedure for Summons Cases into the procedure for Warrant Cases [Section 250, Cr.P.C.]. This resolved the incongruity, of this provision referring to "discharge" in the 1898 Code, even though a Summons Case did not involve the framing of charges.
A reading of the 41st Law Commission Report that led to the 1973 Code reveals no mention of our issue, i.e. whether or not magistrates have a power akin to discharge in Summons Cases. However, this is perhaps understandable. The Law Commission Report was published in September 1969, only a month after the decision in Municipal Corporation, Raipur, where the Supreme Court upheld orders of a magistrate discharging a person in a Summons Case instituted upon a complaint. Perhaps the Report was already finalised before this judgment, and thus, the issue couldn't be considered.

Judicial Engagement — The Journey till Adalat Prasad  
A survey of reported decisions on online databases, of cases after the enactment of the Cr.P.C., 1973, did not lead me to a flood of citations cropping up where the issue of discharge was argued in the months after the new Code came into force. Rather, my most relevant search result was the decision in Raj Kumar Aggarwal [1987 (12) DRJ 62], which suggested that in Delhi at least, accused persons were appearing before magistrates to address legal arguments when the case was at the stage of framing notice under Section 251, Cr.P.C. [the High Court did not mention whether or not this was proper]. The lack of results in the databases could mean many things, of course. One such inference is that this is not because accused persons were happily facing trial in all Summons Cases, but rather that accused persons were engaging in attempts at pre-trial dismissal of cases at a stage other than framing of notice under Section 251, Cr.P.C. And what makes this inference credible is the Supreme Court's decision in K.M Mathew [AIR 1992 SC 2206]. 

K.M. Mathew involved a Summons Case where the Petitioner — the Chief Editor of Malayala Manorma — challenged proceedings in a defamation case instituted upon a complaint, after having been summoned to face trial. All accused persons appeared before the court after summons, and convinced the magistrate to drop proceedings, having argued that no case was made out. But the High Court overturned this order. It is worthwhile to extract the Supreme Court's discussion on the same:    

The High Court did not examine whether the complainant has or has not made out a case against the Chief Editor. The High Court rested its conclusion solely on the procedural requirements of the trial of a summons-case. It has been pointed out that in any private complaint triable as a summons-case the Magistrate, after taking cognizance of the offence and issuing process, has no jurisdiction to drop proceedings against the accused. He is bound to proceed under Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure when the accused enters appearance. He will have to state the particulars of the offence and record the plea of the accused. When the accused pleads not guilty, he will have to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence produced in support of the prosecution. Then he will have to hear the accused and take all such evidence produced in support of the defence. The High Court went on to state that the question of conviction or acquittal will arise only after recording evidence of the parties. There is no question of discharging the accused at an intermediate stage. There is no provision in the Code for dropping the proceedings against any accused. So stating the High Court has directed the Magistrate to proceed with the trial of all the accused. [Emphasis supplied]

This approach did not find favour with the Supreme Court at all, for it considered this was "too technical". Instead, the Supreme Court restored the original order setting aside the prosecution, and justified this decision as follows:  

If one reads carefully the provisions relating to trial of summons-cases, the power to drop proceedings against the accused cannot be denied to the Magistrate. Section 204 of the Code indicates the proceedings before the Magistrate commences upon taking cognizance of the offence and the issue of summons to the accused. When the accused enters appearance in response to the summons, the Magistrate has to take proceedings under Chapter XX of the Code. But the need to try the accused arises when there is allegation in the complaint that the accused has committed the crime. If there is no allegation in the complaint involving the accused in the commission of the crime, it is implied that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed against the accused. It is open to the accused to plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued. The Magistrate may drop the proceedings if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which the accused could be tried. It is his judicial discretion. No specific provision is required for the Magistrate to drop the proceedings or rescind the process. The order issuing the process is an interim order and not a judgment. It can be varied or recalled. The fact that the process has already been issued is no bar to drop file proceedings if the complaint on the very face of it does not disclose any offence against the accused. [Emphasis supplied] 

K.M Mathew suggested that since the need for trial only arose if there was an allegation that the accused had committed the crime, where no such allegation was found to be made on a complaint, then a court was without jurisdiction to continue on its basis. The decision also offered a route to give effect to this reasoning: It told courts to treat the order issuing process under Section 204, Cr.P.C. as an interim order, which could be recalled if an accused person was able to satisfy the court that no case was made out. Thus, a critical stage of discharge was acknowledged as existing for a Summons Case. But this was not located exclusively at the point of framing notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. alone. While an accused person would logically make arguments when the case had reached this stage in its life, courts were not to pass an order on this stage, and instead go ahead and revisit the earlier stage at which the court had decided to summon an accused upon being satisfied that there was sufficient grounds to proceed on a complaint.

It will not be unfair to say that even though the outcome might have been a fair one, the path adopted by K.M. Mathew to reach this outcome was convoluted to say the least. Unwittingly, this strained approach also opened doors for litigants to effect even more drastic changes to how complaint cases would proceed through the system by creating an all new critical stage. After all, the Court in K.M. Mathew did not limit its findings on Section 204, Cr.P.C. being an interim order as only applying to Summons Cases. Thus, it meant that accused persons could go ahead and argue for a recall of process even in Warrant Cases or Sessions Cases instituted upon complaints, in addition to already existing stages of judicial consideration of the complaint, and of framing charge. Moreover, it also encouraged courts to simply invite an accused person to argue at the stage of issuing process, to save time.

