Wednesday, December 11, 2024
Guest Post: Anticipatory Bail, Disclosure Statements, and the 'Samarth Kumar' Jurisprudence
Friday, July 29, 2022
Old Wine in New Bottles? — The Judgment in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (Part Two)
The previous post in this two-part series considered how the Supreme Court's judgment in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [SLP Crl. No. 4364 of 2014; Judgment dated 27.07.2022 ("Vijay Madanlal Choudhary") dealt with the offence of money laundering under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 ["PMLA"]. This post turns its lens to how the judgment understood the procedural facets of that statute. It first recaps the important holdings of the Court, and then turns to a critique. As a result, this post is longer than the previous one.
The Findings on Searches and Arrest
The challenge to powers of search conferred by the PMLA primarily arose due to amendments made to Section 17 of the Act in 2019, whereby a proviso was removed. This proviso was in the nature of a pre-condition that had to be satisfied before a search action under PMLA could be undertaken, and essentially required that an investigation in respect of the scheduled offence ought to have been started. By removing this anchor of the scheduled offence, it was argued that the entire logic of the PMLA had been turned on its head.
For arrests, the argument was much simpler — Section 19 of the PMLA enabled arrests without securing the minimum safeguards that the ordinary criminal procedure under the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 ["Cr.P.C."] allowed, and thus ought to be struck down. Unlike ordinary law, there was no system in the PMLA for an arrested person to know the case against her since no First Information Report was recorded under the PMLA. If Section 19 had to be saved, then the Court ought to declare that the PMLA equivalent — a document called the Enforcement Case Information report or "ECIR" according to Petitioners — ought to be shared with the arrested person.
The Court did not find any such problem with either the search or the arrest powers. In case of the former, it upheld the amendment and held that it expressed the legislative policy (not to be questioned) of treating money laundering seriously. It made sense to de-link the PMLA process from the scheduled offence to not leave the former hamstrung in cases where there is somehow a lapse in prosecuting the scheduled offence. If anything, this enabled the Enforcement Directorate to take action and then ask the sleepy police to also take action. In respect of safeguards, and here the analysis dovetails with the Court's observations on the arrest powers, it noted that comparing the PMLA with a penal statute was incorrect since it was a sui generis law. Even though the statute had used the word 'investigation' to describe the process of the Enforcement Directorate, it was more appropriate to read it as 'inquiry' instead given the PMLA had many facets besides investigating commission of crime.
With that context, it was of the view that the PMLA had many safeguards which made any worries about abuse were unfounded: the powers could only be exercised by very senior officers, with a necessary requirement of recording reasons in writing and forwarding them to a separate authority, and by a statutory provision penalising vexatious searches or arrests. In case of arrests, the Court held that an ECIR was not a First Information Report but an internal document; anyway, a statutory requirement under Section 19 to share grounds of arrest fulfilled the need to inform a person about the case against her.
On "Section 50" PMLA Statements
Section 50 PMLA enables Enforcement Directorate officials to record statements on oath from any person. It was subjected to a limited, twinfold challenge. Firstly, that clause must be read down in terms of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, and secondly, that statements recorded under Section 50 ought to be hit by the bar under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 ["IEA"] rendering confessions to police officers inadmissible, if sought to be used at a subsequent trial.
Since the PMLA was not seen as a penal statute by the Court, and 'investigations' were 'inquiries', it was only logical for the Court to reject submissions on this front as well. The rejection of the Section 25 IEA submission was resounding, with the Court relying upon a line of precedent stretching all the way back to the mid 1960s, where similar powers for officers of other agencies acting under the Customs Act 1962 and other state laws were upheld. The Court noticed the recent judgment in Tofan Singh [(2021) 4 SCC 1] which had extended such guarantees to the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 ["NDPS Act"]. As had been argued earlier on this blog, Tofan Singh carefully tailored its findings on the peculiar statutory scheme of the NDPS Act, and the Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary relied on this aspect to distinguish it from the PMLA context.
