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Wednesday, December 11, 2024

Guest Post: Anticipatory Bail, Disclosure Statements, and the 'Samarth Kumar' Jurisprudence

(This is guest post by Pratyay Amrit and Rohan Gajendra Pratap Singh)

The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 ("the Act") was enacted to tackle illicit drug peddling and consumption in Indian society – not without the oft repeated criticism of aligning with the United States’ ‘War on Drugs’ and consequently, international and intra-national illicit drug trade. Until the judicial pronouncement mentioned in the following paragraph, Indian High Courts were of the opinion that a person may be entitled to anticipatory bail under the Act if the only evidence against them is a disclosure statement made by a co-accused to an investigating officer under the Act. This was in line with the decision in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (“Tofan Singh”) wherein the Supreme Court held that officers falling within the ambit of Section 53 of the Act have powers akin to that of an office-in-charge of a police station, meaning that confessions made to them – specifically officers enumerated under Section 42 of the Act – under Section 67 of the Act would be akin to statements made to the police under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). The corresponding section is Section 180 in the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Samhita (“BNSS”). Consequently, such statements would be inadmissible as evidence as per Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act (“IEA”) and correspondingly, Section 23(1) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam.

However, a series of judgments post Tofan Singh have followed a different route. It can be traced back to a 2022 decision in State of Haryana v. Samarth Kumar (“Samarth Kumar”) which seemingly shut the door for such accused persons to rely on Tofan Singh while seeking pre-arrest bail even when there had been no recovery from them. The only circumstance implicating them in the case was a disclosure statement under Section 67 of the Act. This effectively means that people will be arrested under the Act even absent any material recovery and thus, will be forced to seek regular bail under stringent twin conditions. We argue that such a development has rendered the Act, widely regarded as draconian, stricter and created room for its weaponisation. This analysis is based on the judicial practice followed in cases which sprung up post Samarth Kumar which we argue, is a corruption of the rationale in Tofan Singh. We argue that the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail must depend on multifaceted considerations as has been enumerated in Indian jurisprudence.

The Tofan Singh Ratio
The 2020 judgment in Tofan Singh was the result of a reference made by a Division Bench in 2013 where that bench first gave the conclusion that statements under Section 67 of the Act could not be used, which was later affirmed by a majority in 2020. For almost a decade thereafter, the dominant jurisprudence was that when a person is implicated merely on the basis of a disclosure statement of a co-accused made under Section 67, they are entitled to anticipatory bail if there is no other evidence to corroborate the disclosure statement including lack of recovery of contraband. 

While the reasonability of factors indicating a bail applicant’s innocence may be varied, a scenario that merits careful consideration considering the Tofan Singh verdict arises when a person is implicated solely on the basis of a statement made by an accused under Section 67 of the Act. The said section empowers an officer under Section 42 of the Act to examine any person acquainted with the case and even to call for information from any person to determine whether any provision of the Act has been contravened.

Understandably, this dichotomy creates confusion as to whether Tofan Singh ought to be applied in a way that would allow for the grant of anticipatory bail when the bail applicant’s involvement is not hinged on any factor other than the disclosure statement of a co-accused. While the ratio in Samarth Kumar suffered by reason of the order being non-speaking, perhaps the observations of the Supreme Court in a 2001 judgment in Murleedharan v. State of Kerala lend some strength to its ruling. The Apex Court while dealing with the bail provision of the Kerala Abkari Act had held that the same was in pari materia with Section 37 of the Act. Denying anticipatory bail, the Supreme Court chastised the Sessions Court for granting pre-arrest bail on the ground that only the confessional statement of the accused connected the applicant with the offence. It was observed that it could not be concluded at such an early stage that the investigating agency would not collect further evidence to establish the nexus between the applicant and the offence and that custodial interrogation was crucial to unearth all necessary evidence. However, it is important to note that this decision was rendered much before the verdict in Tofan Singh and that it is open to the court granting anticipatory bail to direct the accused to join the investigation, failing which the anticipatory bail may be cancelled (reading Sections 437(5) and 439 CrPC).

The Backdrop Of Samarth Kumar & The Jurisprudence After
In its order dated 16.07.2021 in Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana, the Punjab and Haryana High Court granted anticipatory bail relying on the ratio in Tofan Singh (by now affirmed by the Three Judges' Bench). It was observed that the petitioner was incriminated based on the disclosure statements of the co-accused. Since such confessional statements cannot be relied upon in a trial for an offence under the Act as per the ratio in Tofan Singh, the court allowed anticipatory bail. The same view was upheld in a host of other orders including in Kamal Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh wherein the High Court of Himachal Pradesh by order dated 22.11.2022 held that the disclosure statement of a co-accused would not be sufficient to deny anticipatory bail, even when call detail records between the petitioner and co-accused are available since such call records are matters to be examined at the stage of trial. The bench used the provision of bail bond to grant the necessary relief to the accused. Importantly, this verdict came after Samarth Kumar highlighting the beginning of the inconsistency in jurisprudence with a binary choice between Samarth Kumar and Tofan Singh. 

The Supreme Court in Samarth Kumar effectively foreclosed reliance on this line of reasoning to allow pre-arrest bail. While doing so, it observed without further elucidation that reliance on Tofan Singh may be placed at the stage of regular bail or final hearing. In effect, Samarth Kumar had excluded reliance on Tofan Singh in considering anticipatory bail applications without providing sufficient justification for negativing this oft-adopted argument. In light of Samarth Kumar, courts have displayed refusal – inconsistently – in granting pre-arrest bail when a person having no criminal antecedents is implicated solely on account of a disclosure statement, even when there has been no recovery of contraband from them.

The Law & The Trouble
Section 37 of the Act affirms the cognizable and non-bailable nature of offences under the Act. It further outlines the procedure for grant of bail to a person accused of an offence under the Act. The section further lays out the twin conditions for offences involving commercial quantity or if they are amongst 3 offences under the Act (namely Sections 19, 24 and 27A). Samarth Kumar dealt with – among others – Section 27A of the Act which deals with financing illicit drug trafficking and harbouring offenders. Thus, the twin conditions would apply to this case. There is a clear and rational nexus in being more stringent with commercial quantity offences. Interestingly, Table 1A.5 of the National Crime Records Bureau data for Special and Local Laws for 2022 divides the incidents under the Act on two broad parameters – either concerning personal or commercial usage in roughly a 3:1 ratio with a total of ~1.11 lakh incidents in 2022. Given the causality implicit in incidents concerning commercial quantities, an argument could be made to justify imposition of twin conditions in commercial quantity cases in a blanket manner. However, the Supreme Court verdict in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (“Sanjay Chandra”) had held that bail – while itself a fact-based discretionary power in non-bailable offences concerning the twin condition – still must adhere to certain foundational principles of objectivity. One would be the test of ‘necessity’. 

In this regard, the recent division bench verdict in Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement is helpful. When the accused complies with summons issued by court, there is no need for him to seek anticipatory bail. While this flows from Section 88 of the CrPC – and correspondingly, Section 91 of the BNSS – the underlying idea is that of ‘necessity’. Section 88 CrPC or Section 91 BNSS alleviates the issue elucidated in Sanjay Chandra. Notably, the judgment in Sanjay Chandra had emphasised on considering criminal antecedents and the absence of it in determining the grant of anticipatory bail. This is observed in numerous cases including in order dated 21.02.2023 in Aniket v. State of Punjab and order dated 23.09.2022 in Gurpreet Singh v. State of Punjab wherein the Punjab and Haryana High Court refused to rely on Tofan Singh while considering anticipatory bail applications as per the ratio in Samarth Kumar. The Special Leave Petitions filed against these orders were also dismissed by the Supreme Court by orders dated 28.04.2023 and 07.11.2022 respectively. At the same time, another bench of the Supreme Court found force in the very argument that High Courts countenanced before the order in Samarth Kumar was pronounced. In Vijay Singh v. State of Haryana, a division bench of the Supreme Court by its order dated 17.05.2023 allowed anticipatory bail to the applicant on the ground that he was implicated by the disclosure statement of the other co-accused, even though he was already enlarged on bail in a separate matter under the Act. This is in contradiction with Samarth Kumar. Ironically, this verdict also does not provide any reasoning for its conclusion.