The K.M. Mathew logic was indeed put to use in a Warrant Case in Adalat Prasad [(2004) 7 SCC 338], and successfully so to convince a magistrate to recall summons in a cheating case. When the matter reached the Supreme Court, it was posted before a bench of Three Justices, specifically to consider the correctness of the view taken in K.M. Mathew. The Court unanimously held that K.M. Mathew was wrong. But since there are two parts to K.M. Mathew — the means and the ends — it is important to note what exactly did Adalat Prasad declare was wrong. This was the means adopted by K.M. Mathew to enable magistrates to terminate Summons Cases. The Three Justices held that there was no basis for recalling the process issued by a court, which happens after due consideration even if it was an interim order, and the only basis for challenging this order was by moving the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. Critically, there was no discussion about the idea of needing a discharge-like critical stage for Summons Cases, and whether or not this could be implemented through Section 251, Cr.P.C.

Judicial Engagement — The Fifteen Years Since Adalat Prasad 
Considering it was dealing with a Warrant Case, and that it did not mention anything about the idea of using Section 251, Cr.P.C. as a critical stage for terminating Summons Case prior to judgment, a fair point could be made for limiting the scope of Adalat Prasad. This attempt was made before the Supreme Court in Subramanium Sethuraman [(2004) 13 SCC 324], a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ["NI Act"]. Crucially, as per the reported decision, the appellant's plea of not guilty had already been recorded and a request for discharge was made thereafter. Another Three Justices' Bench of the Supreme Court found no reason to disagree with the conclusions in Adalat Prasad here, and reiterated the position that the only remedy for an aggrieved accused person was to move the High Court seeking that the summoning order be quashed under Section 482, Cr.P.C. 

With due respect, the refusal in Sethuraman to limit Adalat Prasad to its facts was improper. And, in any event, the Court in Sethuraman could have simply decided the case on the strength of the fact, that the plea of not guilty had already been recorded and thus the accused had elected to stand trial. In any case, even though the Supreme Court did not draw these distinctions, the High Courts were much more vigilant in their reading of the law and restricted Adalat Prasad to its facts. Thus, the Kerala High Court in Kamala Rajaram [2006 Cri LJ 1447] and the Delhi High Court in SK Bhalla [180 (2011) DLT 219] both read Adalat Prasad as not being authority on the scope of Section 251, Cr.P.C., and held that magistrates were well entitled to discharge accused persons in Summons Cases under this provision. Importantly, though, both these cases were not instituted upon a complaint, and thus one could argue that the power to end such cases already existed under Section 258, Cr.P.C. Indeed, in Kamala Rajaram, Justice Basant specifically left the question open of whether or not Section 251, Cr.P.C. conferred powers of discharge that also covered cases instituted upon complaints.

On our specific point about discharge in Summons Cases instituted upon complaints, one finds that the Karnataka High Court in Zulekha v. Mahadev Bharmaji [Crl. Petition No. 11193/2012, decided on 26.09.2012] specifically held that a prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act did not entail any discharge. But a bench of the Patna High Court in Awdesh Singh [Crl. Misc. No. 9432/2012 decided on 14.05.2012] referred to its own Division Bench directing that Section 251, Cr.P.C. also required the court to confirm whether an offence was made out or not. It did not help that the Supreme Court in Bhushan Kumar [(2012) 5 SCC 424] went ahead and copied the language of SK Bhalla, even though it was dealing with a Warrant Case where Section 251, Cr.P.C. was irrelevant.  

One of the only reasoned decisions relevant for this discussion came as late as 2014, when the Delhi High Court discussed the issue in Arvind Kejriwal & Ors. v. Amit Sibal [Crl. MC No. 5245/2013, decided on 16.01.2014]. Here, a defamation case was instituted upon a complaint, and the Petitioner had challenged a summoning order. The Court directed that rather than approach the High Court for setting aside the summoning order (the approach advocated for in Adalat Prasad and Sethuraman), the Petitioner should urge these pleas before the magistrate at the stage of framing notice under Section 251, Cr.P.C. The logic for the Court was simple: If this course was not adopted in Summons Cases, then "the whole proceedings at the stage of framing of notice u/s 251 CrPC shall be reduced to a mere formality and the accused would be compelled to approach the High Court to challenge the notice which would lead to multiplicity of litigation." Besides this decision in Arvind Kejriwal, if one peruses orders of different benches of the Delhi High Court around this time on this issue, one finds many other judges also encouraging parties to raise these pleas before the trial court rather than file a petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. before the High Court. Even in a case under Section 138 of the NI Act, which was at the heart of Sethuraman [For instance, see, Yashveer Anand v. RL Anand (Crl MC 4213/2014, decided on 11.05.2015)].

Conclusion — Setting the Stage for Crl. Reference No. 4 of 2019
The Delhi High Court's order in Arvind Kejriwal was set aside by the Supreme Court by way of an order passed by the consent of both parties [Order dated 17.11.2016 in SLP (Crl) 1306/2014]. In the aftermath of this peculiar order of the Supreme Court, the law had continued to remain in a flux [See here, for a shorter discussion on the judicial engagement up till this point]. In spite of this, different benches of the Delhi High Court have continued to remand petitions under Section 482, Cr.P.C. that challenge summoning orders, urging petitioners to argue their cases at the stage of framing notice. However, none of these orders affirmatively discussed whether or not a right to argue a case at the framing of notice stage existed in the first place. 

The next post returns to where this series started: Criminal Reference No. 4 of 2019, where the Delhi High Court has been invited to clarify the legal position. Besides considering this development of statutory text, and the concerns expressed through judicial decisions, the post will also consider the data made available on Summons Cases through NCRB reports in a bid to offer realistic and practical solutions to a pressing concern in the criminal process.