For Article 20(3) of the Constitution, the Court observed that every person summoned to give statements under Section 50 cannot be a person 'accused of an offence', again relying upon precedent which went back to the 1950s concerning powers to record statements conferred under other laws including the Companies Act 1956, the Customs Act, and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 ["FERA"]. However, where persons under arrest were questioned, it acknowledged that the clause may apply, leaving that determination open to the peculiar facts of each case.
On Bail
In 2018, a different bench of the Supreme Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah [(2018) 11 SCC 1] struck down Section 45 of the PMLA partially, as it then stood. This clause imposed what are popularly known as the 'twin conditions' of bail — restrictive conditions that are found in some laws which require that before granting bail the prosecutor must be heard and a court should be satisfied that (i) the accused was not guilty of the offence, (ii) the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail (see here for more). The reasons behind striking down these parts of Section 45, as it had been explained earlier, was not because the court had any problem with the twin conditions, but only because the manner in which the PMLA applied the conditions was found to be arbitrary — it was based on the kind of scheduled offence allegations involved, and since the legislature had completely eroded any rationality in the scheme of the schedule this made application of Section 45, in turn, arbitrary.
In 2018, Parliament sought to solve this problem by doing away with this classification based application of Section 45 altogether — now, it would apply to all cases under PMLA. This amendment to the law was challenged as unconstitutional. The Court disagreed. Firstly, it explained how nothing prevented a future legislature from remedying a defect identified in Section 45 by Nikesh Tarachand Shah. Secondly, it held that the manner in which Parliament had chosen to remedy this defect — by abandoning the classification altogether — was not unconstitutional as money laundering is exactly the kind of offence which warrants such restrictive bail conditions. At the same time, the Court noted that the twin conditions would not apply in cases of being granted bail for delays in investigation [Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.] or prosecution [Section 436A Cr.P.C.]
Critiquing the Findings on Investigative Aspects
Section 17 — The Tail Wags the Dog
Recall that the very definition of money laundering under the PMLA is intrinsically linked to a scheduled offence. It is that property which is derived or obtained by engaging in acts relating to scheduled offences which become proceeds of crime, which are the heart and soul of the PMLA. Seen from this perspective, a statutory limit on the agency concerned with money laundering to hold its hands till there was at least a suspicion of there having been a scheduled offence makes sense. At the same time, it also makes sense to not ask agencies to wait till that investigation is over to do something. This is the balance that was struck by Section 17, through a proviso which required an investigation into the scheduled offence to have begun before the Enforcement Directorate undertook searches etc.
The Court, in trusting legislative policy, has now approved a state of affairs where the tail shall wag the dog. It is justified, the Court tells us, to allow the Enforcement Directorate to proceed to ensure the system can be cleansed of money laundering. All that is rhetoric, not reasoning. No matter which you look at it, in the current scheme of things where the existence of a scheduled offence is necessary for the PMLA, letting the PMLA process begin even before anyone has alleged the commission of a scheduled offence does not stand to reason. In effect, it makes the judgment of the Directorate also determinative for deciding whether or not a scheduled offence might have been committed, which is nowhere within its mandate. Considering the plethora of scheduled offences that already exist, one can appreciate the perception that this provision allows the Enforcement Directorate to create money laundering allegations where there might not be any, for which police station will disagree with a letter from the 'very senior officers' telling them to register a case for commission of scheduled offences?
We can keep taking turns at it, but a square peg will not fit in a round hole.
Non-Existent Safeguards?