Further, in Union of India v. Shiv Shankar Kesari, the Supreme Court had clarified that a court was not required to determine whether the applicant under Section 37 is guilty or innocent but is merely “called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds.” This is standard for any interpretation concerning twin conditions in any criminal statute. However, this has led to the courts rendering varying interpretations of the threshold required to be met to be allowed the relief of bail under the Act, and even more so for anticipatory bail. This threatens to fortify an already stringent bar to getting relief under Section 37 into an unassailable impediment for persons implicated on flimsy grounds.

Balancing the Scales
Rather than a blanket rejection of the ratio in Tofan Singh at the stage of anticipatory bail, courts must collectively look for substantive material corroborating the confessional statements and consider other factors such as the applicant’s antecedents, possibility of fleeing justice or committing further offences, and the motive behind accusations. This also affirms the Supreme Court verdict in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra which had further emphasised on the cooperation of the accused as a dominant factor in grant of anticipatory bail and bail in general. It held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is not restricted to exceptional cases but based on the particulars of each case. Accepting the ratio in Samarth Kumar would imply that it might be impossible to obtain anticipatory bail for any offence under the Act in any case, because the prosecution would need only to rely on a disclosure statement to have the application rejected. Courts must require a greater nexus between the applicant and the offence, such as their involvement in other offences under the Act, availability of transcripts or recordings of communications with the accused indicating that the applicant is guilty, a suspicious money trail, ownership of apprehended vehicle etc. In fact, the Punjab-Haryana High Court, in Vikrant Singh v. State of Punjab, had acknowledged Samarth Kumar and yet, relied on the audio transcripts to reject the application for denial of bail as meritless. Thus, the issue boils down to the Janus of judicial application here – either follow Tofan Singh and the rationale therein or follow Samarth Kumar which does not provide any reason whatsoever. The problem greater than Samarth Kumar is the way the courts have dealt with similar cases as has been shown in the judgments mentioned above.

Crucially, Section 37 of the Act read with Section 438 of the CrPC empowers courts to grant anticipatory bail when there are “reasonable” grounds indicating that the accused is not guilty. When there is no material incriminating an individual except a confessional statement under Section 67 – which of itself carries little evidentiary value – it might be reasonable to believe that the bail applicant is not guilty for the purposes of bail. The State cannot produce any lesser evidence than the implication in a confessional disclosure statement to seek denial of anticipatory bail. At the same time, the applicant cannot lead any stronger evidence or plead on any other ground apart from referring to a lack of evidence corroborating the disclosure statement. The same ought to suffice as a “reasonable ground” to believe that the applicant is not guilty.

Conclusion
While it is true that custodial interrogation of an accused may be expedient to unearth evidence of offences under the Act, an outright denial of anticipatory bail in cases where the applicant is implicated solely by a disclosure statement of an accused would risk opening individuals – who are falsely being named to be framed, to derail the investigation, or to protect the actual perpetrator – up to humiliation and harassment. A court should not defer applying its mind regarding the freedom of an individual until after he is arrested when the Act itself does not make a distinction between pre and post-arrest bail. The creation of a two-tier system where Tofan Singh does not apply at one stage but applies at a later stage is without reason – as is clear from the language in Samarth Kumar. Preventing reliance on Tofan Singh at the anticipatory bail stage appears to serve no purpose when the court might accept the same argument at a regular bail hearing post-arrest without any change in circumstance in the meanwhile.

Friday, July 29, 2022

Old Wine in New Bottles? — The Judgment in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (Part Two)

The previous post in this two-part series considered how the Supreme Court's judgment in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [SLP Crl. No. 4364 of 2014; Judgment dated 27.07.2022 ("Vijay Madanlal Choudhary") dealt with the offence of money laundering under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 ["PMLA"]. This post turns its lens to how the judgment understood the procedural facets of that statute. It first recaps the important holdings of the Court, and then turns to a critique. As a result, this post is longer than the previous one.

The Findings on Searches and Arrest

The challenge to powers of search conferred by the PMLA primarily arose due to amendments made to Section 17 of the Act in 2019, whereby a proviso was removed. This proviso was in the nature of a pre-condition that had to be satisfied before a search action under PMLA could be undertaken, and essentially required that an investigation in respect of the scheduled offence ought to have been started. By removing this anchor of the scheduled offence, it was argued that the entire logic of the PMLA had been turned on its head.

For arrests, the argument was much simpler — Section 19 of the PMLA enabled arrests without securing the minimum safeguards that the ordinary criminal procedure under the Criminal Procedure Code  1973 ["Cr.P.C."] allowed, and thus ought to be struck down. Unlike ordinary law, there was no system in the PMLA for an arrested person to know the case against her since no First Information Report was recorded under the PMLA. If Section 19 had to be saved, then the Court ought to declare that the PMLA equivalent — a document called the Enforcement Case Information report or "ECIR" according to Petitioners — ought to be shared with the arrested person. 

The Court did not find any such problem with either the search or the arrest powers. In case of the former, it upheld the amendment and held that it expressed the legislative policy (not to be questioned) of treating money laundering seriously. It made sense to de-link the PMLA process from the scheduled offence to not leave the former hamstrung in cases where there is somehow a lapse in prosecuting the scheduled offence. If anything, this enabled the Enforcement Directorate to take action and then ask the sleepy police to also take action. In respect of safeguards, and here the analysis dovetails with the Court's observations on the arrest powers, it noted that comparing the PMLA with a penal statute was incorrect since it was a sui generis law. Even though the statute had used the word 'investigation' to describe the process of the Enforcement Directorate, it was more appropriate to read it as 'inquiry' instead given the PMLA had many facets besides investigating commission of crime.

With that context, it was of the view that the PMLA had many safeguards which made any worries about abuse were unfounded: the powers could only be exercised by very senior officers, with a necessary requirement of recording reasons in writing and forwarding them to a separate authority, and by a statutory provision penalising vexatious searches or arrests. In case of arrests, the Court held that an ECIR was not a First Information Report but an internal document; anyway, a statutory requirement under Section 19 to share grounds of arrest fulfilled the need to inform a person about the case against her.

On "Section 50" PMLA Statements

Section 50 PMLA enables Enforcement Directorate officials to record statements on oath from any person. It was subjected to a limited, twinfold challenge. Firstly, that clause must be read down in terms of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, and secondly, that statements recorded under Section 50 ought to be hit by the bar under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 ["IEA"] rendering confessions to police officers inadmissible, if sought to be used at a subsequent trial.

Since the PMLA was not seen as a penal statute by the Court, and 'investigations' were 'inquiries', it was only logical for the Court to reject submissions on this front as well. The rejection of the Section 25 IEA submission was resounding, with the Court relying upon a line of precedent stretching all the way back to the mid 1960s, where similar powers for officers of other agencies acting under the Customs Act 1962 and other state laws were upheld. The Court noticed the recent judgment in Tofan Singh [(2021) 4 SCC 1] which had extended such guarantees to the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 ["NDPS Act"]. As had been argued earlier on this blog, Tofan Singh carefully tailored its findings on the peculiar statutory scheme of the NDPS Act, and the Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary relied on this aspect to distinguish it from the PMLA context.

For Article 20(3) of the Constitution, the Court observed that every person summoned to give statements under Section 50 cannot be a person 'accused of an offence', again relying upon precedent which went back to the 1950s concerning powers to record statements conferred under other laws including the Companies Act 1956, the Customs Act, and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 ["FERA"]. However, where persons under arrest were questioned, it acknowledged that the clause may apply, leaving that determination open to the peculiar facts of each case.       