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary extols the many safeguards present in the scheme of Sections 17 to 19 of the PMLA to consign worries about abuse of powers into the dustbin. The seniority of the empowered official is supposed to allay fears of misuse, as is the existence of a provision punishing vexatious exercise of power. None of this is new: the same logic was offered when coercive powers granted under other socio-economic laws were challenged in the past. What is, nevertheless, worthy of note is the uncritical, almost loving eye, with which the view is re-affirmed by the Court. The Petitioners made submissions about the biased nature of enforcement under the Act, the inherent limits of provisions punishing abuse of power — it would require internal sanction, which rarely comes — and the paltry rate of conviction to suggest that the threat of abuse and misuse was not mitigated by the purported safeguards. The Court did not so much as blink in the face of this criticism, and its suggestion of trusting the officials would certainly leave some corners bemused, as conservative a view as that may be.
The Sui Generis Argument is Flawed
The idea that the PMLA is not a penal law but a sui generis law is central to much of the Court's reasoning in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary. This is the justification for holding it unnecessary to bring the PMLA at par with other penal statutes in terms of procedural safeguards conferred upon persons who may get entangled in the PMLA process.
The previous post explored this argument from the perspective of how the civil and criminal machinery within the PMLA operated while comparing it with other laws. It argued, that the PMLA did not allow for its civil process to live independent of its criminal process; indeed, without a prosecution for the offence, the civil action would die a natural death sooner rather than later. So the idea that PMLA also deals with inquiries ending in civil consequences is a half-baked truth at best.
We need to return to that comparative perspective and now look at the PMLA together with the other kinds of socio-economic offences that have been passed over time, to assess the Court's reasoning when it comes to procedural safeguards regarding questioning persons. It is difficult to take stock of all such laws passed at the state and central levels, but it would suffice if we take note of some primary central ones — the Customs Act 1962 (preceded by the Sea Customs Act of 1878), the Companies Acts of 1956 and 2013, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 ["FERA"]. Vijay Madanlal Choudhary draws comparisons between the PMLA and these laws, for which the Supreme Court has repelled legal challenges in the past by holding that the questioning of persons under those laws is for an inquiry unlike criminal investigation, to hold that the PMLA ought to be treated similarly.
This comparison is flawed, because while the Customs Act, or FERA, or even the Companies Act, allow officers to file a civil action for penalties at the end of an inquiry, there is no such option in the PMLA. So, in case of the former, the idea that powers to question people or even arrest them are not necessary linked to a future prosecution has at least some legs to stand on because that outcome is statutorily possible. Of course, this does not address the problem in deciding whether procedural safeguards that are relevant during an inquiry should apply basis how an inquiry ends, and whether Article 20(3) should not apply to questioning and Section 25 IEA should not apply in the cases where the inquiry does result in a criminal prosecution. For the PMLA, there is no such possibility; a standalone civil action cannot last beyond 180 + 365 days. What's more, the PMLA is linked to the fact of a crime, and thus any inquiry where persons accused of that prior offence are called, are already placed very differently from individuals suspected of customs duty evasion.
The theoretical sophistry that the Court had been able to rely upon in the past with FERA or the Customs Act is simply not available to it when it comes to the PMLA, where without the criminal action nothing survives. Yet, somehow, this distinction has escaped the Court's attention, and it applied judgments decided in context of other laws.
The few grains that the Court does throw towards procedural safeguards, it fails to flesh out. Imagine that earlier judgments on Article 20(3) and statements to officers under socio-economic laws did not clearly say that an arrested person ought to be treated differently. Vijay Madanlal Choudhary does this much, at least, but in a rather half-hearted manner. Secondly, in refusing to share the ECIR with an arrested person, the Court finds that the clause requiring sharing grounds of arrest would do the job. It would have helped if the Court could stress upon the manner of sufficiency required in these grounds if it was treating them as a substitute for being supplied a copy of the ECIR itself. In practice, it is all too common for the agency to simply state that a person is arrested for committing a Section 3 PMLA offence, nothing more and nothing less. By fleshing out the nature of grounds, the Court could have prevented this from continuing. Now, it would fall upon the High Courts to, hopefully, breathe some life into this clause.
A point, also, about Tofan Singh would be in order. The Court has held that the judgment was unique to the NDPS Act context and could not be extended to the PMLA. This is, undoubtedly, correct. As had been noted at the time, Tofan Singh was unlikely to provide any succour beyond the NDPS Act because of how the Court went about examining the issue then. Still, the manner in which Vijay Madanlal Choudhary suppresses the points of similarity between the NDPS Act and PMLA is rather striking. For instance, it is nowhere mentioned how the NDPS Act also has confiscation mechanisms in place, much like the PMLA.
Assessing the Revival of Section 45 Twin Conditions
Nikesh Tarachand Shah, much like Tofan Singh, dealt with the form of a problem rather than its substance (both were authored by the same judge, incidentally). Here, that problem was the twin conditions of bail.
The problem with Section 45, according to Nikesh Tarachand Shah, was that it imposed the restrictive bail conditions by creating an illogical classification between kinds of cases. It accepted that such conditions are legal and necessary where compelling state interests exist, but recognised that not every case of money laundering would be the same, and adopting a monetary threshold to gauge seriousness made sense. This logic of the threshold had been done away with, while at the same time multiplying the total number of scheduled offences manifold. This was a problem because the underlying offences were very different and since money laundering necessarily turned to the scheduled offence, the nature of that offence was not an altogether irrelevant factor for consideration.
Parliament's answer to this in the 2018 amendment was not to repair the classification, but to do away with it altogether. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, the Court correctly notes that its earlier judgment had pointed out an error with the form and not substance of the twin conditions, but it failed to identify exactly what that error was while upholding the legislative response to the perceived problem. In concluding that the legislature could remedy defects and restore the twin conditions to PMLA, Vijay Madanlal Choudhary is right. But here, the manner of resolving the defect was to completely undermine the logic of the judgment in Nikesh, which the Court chose not to appreciate. Instead, the Court endorsed, whole-heartedly, the abandoning of a classification-based approach and the application of twin conditions to all PMLA cases. For, we are reminded again, money laundering is a very serious offence.
There is an obvious problem with that assertion, though, because unlike other crimes, at a basic level money laundering derives its seriousness from the seriousness of the underlying scheduled offence and what kind of proceeds of crime were generated there. Yes, terrorists and drug cartels might engage in money laundering and should not get bail easily is a plausible view, but the law as it works today paints these persons with the same brush as any copyright or trademark violators who may 'derive or obtain' any property by way of their violation. Such petty offences are not rendering the financial foundations and the economic integrity of the country unstable, with all due respect. To contend that these are hypotheticals unworthy of attention because the Enforcement Directorate will not waste time on such cases is not a good enough response, because a court is required to deal with the law and not how an agency may or may not choose to enforce it in its wisdom.
This is an odious conclusion, no matter which way we look at it.
Conclusions
There are many serious problems in how the Court has justified the refusal to treat the PMLA at par with other penal laws when it comes to procedural safeguards. Vijay Madanlal Choudhary has glossed over distinctions between contexts that are gaping chasms, acting under the illusion that these are minor cracks in the edifice of its immaculate reasoning. The conclusions, at many points, are starkly incorrect on law.
At the outset of this series, it was observed that Vijay Madanlal Choudhary is a conservative decision, inasmuch as the Supreme Court has simply remained faithful to its inglorious past of taking away all semblance of safeguards to personal liberty and property when it comes to socio-economic offences. Restrictive bail conditions in independent India first came for the essential supplies law before they became famous for anti-terror laws; reverse burdens were held good in 1964 when it came to gold smuggling; the guarantee of Article 20(3) was held inapplicable till customs officials or those from the registrar of companies concluded their inquiry given the theoretical possibility that such inquiries might, till that stage, not end in prosecution. More recently, it was okay for the accused in the 2G Scam and Coal Block cases to be denied a right of appeal.