On Bail

In 2018, a different bench of the Supreme Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah [(2018) 11 SCC 1] struck down Section 45 of the PMLA partially, as it then stood. This clause imposed what are popularly known as the 'twin conditions' of bail — restrictive conditions that are found in some laws which require that before granting bail the prosecutor must be heard and a court should be satisfied that (i) the accused was not guilty of the offence, (ii) the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail (see here for more). The reasons behind striking down these parts of Section 45, as it had been explained earlier, was not because the court had any problem with the twin conditions, but only because the manner in which the PMLA applied the conditions was found to be arbitrary — it was based on the kind of scheduled offence allegations involved, and since the legislature had completely eroded any rationality in the scheme of the schedule this made application of Section 45, in turn, arbitrary. 

In 2018, Parliament sought to solve this problem by doing away with this classification based application of Section 45 altogether — now, it would apply to all cases under PMLA. This amendment to the law was challenged as unconstitutional. The Court disagreed. Firstly, it explained how nothing prevented a future legislature from remedying a defect identified in Section 45 by Nikesh Tarachand Shah. Secondly, it held that the manner in which Parliament had chosen to remedy this defect — by abandoning the classification altogether — was not unconstitutional as money laundering is exactly the kind of offence which warrants such restrictive bail conditions. At the same time, the Court noted that the twin conditions would not apply in cases of being granted bail for delays in investigation [Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.] or prosecution [Section 436A Cr.P.C.]  

Critiquing the Findings on Investigative Aspects 

Section 17 — The Tail Wags the Dog

Recall that the very definition of money laundering under the PMLA is intrinsically linked to a scheduled offence. It is that property which is derived or obtained by engaging in acts relating to scheduled offences which become proceeds of crime, which are the heart and soul of the PMLA. Seen from this perspective, a statutory limit on the agency concerned with money laundering to hold its hands till there was at least a suspicion of there having been a scheduled offence makes sense. At the same time, it also makes sense to not ask agencies to wait till that investigation is over to do something. This is the balance that was struck by Section 17, through a proviso which required an investigation into the scheduled offence to have begun before the Enforcement Directorate undertook searches etc.

The Court, in trusting legislative policy, has now approved a state of affairs where the tail shall wag the dog. It is justified, the Court tells us, to allow the Enforcement Directorate to proceed to ensure the system can be cleansed of money laundering. All that is rhetoric, not reasoning. No matter which you look at it, in the current scheme of things where the existence of a scheduled offence is necessary for the PMLA, letting the PMLA process begin even before anyone has alleged the commission of a scheduled offence does not stand to reason. In effect, it makes the judgment of the Directorate also determinative for deciding whether or not a scheduled offence might have been committed, which is nowhere within its mandate. Considering the plethora of scheduled offences that already exist, one can appreciate the perception that this provision allows the Enforcement Directorate to create money laundering allegations where there might not be any, for which police station will disagree with a letter from the 'very senior officers' telling them to register a case for commission of scheduled offences?

We can keep taking turns at it, but a square peg will not fit in a round hole. 

Non-Existent Safeguards?

Vijay Madanlal Choudhary extols the many safeguards present in the scheme of Sections 17 to 19 of the PMLA to consign worries about abuse of powers into the dustbin. The seniority of the empowered official is supposed to allay fears of misuse, as is the existence of a provision punishing vexatious exercise of power. None of this is new: the same logic was offered when coercive powers granted under other socio-economic laws were challenged in the past. What is, nevertheless, worthy of note is the uncritical, almost loving eye, with which the view is re-affirmed by the Court. The Petitioners made submissions about the biased nature of enforcement under the Act, the inherent limits of provisions punishing abuse of power — it would require internal sanction, which rarely comes — and the paltry rate of conviction to suggest that the threat of abuse and misuse was not mitigated by the purported safeguards. The Court did not so much as blink in the face of this criticism, and its suggestion of trusting the officials would certainly leave some corners bemused, as conservative a view as that may be. 

The Sui Generis Argument is Flawed

The idea that the PMLA is not a penal law but a sui generis law is central to much of the Court's reasoning in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary. This is the justification for holding it unnecessary to bring the PMLA at par with other penal statutes in terms of procedural safeguards conferred upon persons who may get entangled in the PMLA process. 

The previous post explored this argument from the perspective of how the civil and criminal machinery within the PMLA operated while comparing it with other laws. It argued, that the PMLA did not allow for its civil process to live independent of its criminal process; indeed, without a prosecution for the offence, the civil action would die a natural death sooner rather than later. So the idea that PMLA also deals with inquiries ending in civil consequences is a half-baked truth at best.

We need to return to that comparative perspective and now look at the PMLA together with the other kinds of socio-economic offences that have been passed over time, to assess the Court's reasoning when it comes to procedural safeguards regarding questioning persons. It is difficult to take stock of all such laws passed at the state and central levels, but it would suffice if we take note of some primary central ones — the Customs Act 1962 (preceded by the Sea Customs Act of 1878), the Companies Acts of 1956 and 2013, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 ["FERA"]. Vijay Madanlal Choudhary draws comparisons between the PMLA and these laws, for which the Supreme Court has repelled legal challenges in the past by holding that the questioning of persons under those laws is for an inquiry unlike criminal investigation, to hold that the PMLA ought to be treated similarly. 

This comparison is flawed, because while the Customs Act, or FERA, or even the Companies Act, allow officers to file a civil action for penalties at the end of an inquiry, there is no such option in the PMLA. So, in case of the former, the idea that powers to question people or even arrest them are not necessary linked to a future prosecution has at least some legs to stand on because that outcome is statutorily possible. Of course, this does not address the problem in deciding whether procedural safeguards that are relevant during an inquiry should apply basis how an inquiry ends, and whether Article 20(3) should not apply to questioning and Section 25 IEA should not apply in the cases where the inquiry does result in a criminal prosecution. For the PMLA, there is no such possibility; a standalone civil action cannot last beyond 180 + 365 days. What's more, the PMLA is linked to the fact of a crime, and thus any inquiry where persons accused of that prior offence are called, are already placed very differently from individuals suspected of customs duty evasion. 

The theoretical sophistry that the Court had been able to rely upon in the past with FERA or the Customs Act is simply not available to it when it comes to the PMLA, where without the criminal action nothing survives. Yet, somehow, this distinction has escaped the Court's attention, and it applied judgments decided in context of other laws.

The few grains that the Court does throw towards procedural safeguards, it fails to flesh out. Imagine that earlier judgments on Article 20(3) and statements to officers under socio-economic laws did not clearly say that an arrested person ought to be treated differently. Vijay Madanlal Choudhary does this much, at least, but in a rather half-hearted manner. Secondly, in refusing to share the ECIR with an arrested person, the Court finds that the clause requiring sharing grounds of arrest would do the job. It would have helped if the Court could stress upon the manner of sufficiency required in these grounds if it was treating them as a substitute for being supplied a copy of the ECIR itself. In practice, it is all too common for the agency to simply state that a person is arrested for committing a Section 3 PMLA offence, nothing more and nothing less. By fleshing out the nature of grounds, the Court could have prevented this from continuing. Now, it would fall upon the High Courts to, hopefully, breathe some life into this clause. 

A point, also, about Tofan Singh would be in order. The Court has held that the judgment was unique to the NDPS Act context and could not be extended to the PMLA. This is, undoubtedly, correct. As had been noted at the time, Tofan Singh was unlikely to provide any succour beyond the NDPS Act because of how the Court went about examining the issue then. Still, the manner in which Vijay Madanlal Choudhary suppresses the points of similarity between the NDPS Act and PMLA is rather striking. For instance, it is nowhere mentioned how the NDPS Act also has confiscation mechanisms in place, much like the PMLA.  

Assessing the Revival of Section 45 Twin Conditions

Nikesh Tarachand Shah, much like Tofan Singh, dealt with the form of a problem rather than its substance (both were authored by the same judge, incidentally). Here, that problem was the twin conditions of bail. 

The problem with Section 45, according to Nikesh Tarachand Shah, was that it imposed the restrictive bail conditions by creating an illogical classification between kinds of cases. It accepted that such conditions are legal and necessary where compelling state interests exist, but recognised that not every case of money laundering would be the same, and adopting a monetary threshold to gauge seriousness made sense. This logic of the threshold had been done away with, while at the same time multiplying the total number of scheduled offences manifold. This was a problem because the underlying offences were very different and since money laundering necessarily turned to the scheduled offence, the nature of that offence was not an altogether irrelevant factor for consideration.

Parliament's answer to this in the 2018 amendment was not to repair the classification, but to do away with it altogether. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, the Court correctly notes that its earlier judgment had pointed out an error with the form and not substance of the twin conditions, but it failed to identify exactly what that error was while upholding the legislative response to the perceived problem. In concluding that the legislature could remedy defects and restore the twin conditions to PMLA, Vijay Madanlal Choudhary is right. But here, the manner of resolving the defect was to completely undermine the logic of the judgment in Nikesh, which the Court chose not to appreciate. Instead, the Court endorsed, whole-heartedly, the abandoning of a classification-based approach and the application of twin conditions to all PMLA cases. For, we are reminded again, money laundering is a very serious offence. 

There is an obvious problem with that assertion, though, because unlike other crimes, at a basic level money laundering derives its seriousness from the seriousness of the underlying scheduled offence and what kind of proceeds of crime were generated there. Yes, terrorists and drug cartels might engage in money laundering and should not get bail easily is a plausible view, but the law as it works today paints these persons with the same brush as any copyright or trademark violators who may 'derive or obtain' any property by way of their violation. Such petty offences are not rendering the financial foundations and the economic integrity of the country unstable, with all due respect. To contend that these are hypotheticals unworthy of attention because the Enforcement Directorate will not waste time on such cases is not a good enough response, because a court is required to deal with the law and not how an agency may or may not choose to enforce it in its wisdom. 

This is an odious conclusion, no matter which way we look at it.

Conclusions

There are many serious problems in how the Court has justified the refusal to treat the PMLA at par with other penal laws when it comes to procedural safeguards. Vijay Madanlal Choudhary has glossed over distinctions between contexts that are gaping chasms, acting under the illusion that these are minor cracks in the edifice of its immaculate reasoning. The conclusions, at many points, are starkly incorrect on law. 

At the outset of this series, it was observed that Vijay Madanlal Choudhary is a conservative decision, inasmuch as the Supreme Court has simply remained faithful to its inglorious past of taking away all semblance of safeguards to personal liberty and property when it comes to socio-economic offences. Restrictive bail conditions in independent India first came for the essential supplies law before they became famous for anti-terror laws; reverse burdens were held good in 1964 when it came to gold smuggling; the guarantee of Article 20(3) was held inapplicable till customs officials or those from the registrar of companies concluded their inquiry given the theoretical possibility that such inquiries might, till that stage, not end in prosecution. More recently, it was okay for the accused in the 2G Scam and Coal Block cases to be denied a right of appeal.

Over time, not many people have had a problem with this growing body of law developing right under our eyes, because these were confined to specific areas of activity. Even for those with left-leaning inclinations, such laws were in fact lauded because of the detrimental impact that white-collar criminals and smugglers posed to the country. 

What the PMLA does, is that it weaves together all the restrictive, rights-effacing clauses from this illustrious past in one fine blanket, and it then goes a step further. It is not restricted to just the smuggler or hoarder, but to practically anyone. It is not old wine in a new bottle, contrary to what the title might suggest. In its reach and deleterious impact on basic freedoms, the PMLA is truly a sui generis law unlike any other. The judgment in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary was an opportunity to trim it down to size and prevent it from becoming another MISA from the 1970s; instead, the Court has, for now, green-lit that very outcome.         

Monday, November 2, 2020

The Three Justices' Bench Decision in Tofan Singh

This past week, a Three Justices' Bench rendered its decision in the Tofan Singh reference [Crl. Appeal No. 152 of 2013, decided on 29.10.2020]. To recap, two questions had been placed before the Three Justices' Bench: 
  • Whether an officer of the central / state government investigating a case under the NDPS Act is a "police officer"? 
  • Whether statements recorded under Section 67(c) of the NDPS Act can be treated as confessional statements, regardless of whether the officer is a police officer?
By a 2-1 split [Banerjee, J. dissenting], the majority held that an officer of the central / state government empowered to investigate a case under the NDPS Act was a "police officer" for purposes of Section 25 and decisions that held to the contrary were overruled. The majority also held that statements under Section 67(c) of that Act could not be treated as confessional statements [Paras 154-55]. As this blog has considered the issues before the Court in Tofan Singh in considerable detail on earlier occasions, I am not recounting the arguments and jumping straightaway to discussing the opinions in this post.   

On Reading Section 67 Statements 
The majority took up the issue of Section 67 statements first [Paras 58 to 85]. This provision allows the officers empowered under Section 42 to record statements in connection with any "enquiry" under the NDPS Act. For the majority, this "enquiry" was different from an "investigation" conducted under Section 53 of the NDPS Act as well as an "inquiry" as it is defined in the Cr.P.C. Since an officer empowered under Section 42 had the ability to conduct all of the above, it meant that the scope of Section 67 had to be restricted to whatever the scope of this "enquiry" was. This "enquiry", according to the majority, referred to the process by which an officer arrived at a "reason to believe" that her powers of arrest / search / seizure under Section 42 had to be exercised in a case. As the majority strongly emphasised, a person's privacy is not something to be trifled with, and that is why the NDPS Act empowered officers to even record statements before exercising their powers of arrest or search and seizure. 

The majority also clarified that officers only empowered for the purposes of Section 42, but not under Section 53, could not investigate a case but only discharge the burden of Section 42, after which the case had to be handed over to a competent officer. Allowing officers to record statements under Section 67 beyond this stage would create an unseemly situation where they would not be bound by the restraints placed under the general law upon officers recording statements. Furthermore, allowing for confessions to be recorded under Section 67 would render Section 53-A of the NDPS Act entirely otiose. 
 
The dissent did not agree that the scope of Section 67 could be restricted thus, as it was of the opinion that officers empowered only under Section 42 but not Section 53 could continue to investigate a case. The neat distinction between "inquiry" and "enquiry" was made short shrift of by referring to cases where these two terms had been read as carrying the same meaning, which cast doubt on whether the majority was correctly reading legislative intent. Further, the dissent was not particularly perturbed by the issue of these statements not being governed by the legal restraints of the general law or about the impact this interpretation had on Section 53-A of the NDPS Act, as ultimately the statements would require to pass the rigours of a trial before they could become evidence of guilt. 

I must admit at having a chuckle when I read the "inquiry" versus "enquiry" discussion in the majority opinion as this had once formed the subject of an intense debate with a dear mentor. While we did not have access to "Lexico", which has been referred to by the majority, we did have Garner's Modern English Usage, which noted that the distinction between these words is not well-observed, especially in British English. A look across statutes and decisions in the context of various Indian laws would confirm that this is indeed how our legal system has also commonly treated the phrases, and not with the sharp distinction that the majority would have us work with. 

Thus, I find it difficult to agree with the majority's reasoning, where it hangs solely on this peg of "inquiry" versus "enquiry" to conclude that Section 67 is only empowering officers to record statements to decide whether or not there exist reasons to believe to arrest somebody. By no means does this take away from the seriousness of the issues that the majority identifies, i.e., the absence of safeguards governing recording of statements under the NDPS Act similar to those under Sections 161-164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, given the specious nature of this definitional conflict, a more legally sound alternative was to tackle this problem head on and give guidance on how Section 67 statements ought to be considered by lower courts. A good place to start could have been a clarification that Section 67 only applied to unsigned statements, as Section 53-A is a specific provision catering to signed statements, and this naturally reduced their veracity.