Over time, not many people have had a problem with this growing body of law developing right under our eyes, because these were confined to specific areas of activity. Even for those with left-leaning inclinations, such laws were in fact lauded because of the detrimental impact that white-collar criminals and smugglers posed to the country.
What the PMLA does, is that it weaves together all the restrictive, rights-effacing clauses from this illustrious past in one fine blanket, and it then goes a step further. It is not restricted to just the smuggler or hoarder, but to practically anyone. It is not old wine in a new bottle, contrary to what the title might suggest. In its reach and deleterious impact on basic freedoms, the PMLA is truly a sui generis law unlike any other. The judgment in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary was an opportunity to trim it down to size and prevent it from becoming another MISA from the 1970s; instead, the Court has, for now, green-lit that very outcome.
Monday, November 2, 2020
The Three Justices' Bench Decision in Tofan Singh
- Whether an officer of the central / state government investigating a case under the NDPS Act is a "police officer"?
- Whether statements recorded under Section 67(c) of the NDPS Act can be treated as confessional statements, regardless of whether the officer is a police officer?
- The term police officer is not defined anywhere and must be given a broad view, coloured by the particular statutory context in which officers are invested with powers traditionally conferred upon police officers under the Criminal Procedure Code;
- The reason behind restricting the admissibility of statements made before police officers was the acknowledgment of coercion involved in the investigative process by police officers to extract evidence from accused persons;
- Where officers are conferred such powers under a "Penal Statute" and where the purpose behind this investiture of powers is primarily to enable them to discharge an investigative function, and this investigative function is not merely incidental towards the officer discharging other functions such as revenue collection etc., such officers should be seen as "police officers"
- The NDPS Act is clearly a "Penal Statute" and, therefore, officers empowered under Section 53 ought to be treated as police officers.
Monday, August 17, 2020
The Tofan Singh Reference — Part 4: Summing Up
(This the fourth part of a multi-part series. Previous posts discussing Tofan Singh can be accessed here)
The 2013 judgment by Two Justices' in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2013) 16 SCC 31 ("Tofan Singh")] had referred two interlinked issues arising under the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 ("NDPS") to a bench of three Justices. No matter the importance of the issues — which, interestingly, even prompted a sitting Justice to plea for a speedy consideration of the reference at one point — the Tofan Singh reference lay in cold storage. Till January 2019, that is, which is when arguments appeared to have been concluded, but no judgment ever came. Fast-forward to August 2020, and a different Three Justices' Bench appears poised to consider — and hopefully decide — the issues in Tofan Singh.
To recap, the issues are:
- Whether an officer of the central / state government investigating a case under the NDPS Act is a "police officer"?
- Whether statements recorded under Section 67(c) of the NDPS Act can be treated as confessional statements, regardless of whether the officer is a police officer?
Saturday, August 15, 2020
The Tofan Singh Reference — Part 3: Statements under Section 67 NDPS Act
(This is part three of a multi-part series. Previous parts can be accessed here, and here)
The previous two posts in this series have discussed the facts in Tofan Singh, the relevant statutory provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 [NDPS] and the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 [Cr.P.C.], and also the first proper issue posed in the reference: Whether officers of the central and / or state government investigating cases under the NDPS Act ought to be seen as "police officers" for purposes of the prohibition under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [IEA].
This post takes up the second proper issue posed in the reference: Whether the statement recorded under Section 67(c) of the NDPS Act by the central / state government officer "can be treated as a confessional statement or not, even if the officer is not treated as a police officer".
The Arguments Before the Division Bench in Tofan Singh
The 2013 judgment acknowledges that the two questions are interlinked, but even so, it referred the second question because there were extensive arguments raised at the bar, and its summation (as captured in the judgment) is extracted below:
"Pitching this argument to the next level, it was submitted that the power under Section 67(c) of the Act is merely a power to examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. Such statements are not required in law to be truthful as provided under Section 161(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which required the person making statement to a police officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to make a true statement. Even such a statement made under Section 161 Cr. P.C. is not a substantive evidence on which a conviction can be based. Statements under Section 67 are not required in law to be given truthfully and hence cannot in any case be treated to be a substantive evidence. Further statement under Section 67 are not recorded after administration of oath as is required under Section 164(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the officers are not competent to administer oaths and, therefore, the statements under Section 67 cannot be substantive evidence for recording conviction."
And later on, while framing the reference questions, the Court noted that:
"As far as this second related issue is concerned we would also like to point out that Mr. Jain argued that provisions of Section 67 of the Act cannot be interpreted in the manner in which the provisions of Section 108 of the Customs Act or Section 14 of the Excise Act had been interpreted by number of judgments and there is a qualitative difference between the two sets of provisions. In so far as Section 108 of the Customs Act is concerned, it gives power to the custom officer to summon persons “to give evidence” and produce documents. Identical power is conferred upon the Central Excise Officer under Section 14 of the Act. However, the wording to Section 67 of the NDPS Act is altogether different. This difference has been pointed out by Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Shahid Khan vs. Director of Revenue Intelligence; 2001 (Criminal Law Journal) 3183."
Making Sense of the Reference Question
Reading the argument, it seems that it was pitched slightly differently than how it was framed by the Court. Rather than consider whether a Section 67(c) statement can be "confessional statement", the argument seems to have been that a Section 67(c) statement cannot be considered as substantive evidence.
The framing of the Court is a bit problematic, largely since there is nothing defined as a "confessional statement" in Indian law, and determining whether a statement is a confession is a very fact specific exercise guided by legal tests. Therefore, I do not follow that framing, and instead engage with the argument that a statement made / recorded under Section 67(c), NDPS Act cannot carry weight as substantive evidence. At best, it must be treated just like a regular statement before a police officer given under Section 161 Cr.P.C., which cannot be used as proof at trial and can only be used for contradicting a witness who takes the stand.
The primary basis for the argument lies in the relative absence of safeguards under Section 67 as a process — both to ensure reliability of the statement as well as to ensure voluntariness. For example, the only kind of statements recorded during an investigation under the Cr.P.C. which can be treated as substantive evidence are those made on oath before magistrates, who are duty-bound to caution the person giving a statement that it could be used against her. Section 67(c), on the other hand, simply says that the officer may "examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case" without prescribing any procedure to ensure the reliability and voluntariness of the resulting statement.
Signed v. Unsigned Statements, Section 53-A of the NDPS Act, and an Additional Question
The core logic of this argument might well be sound (I, frankly, agree with it). But a look at the NDPS Act suggests that the argument cannot be taken to its logical conclusion. Rather, I think we land up is a midway point: not all statements that are recorded under Section 67(c) ought to be considered as substantive evidence, but in some cases the statute itself suggests that this is possible and that there is no clear prohibition.
I say this because (as was raised in Part I) of Section 53-A of the NDPS Act, which was curiously missing in the 2013 judgment. Effectively, this provision has created a special rule of evidence for NDPS cases, overriding the general prohibitions under the Evidence Act, according to which any signed statement made to an empowered officer under Section 53 NDPS Act, becomes "relevant for the purpose of proving, in any prosecution for an offence under this Act, the truth of the facts which it contains". Note that unsigned statements made to such officers stand excluded from Section 53-A and their relevancy and admissibility will be subject to the rigours of general provisions such as Section 25 of the Evidence Act, and a finding on the first issue in the reference (whether the officer is a police officer or not).
Even when we have a signed statement — which, naturally, cannot be under any clause but Section 67 NDPS Act as there is an express bar on taking signed statements under Section 162 Cr.P.C. — Section 53-A cannot kick-in arbitrarily, but only if: (a) The maker of the statement is dead / kept away from the trial / cannot be found, or; (b) The maker of the statement is a witness and the trial judge thinks that, "having regard to the circumstances of the case, the statement should be admitted in evidence in the interests of justice."