Section 53 Officers are Police Officers
This brings us to the other critical issue before the bench: Are government officers empowered to investigate cases under the NDPS Act under Section 53 "police officers"? It would be helpful to break up the components behind the majority opinion's logic for ease of understanding [Paras 86 to 154]:
  • The term police officer is not defined anywhere and must be given a broad view, coloured by the particular statutory context in which officers are invested with powers traditionally conferred upon police officers under the Criminal Procedure Code;
  • The reason behind restricting the admissibility of statements made before police officers was the acknowledgment of coercion involved in the investigative process by police officers to extract evidence from accused persons;
  • Where officers are conferred such powers under a "Penal Statute" and where the purpose behind this investiture of powers is primarily to enable them to discharge an investigative function, and this investigative function is not merely incidental towards the officer discharging other functions such as revenue collection etc., such officers should be seen as "police officers" 
  • The NDPS Act is clearly a "Penal Statute" and, therefore, officers empowered under Section 53 ought to be treated as police officers.
The correctness of this conclusion was buttressed for the majority by the unique statutory context of the NDPS Act. Not only was this context relied upon to conclude that it was a penal statute, but furthermore it was a unique legislation insofar as powers of investigation had been conferred under the same law to those officers who were registered as police officers under Police Acts as well as officers belonging to many other government agencies. Creating a difference in terms of the kind of material potentially available as evidence in cases which are simply dependent on the agency investigating the case would result in an outcome that is manifestly arbitrary and contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution. 

At the same time, the unique statutory context of the NDPS Act is what throws up a stumbling block for this argument in Section 36-A(1)(d), which states that a Special Court may take cognizance of offences on the basis of either a police report, or a complaint filed by officers of the central  / state government. Given that Constitution Bench judgments have held that whether the officer concerned filed a "police report" was critical towards determining whether the investigating officer was a "police officer", how did the majority still arrive at its conclusion? In a very wishy-washy way is my initial answer, as I am still unsure of what to make of the reasoning here. 

At first [Para 137], the majority opinion resembles a boxer flailing at the opponent, throwing many punches but failing to land any of them. It flags many points about why the NDPS process is different, but on its own merit, none of those points is good enough to dislodge the weight of binding precedent on this issue. Then, there is a practical argument [Para 140] about how treating these reports as complaints simplicter would preclude further investigations as that is a process reserved for police reports. Finally [Para 145], the opinion gets tired of beating around the bush and tells it like it is: Given the overarching penal context of this investigation, it should not matter what it is that the officer ends up filing, be it a police report or a complaint, to decide whether this person is a police officer. I guess the majority refrained from saying this too clearly because that might have had an impact on other statutory contexts.

The dissent did not agree with characterising the NDPS Act as a penal statute — even though it spent a fair bit of time extolling the seriousness of the drug menace and the need for stern penalties. At the same time, it held that even if the NDPS Act were to be treated as a penal statute, the existing Constitution Bench decisions on the subject had confirmed that the fact of whether or not the investigating officer has the power to file a police report is determinative for deciding if she is a police officer. When the majority concluded that Section 36A(1)(d) in no uncertain terms required Section 53 officers to file a complaint, it could not sidestep this factual finding and judicial propriety demanded that it follow binding precedent [Para 264].    

The Issue of Binding Precedent
Was the Tofan Singh majority bound by the Constitution Bench in Barkat Ram, then? I honestly think that this is an issue that deserves some serious scrutiny in light of how the majority opinion goes about arriving conclusions. The majority could have clarified the existing position and held that it was not necessary for the statutory text to specifically confer powers to file a police report as had been the case in the peculiar facts of Raja Ram Jaiswal and Section 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act. Or, the majority could have held that the terms of Section 53 of the NDPS Act meant an unrestricted conferral of police powers on such officers, which would mean that what they filed at the end of an investigation before the court would be deemed to be a police report. The majority did not clarify the holding in Raja Ram Jaiswal, and concluded that Section 53 officers did indeed file complaints, but then tried to very unconvincingly explain how the peculiar terms of Section 36A meant that the officers still had to be treated as police officers, given the context of the NDPS Act. 

Ultimately, whether we agree with the majority view depends on whether we agree with how the opinion reads Barkat Ram. If you agree with the majority, like I do, that Barkat Ram does not blindly ask us to look at whether or not an officer has specifically been conferred with a power to file a police report but instead it asks us to carefully consider the entirety of the statutory context, then it is difficult to argue that the majority view is per incuriam. The problem is that the holding in Barkat Ram is easily capable of being oversimplified as prescribing a "chargesheet test" to decide who is a police officer. This is something that many prior decisions have done, and the dissent also seems to advocate a similar approach. 

It is quite possible that a different bench in the future might agree with this approach to reading the holding in Barkat Ram and disagree with the majority in Tofan Singh. That would presumably throw the doors open to re-litigating the issue before a Constitution Bench. An indirect way in which the correctness of the majority in Tofan Singh might come into question later on is if, based on the strength of this opinion, a bench of the Supreme Court is convinced that the previous holdings of High Courts in some other statutory contexts - such as, say, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act - need reconsideration. 

Conclusions - The End of An Era
When the news broke that the Tofan Singh reference had been decided, someone messaged on a lawyers' group that it marked the end of an era. It certainly would have felt like that for a number of litigants who have litigation pending on the basis of this reference which has taken seven years to reach its end. As it had been predicted by many persons during that seven-year wait (including this Blog), the conclusions in Tofan Singh are unique to its statutory context. At the same time, the majority opinion has offered some hints to build an argument for other statutory contexts in the future as well, though I genuinely wonder if any other existing statute has a similar framework and is anywhere nearly as draconian as the NDPS Act.     

As an aside, a mention must be made about the length of the opinions: their combined length runs into more than three hundred pages. In an age when we talk about the need for law and judicial decisions to be more accessible, it is unfortunate that the Bench chose to replicate copious extracts of past decisions. Not only does this make the opinions difficult to read, but it contributes to repetition between opinions, on occasion, and reduction in the clarity of reasoning that is offered for the different sets of conclusions.

Monday, August 17, 2020

The Tofan Singh Reference — Part 4: Summing Up

(This the fourth part of a multi-part series. Previous posts discussing Tofan Singh can be accessed here)

The 2013 judgment by Two Justices' in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2013) 16 SCC 31 ("Tofan Singh")] had referred two interlinked issues arising under the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 ("NDPS") to a bench of three Justices. No matter the importance of the issues — which, interestingly, even prompted a sitting Justice to plea for a speedy consideration of the reference at one point — the Tofan Singh reference lay in cold storage. Till January 2019, that is, which is when arguments appeared to have been concluded, but no judgment ever came. Fast-forward to August 2020, and a different Three Justices' Bench appears poised to consider — and hopefully decide — the issues in Tofan Singh.

To recap, the issues are:

  • Whether an officer of the central / state government investigating a case under the NDPS Act is a "police officer"?
  • Whether statements recorded under Section 67(c) of the NDPS Act can be treated as confessional statements, regardless of whether the officer is a police officer?   
Let's take up both of them, in turn, to flesh out what is at stake and what might be the key points to consider. 

Who is a "Police Officer"
Section 53 of the NDPS Act makes it possible to invest officers / classes of officers from the central or state government, "with the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station" as laid out under the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 ["Cr.P.C."]. Does this make these officers "police officers"? The Court has taken a look at this issue many times in the past, and different benches have ended up at different conclusions. Hence, the reference in Tofan Singh.    

Why does it matter whether these officers are treated as "police officers" formally? It is due to Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 ("IEA") which states that no confessions made to a "police officer" shall be proved against an accused. So, if these officers are police officers, then a confession recorded by them would be hit by the Section 25 prohibition and rendered useless as evidence. 

Provisions similar to Section 53 of the NDPS Act, and the issue of whether such empowered officers are "police officers", is something that the Supreme Court has considered in the past. Besides taking a hard look at all the previous instances where the Supreme Court specifically took up the Section 53 issue, it is likely that the arguments in Tofan Singh might turn to these more general decisions as well to help cull out the legal position. In this regard, the decisions in Raja Ram Jaiswal [AIR 1964 SC 828 (Three Justices' Bench)] and in Badku Joti Savant [AIR 1966 SC 1746 (Five Justices' Bench)] are likely to be critical. 

The so-called "Chargesheet Test" in Badku Joti Savant has proven critical on many a prior occasion when this issue of who is a police officer has come up. According to this view, an officer who is conferred with a power to file a Police Report (commonly referred to as a Chargesheet) is one who qualifies as a police officer for purposes of Section 25 IEA. A plain reading of Section 53 does not show that any express conferral of this power has been done. Rather, Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act suggests that the investigations by such officers should end with a Complaint and not a Police Report.   

In my opinion this approach is certainly plausible, but not desirable, as it ends up privileging form over substance both in terms of how we read precedent and the text of the NDPS Act itself. Let's start with precedent first. Badku Joti Savant did say that a police officer is one who can file a police report. But it did not advocate an approach that shuts its eyes to the specific statutory text in question. Rather, in Badku Joti Savant the Court paid very close attention to the specific text (Section 21 of the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944) to come to the unanimous verdict. Section 21(2) certainly said that the Excise Officer "may exercise the same powers and shall be subject to the same provisions as the officer-in-charge of a police station". But it began with a "For this purpose", thus indicating that the conferral of power was not absolute. For the Constitution Bench, this limitation proved critical (Notwithstanding that this purpose was to "inquire into the charge" against a person). For the Court, this made Section 21 obviously different from the provision in question before the bench in Raja Ram Jaiswal (Section 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Central Excise Act 1915), which did not have any such express limitations and thus correctly arrived at the conclusion that those officers under the Bihar and Orissa Act should be police officers. It bears mention that Section 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Act 1915 created a specific deeming fiction that the document filed at the end of an inquiry must be seen as a "Police Report". However, this was not the basis for deciding the issue in either Raja Ram Jaiswal, or noted at all by the Court in Badku Joti Savant 

Section 53 does not contain any such express deeming fiction which says that the document filed by the empowered officer is deemed to be a police report. At the same time, it also does not contain any limitation on the investiture of power of the kinds that troubled the Court in Badku Joti Savant. To consider such a limitation being implied by Section 36A(1)(d) is certainly possible, but arguably incorrect and unconstitutional. If Section 53 has invested certain officers / classes of officers with all powers of a regular police officer for investigating a case, without any qualifiers, then that deeming fiction should be taken to its logical conclusion and treat the two sets of officers as equal in substance. Using Section 36A(1)(d) to treat the two sets of officers as different, by allowing statements to one as being admissible but not the other, would ridicule the notion of equality and arbitrarily prejudice the set of defendants whose cases are investigated by Section 53 officers. Lastly, it is not at all necessary to read Section 36A(1)(d) as demanding complaints by empowered officers. Instead, this clause could be read as applying to all the other central / state government officers who are not empowered under Section 53.     

Section 67 Statements as Substantive Evidence
Section 67(c) of the NDPS Act is a specific provision that permits empowered officers to examine any person acquainted with the facts of a case. The second issue posed in Tofan Singh is whether such statements can be treated as substantive evidence at trial. This issue was seen as interlinked with the first one because, if the officer recording the statement is treated as a "police officer", then the prohibition of Section 25 IEA would apply to render such statements inadmissible. 

Well, not quite. This is because of Section 53-A of the NDPS Act, which is a special rule of relevancy for NDPS cases crafted for signed statements given to empowered officers. This clause leaves it open for the trial judge to accept such statements in evidence for the truth of their contents if the judge thinks it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice (where foundational requirements of the clause are met). In such cases, I would think that the issue of whether or not we treat the concerned officer as a "police officer" is rendered redundant, as the prohibition of Section 25 IEA is being lifted by this special law.

If this reading of the NDPS Act is correct, then the second issue in the Tofan Singh reference is largely reduced to an issue of unsigned statements under Section 67. If the officer recording the statement is treated as a police officer then, naturally, the general prohibition of Section 25 IEA would apply. But even if this is not the finding on the first issue, the Court in Tofan Singh might yet have something to say about using such statements as substantive evidence. This is because of how Section 67 of the NDPS Act is worded. Compared with what are touted as similar provisions in other laws permitting statements to come in as substantive evidence — say, Section 108 of the Customs Act, Section 50 of the PMLA, or even Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. — the statement under Section 67 is (i) not given on oath, and (ii) is given without any warning / caution administered to the accused of the consequences. As a result, statements under Section 67 NDPS Act are arguably bereft of safeguards to ensure their reliability as well as voluntariness. Especially if one takes a moment to think about the fact that a lot of these statements are tendered by persons under arrest and in police custody. 

In light of this, should trial courts be permitted to consider such statements as substantive evidence and proof of guilt? If the Supreme Court does think that this is a problem, then there are a few options available to address it. Let's flesh out two of these: First, the Court could treat unsigned Section 67 statements the same as those given under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., and only allow them to be used for purposes of contradicting a witness during trial. Or, Second, it could perhaps push for a rule of prudence (similar to that governing accomplice evidence) which requires that trial courts may consider the Section 67 statements only where the prosecution can offer corroboration of material particulars. 

Conclusions
Until the text of Section 25 IEA is changed, the issue of who is a "police officer" will remain a critical one in all contexts. The reference in Tofan Singh should, hopefully, put to bed the confusion that has reigned on this point in the context of the NDPS Act — a confusion that was identified way back in 2013. However, the very specific contours of Tofan Singh and the NDPS Act would suggest that any conclusions that the Supreme Court arrives at are not going to affect the broader landscape, and the "Chargesheet Test" of Badku Joti Savant will probably remain the general statement of law. Unless, of course, the Court clarifies this position of law in a way that has a wider impact. One such way could be to perhaps set the record straight upon just what kind of statutory deeming fiction is required to treat other empowered officers as police officers. Whichever way the Court decides on this issue in Tofan Singh is bound to have an effect on the second issue placed before it—the scope of which is arguably limited by Section 53-A of the NDPS Act itself. However, it would be wrong to think that there is nothing more to be said on the evidentiary status of Section 67 NDPS Act statements. These statements leave a lot wanting on the twin prongs of reliability and voluntariness that Indian evidence law insists upon when dealing with witness testimony. The Court hopefully engages with these limitations while arriving at whatever conclusions it considers appropriate. 

Saturday, August 15, 2020

The Tofan Singh Reference — Part 3: Statements under Section 67 NDPS Act

(This is part three of a multi-part series. Previous parts can be accessed here, and here)

The previous two posts in this series have discussed the facts in Tofan Singh, the relevant statutory provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 [NDPS] and the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 [Cr.P.C.], and also the first proper issue posed in the reference: Whether officers of the central and / or state government investigating cases under the NDPS Act ought to be seen as "police officers" for purposes of the prohibition under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [IEA].

This post takes up the second proper issue posed in the reference: Whether the statement recorded under Section 67(c) of the NDPS Act by the central / state government officer "can be treated as a confessional statement or not, even if the officer is not treated as a police officer". 

The Arguments Before the Division Bench in Tofan Singh

The 2013 judgment acknowledges that the two questions are interlinked, but even so, it referred the second question because there were extensive arguments raised at the bar, and its summation (as captured in the judgment) is extracted below:

"Pitching this argument to the next level, it was submitted that the power under Section 67(c) of the Act is merely a power to examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. Such statements are not required in law to be truthful as provided under Section 161(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which required the person making statement to a police officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to make a true statement. Even such a statement made under Section 161 Cr. P.C. is not a substantive evidence on which a conviction can be based. Statements under Section 67 are not required in law to be given truthfully and hence cannot in any case be treated to be a substantive evidence. Further statement under Section 67 are not recorded after administration of oath as is required under Section 164(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the officers are not competent to administer oaths and, therefore, the statements under Section 67 cannot be substantive evidence for recording conviction."

And later on, while framing the reference questions, the Court noted that: 

"As far as this second related issue is concerned we would also like to point out that Mr. Jain argued that provisions of Section 67 of the Act cannot be interpreted in the manner in which the provisions of Section 108 of the Customs Act or Section 14 of the Excise Act had been interpreted by number of judgments and there is a qualitative difference between the two sets of provisions. In so far as Section 108 of the Customs Act is concerned, it gives power to the custom officer to summon persons “to give evidence” and produce documents. Identical power is conferred upon the Central Excise Officer under Section 14 of the Act. However, the wording to Section 67 of the NDPS Act is altogether different. This difference has been pointed out by Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Shahid Khan vs. Director of Revenue Intelligence; 2001 (Criminal Law Journal) 3183."