Thus, the NDPS Act itself denies any total prohibition on treating statements under Section 67 as substantive evidence. Where such statements are signed, Section 53-A, and the maker of the statement is a witness, then Section 53-A kicks in. Under this provision, it is the trial judge who has been made the final arbiter of whether it is necessary to consider the initial statement, for its truth, and arguably the counsel for an accused would have the opportunity to advance arguments to persuade a judge against doing so in any given case. It is not unimaginable that a judge gets persuaded by the concerns over reliability and / or voluntariness that were ascribed to statements made under Section 67, NDPS Act.
What about the unsigned statements? Whatever might be the finding on issue one, the reference in Tofan Singh could very well hold that such statements ought not to be treated as substantive evidence as a rule of prudence. Such rules of prudence are not uncommon in evidence law, and it is not at all impossible for the Court to hold that the inherent problems in the Section 67 statement — of reliability and voluntariness — require that it must be corroborated. Should the Court go ahead and do so, I would think that it would not affect the playing field beyond the limited confines of the NDPS Act. Unless, of course, the Court thinks that statements to any government officer, notwithstanding the existence of statutory safeguards, is a piece of evidence that must be treated with a degree suspicion considering the natural imbalance of power between the parties, and therefore requires necessary corroboration of material particulars.
Conclusion
Unless the Supreme Court strikes down Section 53-A of the NDPS Act on grounds of unconstitutionality — which, at least under the terms of reference, is an option not on the table — then the second issue of Tofan Singh must be understood as having been qualified by the terms of the NDPS Act itself.
The issue of whether statements given under Section 67, NDPS Act can be treated as substantive evidence (such as confessions) in NDPS Act cases is one that the statute has already addressed, telling us that it is possible to do so if the trial judge considers that the statement must be read for the truth of its contents in the interests of justice (assuming all the foundational requirements were met).
However, for the statements which fall outside of this bracket — such as unsigned statements, or statements made to officers but not being used in the NDPS Act case itself — the special evidentiary rule would not apply, and we end up back with the uncertainty about whether or not the officer in question is a "police officer". Even if the Court does not conclude that these officers are police officers, it still leaves the possibility of creating rules of prudence requiring that unsigned statements must be corroborated in material particulars and not be considered as substantive evidence on their own merit. Whether the Court ends up arriving at these conclusions only for statements under Section 67, or more generally, will be something to wait and see.
The next, and final, post in the series rounds up the discussion.
Thursday, August 13, 2020
The Tofan Singh Reference — Part 2: NDPS Investigating Officers are Police Officers?
"(1) When any person is forwarded under section 19 to a Central Excise Officer empowered to send persons so arrested to a Magistrate, the Central Excise Officer shall proceed to inquire into the charge against him.
(2) For this purpose the Central Excise Officer may exercise the same powers and shall be subject to the same provisions as the officer-in-charge of a police-station may exercise and is subject to under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), when investigating a cognizable case: ..." [Emphasis Supplied]
"(1) Any Collector, or any Excise Officer empowered under section 77, sub-section (2), may after recording in writing his reason for suspecting the commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate, exercise —
(a) any of the powers conferred upon a Police Officer making an investigation, or upon an officer in charge of a police-station, by sections 160 to 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), and
...
(3) For the purposes of section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) the area to which an Excise Officer empowered under section 77, sub-section (2), is appointed shall be deemed to be a police-station, and such officer shall be deemed to be the officer in charge of such station.
(4) As soon as an investigation by a Collector or by an Excise Officer empowered under section 77, sub-section (2), has been completed, if it appears that there is sufficient evidence to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, the investigating officer, unless he proceeds under sub-section (2) of this section or under section 68 of this Act, shall submit a report which shall, for the purposes of section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) be deemed to be a Police-report to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to inquire into or try the case and empowered to take cognizance of offences on Police-reports." [Emphasis supplied]