Making Sense of the Reference Question 

Reading the argument, it seems that it was pitched slightly differently than how it was framed by the Court. Rather than consider whether a Section 67(c) statement can be "confessional statement", the argument seems to have been that a Section 67(c) statement cannot be considered as substantive evidence. 

The framing of the Court is a bit problematic, largely since there is nothing defined as a "confessional statement" in Indian law, and determining whether a statement is a confession is a very fact specific exercise guided by legal tests. Therefore, I do not follow that framing, and instead engage with the argument that a statement made / recorded under Section 67(c), NDPS Act cannot carry weight as substantive evidence. At best, it must be treated just like a regular statement before a police officer given under Section 161 Cr.P.C., which cannot be used as proof at trial and can only be used for contradicting a witness who takes the stand.

The primary basis for the argument lies in the relative absence of safeguards under Section 67 as a process — both to ensure reliability of the statement as well as to ensure voluntariness. For example, the only kind of statements recorded during an investigation under the Cr.P.C. which can be treated as substantive evidence are those made on oath before magistrates, who are duty-bound to caution the person giving a statement that it could be used against her. Section 67(c), on the other hand, simply says that the officer may "examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case" without prescribing any procedure to ensure the reliability and voluntariness of the resulting statement.

Signed v. Unsigned Statements, Section 53-A of the NDPS Act, and an Additional Question

The core logic of this argument might well be sound (I, frankly, agree with it). But a look at the NDPS Act suggests that the argument cannot be taken to its logical conclusion. Rather, I think we land up is a midway point: not all statements that are recorded under Section 67(c) ought to be considered as substantive evidence, but in some cases the statute itself suggests that this is possible and that there is no clear prohibition.

I say this because (as was raised in Part I) of Section 53-A of the NDPS Act, which was curiously missing in the 2013 judgment. Effectively, this provision has created a special rule of evidence for NDPS cases, overriding the general prohibitions under the Evidence Act, according to which any signed statement made to an empowered officer under Section 53 NDPS Act, becomes "relevant for the purpose of proving, in any prosecution for an offence under this Act, the truth of the facts which it contains". Note that unsigned statements made to such officers stand excluded from Section 53-A and their relevancy and admissibility will be subject to the rigours of general provisions such as Section 25 of the Evidence Act, and a finding on the first issue in the reference (whether the officer is a police officer or not).

Even when we have a signed statement — which, naturally, cannot be under any clause but Section 67 NDPS Act as there is an express bar on taking signed statements under Section 162 Cr.P.C. — Section 53-A cannot kick-in arbitrarily, but only if: (a) The maker of the statement is dead / kept away from the trial / cannot be found, or; (b) The maker of the statement is a witness and the trial judge thinks that, "having regard to the circumstances of the case, the statement should be admitted in evidence in the interests of justice." 

Thus, the NDPS Act itself denies any total prohibition on treating statements under Section 67 as substantive evidence. Where such statements are signed, Section 53-A, and the maker of the statement is a witness, then Section 53-A kicks in. Under this provision, it is the trial judge who has been made the final arbiter of whether it is necessary to consider the initial statement, for its truth, and arguably the counsel for an accused would have the opportunity to advance arguments to persuade a judge against doing so in any given case. It is not unimaginable that a judge gets persuaded by the concerns over reliability and  / or voluntariness that were ascribed to statements made under Section 67, NDPS Act.   

What about the unsigned statements? Whatever might be the finding on issue one, the reference in Tofan Singh could very well hold that such statements ought not to be treated as substantive evidence as a rule of prudence. Such rules of prudence are not uncommon in evidence law, and it is not at all impossible for the Court to hold that the inherent problems in the Section 67 statement — of reliability and voluntariness — require that it must be corroborated. Should the Court go ahead and do so, I would think that it would not affect the playing field beyond the limited confines of the NDPS Act. Unless, of course, the Court thinks that statements to any government officer, notwithstanding the existence of statutory safeguards, is a piece of evidence that must be treated with a degree suspicion considering the natural imbalance of power between the parties, and therefore requires necessary corroboration of material particulars.  

Conclusion

Unless the Supreme Court strikes down Section 53-A of the NDPS Act on grounds of unconstitutionality — which, at least under the terms of reference, is an option not on the table — then the second issue of Tofan Singh must be understood as having been qualified by the terms of the NDPS Act itself. 

The issue of whether statements given under Section 67, NDPS Act can be treated as substantive evidence (such as confessions) in NDPS Act cases is one that the statute has already addressed, telling us that it is possible to do so if the trial judge considers that the statement must be read for the truth of its contents in the interests of justice (assuming all the foundational requirements were met). 

However, for the statements which fall outside of this bracket — such as unsigned statements, or statements made to officers but not being used in the NDPS Act case itself — the special evidentiary rule would not apply, and we end up back with the uncertainty about whether or not the officer in question is a "police officer". Even if the Court does not conclude that these officers are police officers, it still leaves the possibility of creating rules of prudence requiring that unsigned statements must be corroborated in material particulars and not be considered as substantive evidence on their own merit. Whether the Court ends up arriving at these conclusions only for statements under Section 67, or more generally, will be something to wait and see. 

The next, and final, post in the series rounds up the discussion. 

Thursday, August 13, 2020

The Tofan Singh Reference — Part 2: NDPS Investigating Officers are Police Officers?

(This post has been co-authored with Shashwat Bhutani and Rishabh Narain Singh)

This blog has introduced the scope of the reference in Tofan Singh and the statutory context of the NDPS Act. Which means that we can straightaway jump in to discuss the first question: Whether an officer who investigates a case under the NDPS Act is a "police officer", for purposes of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This provision, readers may recall, is the statutory prohibition upon using confessions against accused persons at trial. Essentially, then, if the officer investigating an NDPS case is a "police officer", then any confessions / statements made to her would be rendered useless from a trial perspective. 
 
This post will tease out the legal position that led to the Tofan Singh reference, and then argue for what the authors think is the correct approach to follow. 

Revisiting the Classics and "Officer in-Charge of a Police Station".
It might come as a surprise that there is no controlling definition of the phrase "police officer" in Indian law, especially considering the significance of the evidentiary bar mentioned above. But, alas, such is the case. However, courts have filled in this gap, and today it would seem that there is a fairly settled test to decide who can be called a "police officer".

Rather than adopt a "functional" approach, of the kinds on display in, say, the Three Justices' Bench decision in State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram [AIR 1962 SC 276] [whether Customs Officers under the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and / or Land Customs Act 1924, are “police officers” within the meaning of Section 25, and finding that they are not], and Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 828] [Officer under the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act 1915 is a "police officer"] both of which looked at the purpose for investing officers with coercive powers, the Supreme Court quickly turned towards endorsing a more formulaic approach. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore [AIR 1966 SC 1746], was concerned with whether an officer under the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944 would be a "police officer". The Court proferred a simple test to resolve the matter: a police officer is one who can file a police report / chargesheet; if not, then you aren't dealing with a police officer. This decision by Five Justices continues to control the field, and has been followed by subsequent benches (including Constitution Benches), in cases such as Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal [AIR 1970 SC 940] and Illias v. Collector of Customs, Madras [AIR 1970 SC 1065]. 

Rather than belabouring the point about this "Chargesheet Test", let us instead turn our gaze upon what lay behind those conclusions arrived at in Badku Joti Savant. In that case, provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act were in issue, and the investigative / coercive powers of a Central Excise Officer were being considered. Section 19 dictated that any person arrested under the Act had to be forwarded forthwith to a Magistrate or an officer in-charge of the nearest police station. Together with this went Section 21, which said that:

"(1) When any person is forwarded under section 19 to a Central Excise Officer empowered to send persons so arrested to a Magistrate, the Central Excise Officer shall proceed to inquire into the charge against him. 
(2) For this purpose the Central Excise Officer may exercise the same powers and shall be subject to the same provisions as the officer-in-charge of a police-station may exercise and is subject to under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), when investigating a cognizable case: ..." [Emphasis Supplied]

For a limited purpose, then, a Central Excise Officer was conferred the same powers as the officer in-charge of a police station. This deeming fiction was used as the prong to argue that the Officer had to be treated as a police officer. And, as we know, the Court in Badku Joti Savant disagreed with this claim. It held that the power under Section 21 was limited [21(2) starts with "For this purpose"], and did not confer all powers of a police officer upon the Excise Officer, and in this context made its observations about the Act not conferring powers of filing the report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. 

Towards this end, the Court also repeatedly distinguished these facts from those before it in Raja Ram Jaiswal, which was referred to above. The Court noted in Badku Joti Savant, that "In any case unlike the provisions of s.78(3) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915, s. 21(2) of the [1944 Act] does not say that the Central Excise Officer shall be deemed to be an officer-in-charge of a police station and the area under his charge shall be deemed to be a police station. All that s.21 does is to give him certain powers to aid him in his enquiry. [Emphasis supplied]" Thus, the Court implied that the findings in Raja Ram Jaiswal were correct, due to that statutory context. Let's therefore take a look at the kind of clause which the Supreme Court held could deem other officers to be police officers, even for purposes of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. 

"(1) Any Collector, or any Excise Officer empowered under section 77, sub-section (2), may after recording in writing his reason for suspecting the commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate, exercise — 
(a) any of the powers conferred upon a Police Officer making an investigation, or upon an officer in charge of a police-station, by sections 160 to 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), and 
... 
(3) For the purposes of section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) the area to which an Excise Officer empowered under section 77, sub-section (2), is appointed shall be deemed to be a police-station, and such officer shall be deemed to be the officer in charge of such station. 
(4) As soon as an investigation by a Collector or by an Excise Officer empowered under section 77, sub-section (2), has been completed, if it appears that there is sufficient evidence to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, the investigating officer, unless he proceeds under sub-section (2) of this section or under section 68 of this Act, shall submit a report which shall, for the purposes of section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) be deemed to be a Police-report to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to inquire into or try the case and empowered to take cognizance of offences on Police-reports." [Emphasis supplied]

The Court in Badku Joti Savant referred explicitly to Section 78(3) to distinguish this statute from the 1944 Act, to suggest that there were no limits placed upon the deeming fiction created under Section 78. At the same time, the Court surprisingly did not refer to Section 78(4) and its very specific terms about deeming the report to be a police report, which is what it seemingly took inspiration from in its ultimate holding. 

The NDPS Act Cases
The NDPS Act came in 1985, many years after the Chargesheet test in Badku Joti Savant. We have seen the statutory context of the NDPS Act in detail in the previous post — powers to investigate offences may also be conferred upon special officers under Section 53, and these officers may be conferred with powers equivalent to that of an officer-in-charge of a police station to hold the investigation. 

The question of whether an Investigating officer empowered under Section 53, is a police officer or not came before the Supreme Court for the first time in the case of Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India [AIR 1991 SC 45] [Case investigated by an officer of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence empowered under Section 25]. The Court held that the legislature has drawn a distinction in the manner of initiating a case by a police officer and by an officer of central or state government, by virtue of Section 36-A (1)(d) of the Act. According to the Court, Section 36-A (1)(d), allows officers of the central or state government to only file a complaint. On the other hand, a police officer would file a charge-sheet to initiate such proceeding. Thus, these empowered officers of central or state government were not police officers as they do not fulfil the criteria laid down in Badku Joti Savant. 

Raj Kumar Karwal was also followed by the Court in the case of Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India [(2008) 4 SCC 668]. However, in Noor Aga v. State of Punjab [2008 (9) SCALE 681] a Division Bench of the Supreme Court digressed from these earlier decisions. It stated that Section 53 of the Act empowers the customs officers with the powers of the Station House Officers and officers invested with these powers by reason of a special statute in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 53, should be considered as police officers. However, soon after this, in Ram Singh v. Central Bureau of Narcotics [(2011) 11 SCC 347] the Court went back to the position in Raj Kumar Karwal and stated that Section 53 alone would not be sufficient to hold such officers as police officers as it does not confer the power of filing a charge sheet. However, the pendulum swung back again, when in Nirmal Singh Pehlwan v. Inspector, Customs [(2011) 12 SCC 298] as the bench in this case doubted the correctness of the holding in Kanhaiyalal and that line of judgments.

The result of all this confusion? A reference in Tofan Singh.

Why S. 53 Officers Must be Treated as "Police Officers"
The dichotomy within Section 36-A(1)(d), where it refers to both complaints and police reports, is what has led previous decisions to conclude that the officers of the central / state government which might be empowered under Section 53 are those who can only file a complaint. This, in our view, is an incorrect conclusion to draw.

The officers appointed under Section 53 fall within a larger subset of officers, as mentioned under Sections 5 & 7 of the Act. Section 5 defines the “officers of Central Government” and empowers the Central Government to appoint the Narcotics Commissioner as well as other officers for the purposes of this Act. Similarly, Section 7 defines the “officers of State Government” and empowers the state governments to appoint officers to carry out the purposes of the Act. The definitions given under both the sections are general and inclusive as they do not define which officers and of what designation will be appointed. 

Basically, the sensible way to read Section 36-A(1)(d) is this: while officers who are not empowered under Section 53 end up filing complaints, the report filed by empowered officers — who have been conferred with powers of an officer in-charge of a police station — should be seen as as a Police Report to give full effect to the deeming fiction created under Section 53. Not only does this degree of nuance help maintain the dichotomy under Section 36-A(1)(d), it also keeps the law in line with the tests laid out in the earlier Supreme Court decisions that we discussed above. If we look at the language of Section 53, it is not at all like that found in Section 21 of the Central Excises and Salt Act of 1944 inasmuch as there is no express limitation conferred upon the conferral of powers. Instead, Section 53 looks a lot more like Section 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Act of 1955. 

Such a reading also saves the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act from being assailed on an arbitrariness challenge. After all, if Section 53 makes empowered officers coequal in terms of their powers with regular police officers for all intents and purposes, and this was the legislative intent behind the provision, it is clearly arbitrary to render these officers exempt from the limitations on their powers that exist in law. If that were the purpose, the NDPS Act would very well have created clear deviations, as it has on so many other aspects by say enhancing powers of search and seizure under Section 42. More importantly, the NDPS Act already has created a statutory mechanism to override Section 25, and it does not rely upon an interpretation of the phrase "police officer" but instead involves a judicial determination about the interests served by admitting statements made to empowered officers. If the legislature had sought to simply remove the so-called shackles of Section 25, it would not have gone through all this trouble.

Conclusion
After thoroughly conducting an investigation, there are only two possible routes to initiate a case under an NDPS Act: upon the perusal of a “police report” or upon filing a “complaint”. Therefore at present, only a police officer can initiate a case by following the chargesheet-route, as other investigating officers do not have this power. If other officers have to initiate a case, they have no other alternative, but to follow the “complaint case route” because they cannot file a chargesheet. This conundrum can be easily be solved by reading Sections 36-A (1) (d) and 53 together. These two provisions will prove to be the decisive arrows in the statutory quiver if they are given a conjoint reading, as it will pave the way for the empowered officers to adopt the chargesheet route in order to initiate a case. 

Whatever might be our views about the "Chargesheet Test" laid down in Badku Joti Savant, a close reading of that decision shows how the Supreme Court did not advocate an entirely simplistic approach but still implored a careful reading of the statutory context involved in each case. In the case of the NDPS Act, Section 53 shows that the conferral of police powers upon other government officers is not limited by a specific purpose, and therefore the deeming fiction demands being given fullest effect to. We have also argued that such a reading is harmonious with the legislative intent behind the NDPS Act, and that any other reading would arguably be unconstitutional on arbitrariness grounds.